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1. At a Glance
The company clocked ₹1,378 crore revenue in FY26, up 96% from ₹702 crore in FY25. The jump is real. Net profit climbed to ₹38 crore from ₹18 crore—a 111% jump. Earnings per share hit ₹17.27, versus ₹8.17 in FY25.
But the balance sheet tells a second story. Total debt jumped 71% to ₹313 crore from ₹183 crore. Working capital consumption accelerated. The P/E sits at 14.8x against a peer median of 20.28x, which sounds cheap until you ask why the company is borrowing so hard.
One tension: the operating margin sits at 5.3%, flat against history. The growth is turning volume into revenue faster than margins are improving.
2. Introduction
Shri Venkatesh Refineries (SVRL) was incorporated in 2003 and remained a private business until converting to public in December 2020. It migrated off the BSE SME platform to the mainboard in September 2025—a real corporate step.
The company refines edible oils (mainly soyabean and cottonseed) and trades in raw oils under brands Rich Soya, Rich Sun, Silver Gold, and Diamond Soya. The installed refining capacity is 54,000 TPA, with plans to double it (board-approved in August 2024). The network spans Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat through over 225 dealers and distributors.
Promoter Dinesh Ganapati Kabre and family hold 73.5% throughout FY26, with no pledging.
3. Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
SVRL is a refinery that buys raw oils (mainly from local Jalgaon farmers during season, supplemented by imports), refines them, packages them in cans and pouches, and sells to a dealer network. The company also trades wholesale edible oils—soya, sunflower, cottonseed, mustard, palm—to scale without owning that inventory.
The by-products (soya acid oil, soyabean sludge oil, fatty acids) are monetised as industrial feedstock. This mix—manufacturing-heavy but with a trading crutch—is why you see lumpy revenue and working-capital swings.
Distribution is dealer-heavy and location-specific. Maharashtra remains the heartland. The company has been upgrading: solar generation at the plant (650 KWH), newer warehouse capacity. But the model is still fundamentally local, not national.
Operating margins hover at 5%. That’s thin for a brand business, but unavoidable in edible oils where commodity pricing is regulated and competition includes unorganized refiners who don’t pay tax.
4. Financials Overview
Figures are consolidated, in ₹ crore.
| Metric | FY26 (Latest) | FY25 | YoY Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 1,378 | 702 | +96.3% |
| EBITDA | ~73 | ~36 | ~+103% |
| PAT | 38 | 18 | +111% |
| EPS | 17.27 | 8.17 | +111% |
The EBITDA calculation: Operating Profit (₹73 crore) + Depreciation (₹2.73 crore) ≈ ₹76 crore (EBITDA), because interest is post-EBITDA.
The half-year ended March 2026 (H2 FY26) saw PAT of ₹23.8 crore on revenue of ₹822 crore (the H2 is derived by subtracting H1 audited figures). The company reported a final dividend of ₹1 per share recommended for FY26 shareholder approval.
5. Market Expectations & Historical Multiples
This section describes how the market is currently pricing the company and how that compares with its own history and peer group. It is descriptive, not predictive.
| Metric | Current | Historical Average (5Y) | Peer Median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 14.76x | ~16x | 20.28x |
| EV/EBITDA | 11.7x | ~12x | N/A |
| ROE | 33.7% | 26.0% | ~18% |
| ROCE | 19.8% | ~18% | 12.27% |
The market currently pays 14.76x earnings here versus a peer median of 20.28x. That peer set includes Marico (60x), Patanjali Foods (23x), AWL Agri (24x), and Gokul Agro (18x)—a wide band. On ROE, the company sits at 33.7%, above its own 5-year average of 26% and most peers.
What is the market pricing in? Volume growth and capacity utilization, not margin expansion. The company has doubled capacity utilization in the last 5 years and is filing for further capacity additions. The trading business is cross-selling into the dealer network. The lower multiple likely reflects thin OPM, working-capital intensity, and commodity price exposure.
6. What’s Cooking
Capacity expansion approved. Board approved a 200 TPD capacity increase (August 2024), pending execution. The company operates 54,000 TPA currently and is building toward 108,000 TPA per internal roadmap.
Order book steady. The company didn’t disclose a forward order pipeline in recent filings, but dealer network expansion (148 → 225 stores) and regional reach deepening suggest consistent internal order flow.
Trading business gains traction. Non-manufacturing edible oils (soya, sunflower, cottonseed trading) contribute to revenue scale without capex, though at lower margins.
Working capital stress visible. Inventory jumped 61% YoY (₹37.4 crore vs ₹23.1 crore) to support the ₹96% revenue jump. Trade payables and short-term borrowings climbed in step.
Mainboard migration done. The company moved from BSE SME to BSE mainboard in September 2025, opening access to larger institutional investors. This is ceremonial but signals corporate progress.
Credit rating upgraded. Infomerics upgraded SVRL’s long-term bank facilities from IVR BBB- to IVR BBB (Stable) in June 2025, reflecting improved scale and debt coverage.
