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Prices referenced are lagged to ₹185, as of mid-June 2026.
1. At a Glance
NCL Industries swung from a ₹25.38 Cr net profit in FY25 to ₹95.29 Cr in FY26—a 276% jump.
That bounce matters. So does what caused it: the numbers came partly from cleaner operations (cement and boards stayed competitive) and partly from a very messy decision: the company discontinued its Doors division and booked a ₹25.75 Cr impairment. The Board called it a move to “improve overall performance.”
Revenue fell 21% year-over-year (₹1,799 Cr to ₹1,422 Cr), but margins expanded. Operating profit margin climbed to 13.4% from 6.3%. That tension—less volume, fatter margins, one fewer division—is the story.
Market cap sits at ₹837 Cr. The P/E is 6.38x on trailing reported earnings.
2. Introduction
NCL Industries was born in 1979 as a building-materials house. Forty-seven years in, the company manufactures cement, ready-mix concrete (RMC), cement particle boards (Bison Panels), hydropower, and until now, prefab doors. Headquarters in Secunderabad. Listed on NSE and BSE.
The Kalidindi family and related entities control 41.6% (down from 47% in June 2023—a drift, not a collapse). Ravi Kalidindi holds 6.84% personally. The family took a tangible step in December 2025: K. Ravi was appointed Vice Chairman & Managing Director, replacing the prior arrangement. Gautam and Roopa Kalidindi stepped down from executive roles.
The company is an established player in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, with 2,000+ dealers and a captive limestone mine feeding the cement plant.
One recent move: a new 0.66 MTPA cement grinding unit went live at Thallapalem (near Visakhapatnam) in November 2025, pushing total cement capacity from 3.30 MTPA to 4.00 MTPA.
3. Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
Cement dominates. FY26 saw cement sales of ₹1,500 Cr (106% of total revenue, after adjusting for inter-segment transfers). Volume sold: 2.71 Bn MT, down 6% from 2.89 Bn MT in FY25. Pricing pressure in the South is real; so is the company’s dealer network.
Boards earn steady money. Bison Panels—cement-bonded particle boards made under German technical tie-up (BISON WERKE)—sold ₹163 Cr worth in FY26. Prefab construction, airports, housing, infrastructure. Margins here are thicker than cement.
RMC is small but sticky. ₹131 Cr in FY26 from ready-mix concrete. Ten plants, transit mixers, captive clients. Not a growth engine, but a moat: customers prefer one-stop delivery.
Doors were a bet that lost. Prefab doors (Natura, Soft Touch, Signature, Fire Rated) sold ₹49 Cr in FY25. By FY26, after the discontinuation decision, the division collapsed into discontinued operations. The Board recognized a ₹25.75 Cr impairment. The message was clear: execution fell short. Operational and commercial challenges.
Energy is footnote. Two mini-hydel projects (15.75 MW capacity) supplied ₹7.36 Cr worth of power in FY26. Renewable, low margin, but keeps grid obligations and some costs inside.
Put it together: cement is the bread, boards the butter, RMC the steady drizzle, energy the tax break, and doors, well—the Board bid them farewell.
4. Financials Overview
Figures are consolidated, in ₹ crore.
Result Type: Annual. Basis: Consolidated. Latest Period: FY26 (Mar 2026).
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 1,422.08 | 1,798.97 | -21% |
| EBITDA | 190.26 | 99.20 | +92% |
| PAT (Continuing Ops) | 123.66 | 34.24 | +261% |
| PAT (Total, incl. Discontinued) | 95.29 | 25.38 | +276% |
| EPS (Reported, continuing) | ₹27.87 | ₹7.52 | +271% |
| EPS (Total, incl. discontinued) | ₹21.50 | ₹5.56 | +287% |
The margin story flips the volume story. Revenue dropped 21% but net profit from continuing operations jumped 261%. Operating margin went from 6.3% (FY25) to 13.4% (FY26). The company did less business but kept more of what it did. The doors impairment (a one-time charge, not an operating loss) landed in exceptional items (₹9.77 Cr on consolidated, ₹9.77 Cr on standalone). Strip out discontinued ops and the ₹25.75 Cr impairment, and the core cement-boards-RMC business was pulling decent leverage.
Board meeting held 29 May 2026 approved a 35% total dividend for FY26 (₹1.50 per share paid as interim in March, ₹2.00 per share final). That’s a 23.8% payout on net profit (before discontinued ops). Healthy signalling.
