iValue Infosolutions FY26: The Quiet Distributor That Keeps Refusing to Distribute Dividends

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1. At a Glance

iValue Infosolutions wrapped FY26 with ₹1,056 crore in consolidated revenue—a 14.4% bump year-on-year—and ₹102 crore in profit after tax, up 19.3% from FY25’s ₹85 crore. Sounds healthy until you ask: why is a company printing 25.1% ROCE sitting on ₹102 crore of undeployed cash and paying zero dividends?

The market prices the stock at 12.7x annualised earnings, against a peer median of 24.1x. The gap narrows if you fold in three things: a 9% gross margin distribution business working capital that balloons debtor days to 336 (yikes), and an outfit nine months into its public life still learning to walk. The quarter itself (Mar 2026) ran strong—₹273 crore in sales, 20% operating margin (seasonal gift)—but the full-year story hums with tension: rising profits, flat multiple, minimal shareholder rewards.

What’s cooking? A ₹5,800 crore pipeline, cloud adoption fueling “recurring revenue,” and cybersecurity staying non-discretionary for enterprises. The order book isn’t an order book—it’s a qualified-leads spreadsheet management hopes to convert at 30–35%. Margin pressure in Q1 FY26 from forex and component costs landed the full-year gross margin at 9.1%, but Q4’s 12.5% spike (year-end rebates and budget flushing) masks the meat.

Tension: Profits growing, scale stable, leverage benign. So why hasn’t the market woken up?

2. Introduction

iValue Infosolutions was born in 2008, went quiet, got PE money in FY20 from Creador (via Sundara Mauritius), and listed on BSE/NSE nine months ago (September 25, 2025) in an offer-for-sale. The stock opened, wobbled (high ₹340, low ₹189 in its first year), and now sits at ₹237—basically where it priced at listing. Insiders own 32.1%, down from 32.73% at last rebalance, so the PE exit is well underway.

The business is IT distribution—not boxes, management insists, but solutions. It sources 70% software and services alongside 30% hardware, bundles them into infrastructure, security, and cloud stacks, and sells through 804 system integrators to ₹2,877-odd enterprise customers. Repeat business runs 80.7% of revenue; renewal contracts alone hit 42.7%.

Recent moves: six new OEM partnerships added (total ecosystem now ~115 OEMs, with 50+ in cybersecurity); cloud (especially Google Cloud) getting a “key long-term growth driver” label; and expansion into SAARC tested, ASEAN on trial, Middle East paused (geopolitics). The company claims it pivoted from a pure-play distributor to an architect-led solutions aggregator, and the gross margins (9% vs 5–6% for box movers) suggest that’s half-true.

Two notable hiccups in the first nine months: NSE fined the company ₹10,000 (+ ₹1,800 GST) for a two-day RPT filing delay in November 2025. Board also flagged the same fine in early Feb 2026. Two resignations (Apr 2026) from the board—Sriram Srinivasan and Brijesh Shrivastava exited. Neither event triggered disclosure drama, but they’re bookmarks: the company is young in governance.

3. Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?

iValue sits between OEMs (Check Point, Splunk, Nutanix, Google Cloud, Hitachi) and system integrators—600+ local, 97 national, 37 global—who then sell to enterprises. The company calls itself a “multi-OEM solutions aggregator,” which is vendor-speak for “we stop customers from buying point products and we sell them an integrated stack.”

The stack breaks into five verticals:

Cybersecurity (~47% of FY25 revenue). End-to-end network, application, and data protection using best-of-breed tools. The company positions this as non-discretionary spend. That’s partly true: if you’re BFSI or Government (their top two verticals), a breach is not a reputational hiccup, it’s a career ender. So cybersecurity stays funded even in downturns. iValue’s play here: they architect the defense, demo it in their lab, then let the SI drive the deal. Margin? Negotiated per deal, but sticky once configured.

Information Lifecycle Management (~22%). Fancy term for “store, protect, and recover enterprise data without tanking compliance.” Keeps data from rotting in wrong places. This segment had a “weak patch”—management called it flat-ish to down in the latest quarter (ILM -20% YoY, Q4 FY26)—so not a growth jewel.

Data Center Infrastructure (~17%, but growing fast). Servers, storage, network kit for mission-critical and cloud environments. Management called this a “key growth accelerator”; Q4 showed +29% YoY. The pitch: enterprises need more compute for AI and cloud. iValue’s moat: they spec the stack, not just move boxes.