7. Balance Sheet
| Item | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | 587 | 334 | 237 |
| Net Worth | 132 | 96 | 76 |
| Borrowings | 313 | 183 | 124 |
| Other Liabilities | 142 | 56 | 33 |
Assets equal liabilities: 587 = 587 ✓
The balance sheet expanded because inventory grew sharply (inventory days jumped from 128 to 106—a confusing metric in the data—but absolute inventory jumped 61%). Trade receivables climbed from ₹16 crore to ₹49 crore (debtors days: 13 days). Capital work in progress moved from ₹12 crore to ₹25 crore, earmarking capex.
On the liability side, short-term borrowings jumped 95% to ₹213 crore from ₹108 crore. The company is rolling short-term debt to fund working capital, a refinery hall-mark. Long-term debt added ₹275 crore cumulatively.
Three bullet points:
- The debt pile is real. ₹313 crore against ₹132 crore net worth is a 2.4x debt-to-equity ratio. Not catastrophic for a capex-heavy business, but tight for a thin-margin one.
- Cash balance is skeletal. Cash and bank balances sit at ₹8 crore—barely a week of payables. The company is operationally tight.
- Working capital is the tail that wags the dog. The business converts 31 working capital days (debtors + inventory – payables), which for ₹1,378 crore revenue means ₹118 crore tied up. Every ₹100 crore revenue jump consumes ₹8–10 crore more cash.
Wisdom line: A balance sheet this leveraged survives on velocity, not comfort. Miss one quarter of demand and the working-capital machine jams.
8. Cash Flow: Sab Number Game Hai
| Year | Operating | Investing | Financing |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY26 | (70) | (36) | 109 |
| FY25 | 1 | (47) | 46 |
| FY24 | (28) | (5) | 37 |
Operating cash flow turned negative in FY26 (₹(70) crore), driven by a ₹142 crore surge in inventory and trade receivables against only ₹77 crore increase in payables. The company burnt cash to fund growth. It plugged the gap with ₹109 crore in net financing (borrowings up ₹130 crore net).
The company invested ₹36 crore in capex (capacity additions, CWIP), down from ₹47 crore in FY25. Capex is moderating relative to revenue, a sign of efficiency, or deferred spending.
Wisdom line: Free cash flow is negative and has been since FY24. The business is growth-funded by debt, not cash generation. That works until volume growth stalls.
9. Ratios: Sexy or Stressy?
| Ratio | Value |
|---|---|
| ROE | 33.7% |
| ROCE | 19.8% |
| P/E | 14.8x |
| OPM | 5.3% |
| D/E | 2.38x |
The ROE of 33.7% is high in absolute terms, but it’s inflated by leverage. The net worth base is small (₹132 crore) relative to profit (₹38 crore), so the ratio looks generous. Remove the debt assumption and the return would be lower.
ROCE of 19.8% is solid—the capital base (₹132 crore equity + ₹313 crore debt) generated ₹52 crore PBT + ₹3 crore interest, net of tax. The company earns 3.5% on its capital base, on a blended cost of ~7% (bank rates on ₹313 crore debt), so returns are adequate but not outsized.
OPM at 5.3% is thin and unchanged from FY25 (5.08%). The company is scaling revenue without leverage on margins. In commodity refining, that’s expected but limiting.
D/E at 2.38x is high. The company is leveraged 2.4 times. For perspective, median peer D/E is ~0.8x. This company is an outlier.
10. P&L Breakdown: Show Me the Money
| Year | Revenue | EBITDA | PAT |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY26 | 1,378 | 76 | 38 |
| FY25 | 702 | 36 | 18 |
| FY24 | 575 | 29 | 15 |
Revenue grew 96% in one year. EBITDA doubled. PAT more than doubled. The profit leverage is real because depreciation and interest are fixed-ish costs that don’t grow with volume. As volume jumped, fixed costs spread, lifting profit percent-wise.
But margins (EBITDA ÷ Revenue) sat at 5.5% in FY26 versus 5.1% in FY25—barely moved. So the growth is operational leverage from fixed costs, not pricing power or product mix improvement.
The company also took a ₹14 crore tax charge on ₹52 crore PBT (effective rate 27%), up from 26% in FY25. Marginal rate creep is minor but a watch.
11. Peer Comparison
| Company | Revenue | PAT | P/E |
|---|---|---|---|
| Marico | 3,333 | 408 | 60.0x |
| Patanjali Foods | 11,156 | 524 | 23.3x |
| AWL Agri | 21,465 | 293 | 24.0x |
| Gokul Agro | 6,200 | 119 | 18.4x |
| Shri Venkatesh | 822 (H1 FY26) | 24 | 14.8x |
All quarterly figures except SVRL (which is H2 annualized for ease). SVRL is the smallest by revenue, the least profitable by PAT margin (2.9% vs peers at 3–4%), and carries the lowest P/E. The company trades at a 30% discount to Gokul Agro (18x) and 60% discount to Patanjali Foods (23x).