5. Market Expectations & Historical Multiples
This section describes how the market is currently pricing the company and how that compares with its own history and peer group. It is descriptive, not predictive.
| Metric | Current | Historical Avg (5 yrs) | Peer Median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E (Reported) | 6.38x | 9.2x | 28.45x |
| EV/EBITDA | 4.81x | 7.5x | N/A |
| P/B | 0.88x | 0.92x | N/A |
| ROE | 14.5% | 9.8% | N/A |
| ROCE | 14.5% | 14.0% | 7.06% |
The market currently pays 6.38x reported earnings here, well below its own 5-year average (9.2x) and a fraction of the cement-sector median (28.45x). The discount reflects: (a) revenue decline and operational stress through FY25, (b) the doors catastrophe, (c) smaller scale than peers, and (d) likely a wait-and-see posture toward management’s new direction under Ravi Kalidindi.
The company’s ROCE at 14.5% sits ahead of the sector median (7.06%) and stable vs. its own 5-year average (14.0%), signalling that capital allocation has historically earned its cost. The ROE of 14.5% (last year, 9.79% over 3 years) shows recent improvement.
The P/B ratio of 0.88x means the market values the company at 12% below book. The balance sheet carries ₹901 Cr in reserves and ₹239 Cr in borrowings—net cash of ~₹66 Cr after accounting for current liabilities.
The data reflects: the market is pricing in caution, not conviction. No imminent recovery narrative is priced in.
6. What’s Cooking
Capacity ramp: Thallapalem grinding unit (0.66 MTPA) commissioned Nov 2025. Total cement capacity now 4.00 MTPA. Expansion roadmap signals intent to grow the core.
Doors exit: ₹25.75 Cr impairment booked on discontinuation. The Board framed it as pruning to “improve overall performance.” Interpretation: the division burned cash and management chose to stop the bleeding rather than fight.
New MD: K. Ravi appointed Vice Chairman & MD in December 2025, five-year term, salary ₹13.75 Lakh/month + 2% commission. Prior execs (Gautam, Roopa) stepped back. A leadership reset.
Solar-wind bid: April 2026, Board approved Phase 1 of a 50 MW solar-wind project at Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu, budgeted at ₹392 Cr. Energy diversification or a bet on renewable energy upside? Unclear. Capex will tighten near-term cash.
Shareholding decay: Promoter holding fell from 47.27% (June 2023) to 41.56% (Mar 2026). Promoter group made off-market sales (SEBI disclosures: Nov 2025, June 2026). FII holding at 3.87%, DIIs at 0.20%, Public at 54.38%. The drift suggests the family is taking chips off the table, not reloading.
Rating: CARE Ratings holds the Fixed Deposit rating at BB+, Stable, but marked it “Issuer Not Cooperating” since Nov 2024. The company stopped providing monitoring data. CARE’s analysis (pre-non-cooperation) flagged: declining revenue, margins under stress, moderate gearing (0.29x in FY25, now cleaner post-Doors write-off). No upgrade signal.
7. Balance Sheet: Nothing to Hide, Everything to Prove
| Item | Mar 2026 | Mar 2025 | Mar 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | 1,588.32 | 1,648.47 | 1,541.98 |
| Equity (Cap + Reserves) | 946.24 | 864.38 | 854.46 |
| Borrowings | 239.48 | 252.47 | 218.00 |
| Other Liabilities | 402.60 | 531.62 | 469.52 |
Assets = Liabilities (✓ Standalone and Consolidated balance sheet reconciles).
Three bullets:
- The company shed ₹60 Cr in assets over the year, mostly from inventory normalization (₹100 Cr decline) and capex moderation (CWIP dropped from ₹148 Cr to ₹2.29 Cr). The Doors impairment sits here.
- Equity grew 9% year-over-year (₹864 Cr to ₹946 Cr), despite the impairment, thanks to profit retention. Debt fell ₹13 Cr; gearing sits at a relaxed 0.25x.
- Other Liabilities ballooned in FY25 (₹532 Cr) before normalizing in FY26 (₹403 Cr). Trade payables noise, likely related to shutdown of Doors operations and working-capital management.
Net cash position: ₹66 Cr (Reserves + Equity cap – Borrowings – Other Liabilities). Not fortress. Not dire. Enough to absorb a bad quarter or fund small M&A.
8. Cash Flow: Sab Number Game Hai
| Year | Operating | Investing | Financing |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY24 | ₹182.98 Cr | -₹64.15 Cr | -₹110.32 Cr |
| FY25 | ₹96.47 Cr | -₹111.13 Cr | -₹5.47 Cr |
| FY26 | ₹145.71 Cr | -₹107.66 Cr | -₹49.60 Cr |
Operating cash flow recovered 51% in FY26 (₹96 Cr → ₹146 Cr) despite lower profits, thanks to working-capital release (inventory down sharply after Doors write-off). Investing stayed flat (capex for the new grinding unit and Tuticorin solar prep). Financing was a net cash out: dividend paid (₹20.48 Cr), debt repayment, and interest.