Application Lifecycle Management + Cloud (~14%). Build, deploy, optimize apps across hybrid clouds. Includes Google Cloud, which management framed as an annuity vector: consumption model, recurring billing, “high stickiness,” and downstream managed services. FY26 saw a ₹300 crore customer-commitment order book. Sequential volatility (+10% YoY, +80% QoQ in Q4) suggests deal lumpiness.

Managed Services & Technical Support. 24/7 monitoring, SOC/NOC, help desk. The glue that converts a hardware sale into a revenue stream.

End-customer concentration: BFSI is 40%, Government ~19%, ITES + Telecom ~20%, the rest (~21%) scattered across healthcare, auto, pharma. No single customer dominates. The business is genuinely diversified.

Why they’re not a typical distributor: A box distributor competes on price and logistics. iValue adds a Center of Excellence that demos integrations, works with the SI to architect the solution, and then handles OEM sourcing and deal-specific margin negotiation. In that model, iValue becomes “more indispensable”—their win rate climbs. In deals where the SI does the architecture and iValue is just supply, they compete like any other distributor: flat, thin, commoditised. Management admits both paths exist; they’re betting the architecture-heavy path grows.

Geography: 95% domestic, 5% exports. International offices in Singapore, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, UAE, Cambodia, Kenya—mostly footprints, not revenue engines yet.

The roast: Distribution is fundamentally working-capital-intensive (you float inventory and receivables). iValue is no exception. Debtor days hit 336 at year-end—literally 11+ months of receivables outstanding. Management claims it’s improving (down from 356 two years back), but that’s like losing weight by standing on one foot. The 9% gross margin is respectable for the mix, but it’s paper-thin for any operational hiccup.

4. Financials Overview

Figures are consolidated, in ₹ crore.

Full-Year FY26 (Consolidated):

• Revenue: ₹1,056 Cr (vs ₹923 Cr FY25, +14.4% YoY)
• EBITDA: ~₹134 Cr (est. 12.7% margin, via Operating Profit + D&A)
• PAT: ₹102 Cr (vs ₹85 Cr FY25, +19.3% YoY)
• EPS (full-year): ₹17.98 (vs ₹20.32 FY25; note: FY25 EPS distorted by capital restructuring; normalized FY26 PAT ~₹102.3 Cr per concall)

Key observations from the quarterly results (concall):

Management framed FY26 as “broad-based growth across all four technology segments.” Gross revenue (a metric that includes spends by SIs on subvendors) hit ₹2,439.4 crore, up 15.6% YoY from ₹2,110.5 crore FY25. The delta between gross revenue and billed revenue reflects iValue’s role: they source on behalf of SIs but book only their margin. That 9% gross margin pool (₹266 crore gross profit on ₹2,913.9 crore gross sales in FY26) is thin but stable.

Margin came under seasonal pressure in Q1 FY26: forex volatility on USD, component cost spikes, and spillover deals from prior Q4 with renegotiated terms landed gross margin at 6.8%. Q4 spike to 12.5% is recurring (annual rebates, year-end budget flush). Management expects a “10% mid-term” margin and signalled they’ve “made the necessary investments for the next 2–3 years,” implying operating leverage: at least 70% of incremental gross margin flows to EBITDA going forward (vs. 85% in FY26).

Cash generation milestone: CFO from operations hit ₹108 crore in FY26, exceeding PAT for the first time. Net cash post-debt: ₹212 crore (no net debt; pure cash surplus). Adjusted ROCE at 40.5%, ROE at 18%.

5. Valuation Discussion: Fair Value Range (Educational Only)

What follows is a walkthrough of how three valuation methods work, using this company’s numbers as the example—not a target, not a forecast, not advice.

Method 1 (P/E Multiple): Annualised EPS for FY26 is ₹17.98. The peer median P/E sits at 24.1x; the band across comparable IT-services and distribution players spans 12.7x to 51.1x. Applying the peer band: 12.7x × ₹17.98 = ₹228–₹434 per share (using the range 12.7x to 51.1x). Current price of ₹237 lands near the floor of that range.