Why? Size, scale, and profitability. Marico is a household FMCG brand. Patanjali Foods is diversified (rice, flour, ghee). Gokul Agro is a cooperative with a strong balance sheet. SVRL is single-product, single-region, leveraged, and thin-margin. The discount is justified.
12. Miscellaneous: Shareholding & Promoters
| Holder | % |
|---|---|
| Promoters | 73.5% |
| Public | 26.4% |
| DIIs | 0.05% |
No pledging of promoter shares. Promoter concentration is high at 73.5%, which locks in long-term control but also signals limited institutional confidence (DIIs at 0.05% is negligible). Public float is ₹149 crore out of ₹564 crore market cap, which is illiquid for larger trades.
Promoter bios: Dinesh Kabre (MD, 18.68%), Anil Kabre (18%), Prasad Kabre (15.66%), Shantanu Kabre (5.23%), plus spouses and children in smaller tranches. The Kabres have 40+ years in edible oil refining, per Infomerics. One director, Sushmita Swarup Lunkad, was appointed as independent director in March 2026 (post-IPO governance upgrade).
Small promoter roast: The Kabre family has stuck with this business for 23 years post-incorporation and took it public late (in its third decade), which is unusual. It suggests they either didn’t need capital markets (unlikely given the recent debt spike) or didn’t want institutional scrutiny. The mainboard migration in 2025 and recent independent director appointments are catch-up moves.
13. Corporate Governance: Angels or Devils?
Auditor: Joshi & Shah, Chartered Accountants (Firm Registration 144627W), issued an unmodified (clean) audit opinion on FY26 results. No qualifications, no red flags.
Board: The company appointed Mrs. Sushmita Swarup Lunkad and Mrs. Anisha Sheshnath Pandey as additional independent directors in March 2026—the same month as full-year close. This is defensive timing (companies often add IDs post-AGM when scrutiny isn’t fresh), but the appointments are made.
Related-party transactions: The company has material related-party ties—sales to Shri Balaji Oil Mills (₹100 crore cap), inter-corporate loans to Shrikrupa Ginners (₹64 crore cap), and sales to Sanjay Traders (₹30 crore cap). These weren’t flagged as breaches, but they are concentration risks.
Trading window closure: The company closed trading windows post-AGM (Mar 31–30 May 2026), as is standard.
No resignations, no tax demands, no pledging. The governance file is clean, if thin on depth.
14. Industry Roast & Macro Context
The edible oil industry in India is a commodity knife-fight. Margins are regulated under the Essential Commodities Act. Raw material prices (soya, cottonseed) swing on agro-climatic risks and global vegetable oil cycles. Unorganized competitors don’t remit GST or income tax, so organized players perpetually undercut on net cost.
The advantage of a brand like Rich Soya is distribution lock-in (dealers prefer to stock one brand heavily) and retail loyalty in Maharashtra. But moving that brand beyond Maharashtra is capital-intensive—new dealer networks, regional media, channel conflict with existing routes.
Imports of raw de-gummed oils are subject to tariff and geo-political risk (Russia, Ukraine, Indonesia). Price controls on retail edible oil, if tightened, directly compress refiner margins. The government has been conservative here recently, which helped.
The sector is also seeing consolidation by larger players (Marico, Patanjali) into edible oils, poaching distribution and crushing margins further. For a ₹564 crore market-cap regional player, this is David versus Goliath.
15. EduInvesting Verdict
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| Revenue doubled; profit tripled. Capacity utilization improving (95%+). Margins stable YoY. Dealer network expanding. | Margins at 5.3%, unchanged despite volume jump. Debt-to-equity 2.38x—among peers, this is high. Cash burn in FY26. |
| Credit rating upgraded (June 2025). Promoter ownership stable. Clean audit opinion. | Working capital consumes ₹8–10 crore per ₹100 crore revenue. Limited institutional ownership (DIIs 0.05%). No dividend buyback. |
| Opportunities | Threats |
|---|---|
| Capacity doubling (approved) can increase profit 30%+ at current margins. Mainboard migration attracts institutional inflows. Regional expansion (Gujarat, MP) untapped. | Commodity oil prices, import tariffs, Essential Commodities Act regulation. Marico, Patanjali squeezing regional margins. Agro-climatic risk on raw material. |
Central Tension:
The company has built a high-growth, high-leverage model. It scales revenue and profit by borrowing to fund inventory and receivables. That works as long as volumes grow and raw material costs stay stable. The moment volume flattens or input prices spike, the working-capital cycle reverses, and the company is left servicing debt on thinning margins.
Is ₹313 crore debt fixable? Yes—if the next two years deliver ₹75–80 crore PAT and the company de-levers. Is it a bet? Also yes.
The stock at 14.8x P/E is cheaper than peers, but the leverage is higher too. The risk-reward is balanced, not tilted.