The wisdom: The company can fund operations without liquidity stress. It’s not cash-generative at the level of large-cap cement peers (which spit out ₹500+ Cr annually), but it’s not a cash sink.
9. Ratios: Sexy or Stressy?
| Ratio | FY26 | What It Reveals |
|---|---|---|
| ROE | 14.5% | The equity base is working overtime. A 3-year low was 9.79%; this year bounced to 14.5%. Profitability recovery. |
| ROCE | 14.5% | Capital earns its cost and a margin above. Stable at the 5-year average (14.0%). The impairment on Doors means less capital deployed, same or higher return. |
| P/E | 6.38x | The market values the company at less than 0.7 of sector median. Pricing in distrust, not fundamentals. |
| PAT Margin | 6.7% (continuing ops, 8.6%) | Down vs. the boom years (FY21: 8.5%, FY22: 4.8%, FY23: 2.2%, FY24: 4.5%, FY25: 1.4%). FY26 recovered. |
| D/E | 0.25x | Debt is a quarter of equity. Conservative. Low refinancing risk. |
The ratios show a company that’s lean on leverage, earning its cost of capital, but unloved by the market. The jump in PAT margin (from 1.4% to 6.7% continuing) is real but arrived via cost cuts and the Doors exit, not sales growth. That’s a weakness to watch: the company is squeezing, not scaling.
10. P&L Breakdown: Show Me the Money
| Year | Revenue | EBITDA | PAT |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY24 | 2,104.03 | 209.35 | 94.20 |
| FY25 | 1,798.97 | 99.20 | 25.38 |
| FY26 | 1,422.08 | 190.26 | 95.29 |
Three years tell a story: FY24 was the peak (₹2,104 Cr revenue). FY25 was the collapse (volume dropped, margins compressed, net profit tumbled 73%). FY26 is the reset: less revenue (₹1,422 Cr, down another 21%), but EBITDA recovered almost to FY24 levels (₹190 Cr vs. ₹209 Cr), and net profit bounced back nearly to FY24 levels (₹95 Cr vs. ₹94 Cr), thanks to the Doors exit and operational tightening.
The trajectory reads: the company is contracting but not collapsing. It’s choosing to be smaller and profitable rather than large and bleeding.
11. Peer Comparison
| Peer | Revenue | PAT | P/E | ROCE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UltraTech Cement | 25,799 | 3,000 | 39.62x | 12.78% |
| Ambuja Cements | 10,915 | 1,857 | 21.04x | 5.61% |
| Shree Cement | 6,101 | 528 | 50.03x | 10.48% |
| Dalmia Bharat | 4,245 | 394 | 28.79x | 7.59% |
| ACC | 7,146 | 238 | 11.82x | 11.25% |
| NCL Industries | 399.63 (Q4) | 42.09 (Q4) | 6.38x | 14.49% |
NCL operates at 1/25th the scale of UltraTech (₹399 Cr quarterly revenue vs. ₹25,799 Cr). It trades at a 84% discount to the cement-sector P/E median (6.38x vs. 28.45x). Yet its ROCE at 14.49% beats UltraTech (12.78%) and most peers. The market is not rewarding that capital efficiency—likely because it’s paired with revenue stagnation and execution risk (Doors impairment, management change, capacity underutilization).
12. Miscellaneous: Shareholding & Promoters
| Holder | % (Mar 2026) |
|---|---|
| Promoters | 41.56% |
| FIIs | 3.87% |
| DIIs | 0.20% |
| Public | 54.38% |
The Kalidindi clan: Ravi Kalidindi 6.84%, Roopa Kalidindi 5.98%, Gautam Kalidindi 6.15%, K Gautam (related) 5.64%, Kalidindi Pooja 4.20%, Anuradha Kalidindi 3.31%, others in smaller slivers. NCL Holdings (A&S) Ltd (family vehicle) 0.66%. The family has been selling in tranches (SEBI disclosures Nov 2025, June 2026). That’s either portfolio rebalancing or confidence erosion—hard to tell. The transition to professional management (Ravi as MD, post-December 2025) suggests intent to preserve, not exit.
FIIs are subdued. Only 3.87%, down from 5.41% in June 2024. DIIs are footnote (0.20%). The stock is a domestic niche play—not on the foreign radar.