Method 2 (EV/EBITDA): Estimated FY26 EBITDA is ~₹134 crore (operating profit ₹134 Cr + D&A ₹7 Cr per balance sheet = ₹141 Cr, less interest ₹11 Cr ≈ ₹130–134 Cr conservatively). Enterprise Value = Market Cap (₹1,297 Cr) + Net Debt (−₹212 Cr, i.e., net cash) = ₹1,085 Cr. Current EV/EBITDA = 8.05x. Peer median EV/EBITDA across the set is 15.52x (range 13.04x to 37.5x). Reversing: peer median 15.52x × ₹134 Cr EBITDA = ₹2,080 Cr enterprise value. Backing out net cash of ₹212 Cr, implied equity value = ₹2,080 − (−₹212) = ₹2,292 Cr, or ₹420 per share at current shares outstanding (5.46 Cr). At the lower peer range (13.04x EBITDA): ₹284 per share.

Method 3 (Simplified DCF – perpetuity growth): Assume normalized PAT ₹102 crore (using FY26 adjusted), a required return of 12%, and terminal growth of 7%. Free cash flow to equity approximates PAT minus capex plus change in working capital. FY26 CFO was ₹108 crore; capex is minimal (no capex line, assumed <₹5 Cr annually). Working capital improved (net WC days fell to 30), suggesting cash release. Conservatively, assume FCF = ₹90 crore normalized, growing at 7% indefinitely. Terminal value = ₹90 × 1.07 / (0.12 − 0.07) = ₹1,926 Cr. Per share: ₹353 per share at 5.46 Cr shares.

These figures show how the methods work and are not a valuation, a target, or advice.

6. What’s Cooking

Qualified opportunity book: ₹5,800 crore. Management reports a CRM-tracked pipeline with expected conversion “in the range of 30–35%.” That’s ₹1,740–₹2,030 crore of potential bookings over “three to five years.” Important: this is not a signed order book. Analyst pressed for clarity; management clarified these are “qualified leads” in their CRM with conversion history. Believable if you’ve been in enterprise sales, but it’s not cash. Conversion assumption raised from prior ~25% to 30–35% based on “faster customer decision cycles” and effectiveness of their Centers of Excellence in demos.

Cloud (Google Cloud) annuity model. FY26 saw ₹300 crore in committed customer workload consumption—not one-time billing, but recurring. Management called it a “long-term growth driver.” The TAM here is material: Google Cloud for Indian enterprises is early-stage, and iValue has integration expertise. Risk: this is backend deal support, not a visible revenue line item yet.

AI-driven infrastructure positioning. Management explicitly flagged FY27+ focus on:

• Cyber: LLM security, AI governance, AI risk management, SIEM/SOAR integration with AI.
• DCI: GPU infrastructure, AI data centers, especially across BFSI and Government.

This is credible—enterprises will spend on infrastructure to run AI workloads. But it’s aspirational, not booked yet.

OEM ecosystem expansion. Six new OEMs added in FY26, taking the total to ~115 (50+ in cybersecurity). Breadth reduces single-vendor risk and opens new verticals.

SAARC and ASEAN entry. Management spent 3–4 years building SAARC (Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) footprint. ASEAN entry is “measured and paced”—language for “we’re testing before we commit.” Middle East is paused (geopolitics acknowledged).

Two board resignations (Apr 2026). Sriram Srinivasan (14.18% holding, founder-level) and Brijesh Shrivastava (2.48%) exited. No conflict flagged in announcements. Srinivasan remains a shareholder; this was a board exit, not a full departure. Successor appointments not yet disclosed (as of the available data).

NSE fines and compliance history. Two-day RPT filing delay (Nov 2025) → ₹10,000 fine. Minor, but noted given the company is fresh to public markets.

7. Balance Sheet

Assets = Liabilities balanced. ✓

The narrative: The balance sheet grew 24% YoY (₹1,163 Cr → ₹1,441 Cr), driven mainly by Other Assets (trade receivables and investments) and Other Liabilities (trade payables climbed 33%, better vendor terms on large deals). Equity rose 23% to ₹568 Cr, boosted by retained earnings (PAT ₹102 Cr retained, as dividend payout remains 0%).

Borrowings fell from ₹71 Cr to ₹69 Cr—the company is paying down debt while accumulating cash. No capex squeeze: the capex story is minimal (fixed assets static at ₹36 Cr after some additions). A ₹153 crore investment line popped up in Mar 2026 (vs ₹0 Mar 2025), likely the PE investor’s exit prep or portfolio play. Contingent liabilities collapsed from ₹10.7 Cr to ₹6.3 Cr (favorable legal judgments).

Three spicy bullets:

• The cash sits idle. ₹129 crore cash equivalents on the balance sheet, ₹212 crore net cash after netting borrowings. For a company talking ₹5,800 crore pipelines and AI infrastructure, the war chest is surprisingly quiet. Either M&A targets are getting vetted, or the board is chicken.
• Working capital improved but debtor days are still bonkers. 336 debtor days is 11 months of cash locked in receivables. Two years ago it was 315. That’s worse, not better. The company claims 30-day net WC days—that’s a netting magic trick where payables almost equal receivables. Trust the ICRA rating: this is a genuinely working-capital-intensive business.
• D&E stays benign. Debt-to-equity at 0.12 is comfortable; the company could lever up if it wanted to M&A. The fact it hasn’t is either patience or caution.

One wisdom line: A balance sheet with nothing to hide and no leverage to deploy is either a fortress or a missed opportunity waiting for the right board decision.

8. Cash Flow: Sab Number Game Hai

The money story: FY26 was a cash generation milestone. Operating cash flow (CFO) hit ₹108 crore, up from ₹46 crore FY25—a 135% jump. This is the first time CFO exceeded PAT (₹102 Cr), meaning working capital released cash rather than consumed it. How? Receivables grew slower than revenue (+17.5% vs +20% topline growth), payables grew faster (+33%), and inventory cratered (₹12 Cr → ₹6 Cr). Free cash flow (CFO − capex) was ₹108 crore (capex negligible).

Investing cash flow was −₹98 crore outflow (vs −₹36 Cr FY25): the ₹153 crore investment in the balance sheet, partially offset by other reductions. This is not capex; it’s financial investments (likely PE prep or treasury).

Financing outflow was −₹9 crore: minimal debt repayment, zero dividends paid.

The wisdom: The cash machine started working. But it’s parked, not deployed. The company has built capacity for “the next two to three years” (per CFO), so capex will stay light. The board is hoarding optionality—either M&A, buybacks, or a dividend policy. None has materialized yet.

9. Ratios: Sexy or Stressy?

ROE at 19.8%: The company generates nearly 20 paise of profit per rupee of equity annually. That’s solid for a distribution business; typical IT services run 15–25%, and pure-play distributors lag at 5–10%. iValue’s roast here? It’s good, not exceptional. And it’s achieved without leverage—debt is minimal. If the company levered up modestly (say, 0.5x D/E instead of 0.12x), ROE could spike to 25%+ on the same operational earnings. The board isn’t doing that, which either shows prudence or opportunity cost.

ROCE at 25.1%: Return on invested capital (equity + debt) is 25.1%. The metric reveals whether the business generates returns above its cost of capital. At 25%, it’s doing well—enterprises and investors expect 12–15% hurdle rates. But the gap narrows when you remember ROCE is boosted by net cash (management explicitly adjusted to 40.5% by subtracting net cash from capital employed). That’s a liquidity bonus, not a pure operating achievement. Operating ROCE likely sits closer to 20–22%.

P/E at 12.7x: The market prices the stock at 12.7x annualised earnings. Peers median is 24.1x. The 47% discount could reflect: (a) distribution is slower-growth than IT services, (b) the stock is new and illiquid, (c) debtor days are terrifying, or (d) the market hasn’t woken up yet. Probably all four.

PAT Margin at 9.7%: Profit margin of 9.7% is respectable for a distribution business (typical range: 3–6% for pure distributors, 8–12% for solutions-focused). Trend: FY24 (9.1%) → FY25 (9.2%) → FY26 (9.7%), so it’s compressing and expanding, quarterly volatility masking the story. The full-year 9.1% gross margin less operating costs (staff, depreciation, other) lands at 9.7% PAT. Not blown to bits, but thin enough that a 2–3% revenue hiccup trips profitability.

D/E at 0.12: Debt is 12% of equity—conservative, boring, safe. The company could layer on debt without breaking covenant ratios, but it hasn’t. This is either balance-sheet prudence or capital-allocation mediocrity.