The roast: The Kalidindi family has built a working business in a tough sector, but the last five years have been chaotic. The Doors bet flopped. The revenue curve is down. And the family is trimming holdings while management fumbles through a transition. Confidence is not the word.
13. Corporate Governance: Angels or Devils?
Auditors: M. Bhaskara Rao & Co (Chartered Accountants, Hyderabad). Issued unmodified audit opinions on standalone and consolidated FY26 results. No red flags from the auditor’s chair.
Board and executives: The December 2025 reshuffle planted K. Ravi as Vice Chairman & MD (five years, ₹13.75 Lakh/month + 2% commission). Gautam and Roopa stepped down from executive roles. Two non-executive directors were appointed (postal ballot, Dec 2025–Jan 2026). The Board also faced NSE fines for late filings (₹54,280 in Feb 2026 for a 23-day delay) and another fine for committee reconstruction delays (₹3,39,840 proposed, later sought waiver). Sloppy housekeeping, not governance rot.
Pledges: Promoter pledges stood at 13.9% of promoter holding in Mar 2026. That’s a material pledge load (up from single digits historically). A sign of promoter liquidity squeeze or leverage? The data doesn’t clarify. Worth monitoring.
Related-party transactions: The annual report discloses related-party transactions (Tern Distilleries Ltd, Vishwamber Cements Ltd—subsidiaries). Nothing alarming.
Tax regime change: The company opted for the concessional tax regime under Section 115BAA in FY26 (20% corporate tax). That cut tax outflow and boosted net profit. A legitimate move, not a loophole.
Labor Codes: Management assessed that India’s new Labor Codes (notified Nov 2025) have immaterial impact on the company. Standard disclaimer.
14. Industry Roast & Macro Context
The cement sector is a pricing war with occasional truces. Capacity in southern India is bloated. Demand is there—roads, airports, housing—but it’s spotty, and pricing power is nil. NCL sells in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, where larger players (UltraTech, ACC, Ambuja) also hunt. Volume growth is structural (infrastructure spending), but margin compression is secular.
Ready-mix concrete is sticky but small. Bison Panels is a niche (prefab construction isn’t yet mainstream in India). Both are defensible, neither is a goldmine.
The 50 MW solar-wind project at Tuticorin (₹392 Cr Phase 1) is a bet on renewables upside and maybe on power sales margins—but it’s a cash drain for two-three years and adds capex risk.
The sector’s tailwind is infrastructure spending; the headwind is overcapacity, power costs, and limestone reserves depletion in some regions. NCL has mine access, which helps. But it’s also small, so every price war stings.
15. EduInvesting Verdict
SWOT
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| ROCE (14.5%) beats sector median (7.1%) and peer multiples. Disciplined capital allocation. | Revenue down 21% YoY. Declining volumes across cement segment. |
| Conservative leverage (D/E 0.25x, net cash positive). Dividend history intact. | Doors division collapsed; ₹25.75 Cr impairment. Execution misses. |
| Captive limestone mine + dealer network in AP/TG. Niche boards business (Bison) with margins. | FY25 nearly broke profitability; dependent on cost cuts, not growth. |
| New grinding unit (0.66 MTPA) commissioned. Capacity roadmap in place. | Management transition (Ravi as MD, Dec 2025) adds uncertainty. |
| Opportunities | Threats |
|---|---|
| Tuticorin solar-wind project (50 MW, ₹392 Cr) diversifies energy. Early bet on renewables. | Cement sector pricing wars, especially in southern India. |
| Continued government capex in AP/TG (roads, ports, housing). | Promoter shareholding declining (41.56% from 47%); confidence signal muted. |
| Bison Panels margins could expand if prefab construction picks up. | Refinancing risk if capex on Tuticorin project stalls or requires more capital. |
| Smaller scale could attract strategic acquirer (Bison IP + RMC assets). | Small float (₹837 Cr market cap) makes the stock illiquid and volatile. |
A company that has swapped size for solvency: revenue fell 21%, but net profit bounced 276% and the balance sheet cleaner. The market is pricing in distrust—P/E at 6.38x, P/B at 0.88x—because volume momentum is absent and the Doors disaster spooked confidence.
The central tension is unresolved: Is this a restructuring toward a leaner, profitable niche player? Or the slow fade of a mid-sized regional cement company? The new MD has a mandate to grow. The Tuticorin capex (₹392 Cr) signals ambition. But the promoters are stepping back. That contradiction—professional management tasked with growth, family winding down—is the equation the market is still working out.