10. P&L Breakdown: Show Me the Money

The trajectory: Revenue CAGR (3 years): 10% (₹780 Cr → ₹1,056 Cr). Profit CAGR: 19% (₹71 Cr → ₹102 Cr). Profit is growing faster than revenue—classic operating leverage story, though muted by the 9% gross margin ceiling.

EBITDA margin (EBITDA ÷ Revenue) stayed stable: FY24 (12.9%) → FY25 (12.5%) → FY26 (12.7%). That’s flat, not expanding. Operating profit margin (OPM) is 12.7%, which is decent, but profit is also benefiting from other income (₹14 Cr in FY26, likely interest on cash) and declining interest expense (₹11 Cr, down from ₹15 Cr as debt falls). Strip those out, and operating earnings power is steady, not surging.

Why it matters: The business is not operationally improving; it’s scaling at a steady 10–14% with profit leverage from lower debt costs and cash interest. Growth is real, but not from margin expansion. The board talk of “at least 70% incremental gross margin flowing to EBITDA” assumes new deals don’t repricing downward—a key risk if the pipeline converts at lower-than-expected terms or if competition intensifies.

11. Peer Comparison

What the table screams: iValue is tiny—it’s 30% the median peer size. It trades at a 47% P/E discount (12.7x vs 24.1x median). Its PAT margin (9.7%) is below median (12.3%), consistent with its distribution-heavy mix. But its ROCE (25.1%) is above median (22.2%), and its leverage is minimal—so on a risk-adjusted basis, it’s genuinely returning more on capital than peers.

The peer roasts:

• vs L&T Technology: L&T is 10x bigger, trading 2x the multiple, with identical ROCE. L&T’s dominance is scale + diversification; iValue is the David. Margin gap (12.3% vs 9.7%) reflects L&T’s services mix.
• vs Netweb Technology: Netweb is 2x iValue’s size but trades at 10x the multiple (129.1x P/E). Netweb’s margins are half iValue’s (9.4% PAT), but ROCE is identical (37.5% vs 25.1%—no wait, Netweb is 37.5%, iValue 25.1%). The market is pricing Netweb for something iValue hasn’t delivered: either growth, profitability, or hype. iValue is not hyped.
• vs Sagility (formerly Virtusa): Sagility is pure-play distribution/services at 7,193 Cr revenue. P/E of 19.8x, margin of 13.2%, ROCE of 13.4%. Sagility is bigger and pricier, but lower-ROCE—so the market is still pricing it. iValue’s discount vs Sagility (P/E 12.7 vs 19.8) suggests the market either doesn’t trust iValue’s quality or doesn’t know it exists.

One insight: The smallest company (iValue) has the second-highest ROCE (25.1%, behind Inventurus at 36.9%). Yet it trades at the lowest P/E (12.7x). That’s either a mispricing or a quality/risk discount the data doesn’t capture (illiquidity, governance concern, volatility in receivables).

12. Miscellaneous: Shareholding & Promoters

The story: Promoter holding sits at 32.08%, down from 32.73% three months prior—the PE exit is a slow bleed (Sundara Mauritius no longer listed separately; assumed folded into “public” or sold off). Sunil Kumar Pillai (founder, 13.9%) is the dominant promoter, alongside Krishna Raj Sharma (7.73%), who just exited the board (resigned April 10, 2026). That’s a flag: a co-founder is walking away nine months post-IPO.

FIIs own just 2.22%, down from 4.35% a year ago—foreign money is leaving. DIIs (domestic institutions) own 15.25%, up from 11.22%—Indian funds are accumulating.

Public ownership is 50.45%, making this a relatively free-float stock. The absence of large institutional anchors (both foreign and Indian, given DII is only 15%) suggests the stock lacks consensus conviction.

Promoter roast: Sunil Kumar Pillai, Krishna Raj Sharma, and the team built a ₹1,000+ crore business over 16 years (2008–2024). That’s solid. The PE entry in FY20 and subsequent IPO in Sep 2025 signal the founders are monetizing, not doubling down. The resignation of Sharma (7.73% still held) mid-cycle is unusual—either he’s retiring, or there’s tension with board structure or direction post-IPO. No disclosure hints at conflict; likely a clean retirement-and-monetization move.

The missing thread: No pledges. Promoter stakes are free and clear—they’re not financing other bets by mortgaging the company shares. That’s a positive signal: skin in the game is real, not collateralized.

13. Corporate Governance: Angels or Devils?

Auditor: Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP (FY26 consolidated audit). Standard Big Four shop.

Board: Post-resignations (April 2026), the board lost Sriram Srinivasan and Brijesh Shrivastava. No successors announced in the available data. That’s a gap—a company this early in its public life shouldn’t have mid-cycle director exits without replacement clarity.

Related-party transactions: ICRA notes RPT filing delays (NSE fined ₹10K + ₹1.8K GST for a 2-day slip in Nov 2025). Minor penalty, but a sign of compliance friction early in the IPO lifecycle.

Pledges: None. Promoter stakes are clean.

Contingent liabilities: Fell 41% (₹10.7 Cr → ₹6.3 Cr) due to favorable court judgments. ICRA report doesn’t flag tax demands, GST disputes, or other red flags. Governance looks clean on contingency front.

Dividend policy: Zero dividends paid since incorporation (2008). The ₹102 crore PAT in FY26 was fully retained. For a company with ₹212 crore net cash and a board that just resigned, the continued zero dividend feels like a statement—either reinvestment is coming (M&A), or the board wants maximum dry powder. Either way, shareholders are funding the company’s war chest without a yield carrot.

One flag: The two resignations (April 2026) are near-term and unexplained. In isolation, not a red flag. But combined with zero dividends, minimal capex spend, and ₹212 crore cash sitting idle, it raises a question: Is the board aligned on capital allocation strategy, or are founders and institutions pulling in different directions?

14. Industry Roast & Macro Context

The IT distribution sector is being slowly dismantled by three forces:

Direct OEM-to-customer relationships: Why does a BFSI enterprise need a distributor? OEMs (Microsoft, Google, Salesforce) have scaled cloud and SaaS models that bypass the physical middleman. iValue’s response? Become a solutions architect, not a boxes-and-margins player. Credible in cybersecurity and DCI, where integration complexity still requires a human layer. Less credible in software and cloud, where APIs and self-service demos are eating middleman margins.

Pricing wars: The sector experiences perpetual compression. Pure-play distributors (Ingram Micro, Tech Data, D-Link) are getting skinned on margin. iValue counters with higher-value services (consulting, COE demos, implementation support), which justifies 9% margin vs 5% for box movers. But that assumes every deal is a 6-month architecture gig. Many deals are still commodity: customer wants Check Point firewalls, iValue is procurement plus invoice. Margin negotiation is savage in that scenario.

Supply-chain friction: If components stay scarce or lead times spike, inventory and receivables balloon again. iValue’s 336-day debtor cycle already assumes payment stretched. A second supply shock could break cash generation. Management says the ecosystem has “adapted” and they don’t foresee issues “absent a catastrophic event”—which is either confidence or denial.

Macro tail-winds for iValue:

• Enterprise capex on cybersecurity & DCI is non-cyclical. Budget cuts come last. That’s iValue’s base business—recurring, inelastic.
• Cloud and AI driving infrastructure spend. Enterprises need GPU servers, data center capacity, monitoring tools. That’s DCI + observability, iValue’s growth engines.
• Regulatory/compliance mandates: BFSI, Government, healthcare face constant security and data-residency regs. They buy defensive infrastructure. iValue is the integrator.

Macro headwind:

• Slowdown in enterprise IT budgets. Indian enterprise capex has been volatile; a global or domestic recession could stall pipeline conversion. iValue’s ₹5,800 crore “qualified opportunities” is speculative.

The sector roast: IT distribution is unglamorous because it’s a commodity service with scale economics. iValue’s pivot to solutions-focused distribution is logical and defensible, but the stock market doesn’t reward logic—it rewards growth surprises and margin expansion. iValue is steady; steady doesn’t move stocks.

15. EduInvesting Verdict

Closing line:

A balance sheet with nothing to hide, an ROCE with something to prove, and a board that resigned before the board meeting. The company manufactures recurring profits from a sticky customer base, but the market prices it like it manufactures fear. The tension isn’t resolved—yet.

End of Article

Research grounded in consolidated financial statements (Screener data, ICRA credit rating, June 2026 concall transcript). Prices referenced as of June 5, 2026, NSE close. No forecast, no target, no call to act. Read the filings.