Hazoor Multi Projects Ltd Q3 FY26: ₹139 Cr Sales, ₹6.46 Cr PAT, but “Interest” Just Jumped to ₹22.85 Cr — Who’s paying the TOLL’s?
1. At a Glance
Hazoor Multi Projects Ltd (HMPL) is sitting at a market cap of ₹828 Cr with a current price of ₹34 (as of 19 Feb 2026), and the stock has delivered a classic Indian-market mood swing: +7.27% in 3 months, but -22.4% in 6 months and -21.2% in 1 year. The headline ratios look “reasonable” at first glance: Stock P/E 30.5, ROCE 14.1%, ROE 11.4%, P/B 1.73, Debt/Equity 0.79, and Dividend Yield 1.17%. Then you peek into the quarterly numbers and realize this company is basically a reality show: Dec 2025 revenue ₹139.04 Cr (down YoY), PAT ₹6.46 Cr (up YoY), EBITDA margin 21.12% (nice), and interest cost ₹22.85 Cr (…excuse me?). Also, promoter holding is just 16.92% and it keeps falling. So yes, it’s a construction + real estate story, but the real construction here might be happening in the balance sheet.
Now tell me honestly—when you see ₹22.85 Cr quarterly interest on ₹139 Cr quarterly sales, do you feel “infrastructure growth vibes” or “EMI stress vibes”?
2. Introduction
Hazoor Multi Projects started life in 1992, and today it claims two big buckets: Real Estate and Road Construction. In practice, HMPL functions like an infrastructure EPC/sub-contractor that executes national highway projects for government authorities (like MSRDC and NHAI) and has historically been heavily linked to large road packages (like the Mumbai–Nagpur Expressway / Samruddhi Mahamarg work).
And yes, the business sounds respectable. Roads are real. Asphalt doesn’t lie. A highway doesn’t get built by motivational quotes; it gets built by contractors who can move material, manage labour, and survive government payment cycles.
But here’s the fun part: roads are not just “engineering” — they’re a working-capital sport. If collections get delayed or receivables balloon, your profit can look fine on paper while cash looks like it ran away to Goa. In HMPL’s case, the dump literally screams working-capital and financing pressure: debtor days increased from 62.2 to 111, and interest coverage is 1.98 (translation: “we can pay interest… but please don’t increase rates or delay receipts”). Plus, the cons list even flags: “Company might be capitalizing the interest cost.”
So the real question is not “Can they build roads?” The real question is: Can they build roads AND still keep their finance costs from eating the project profits like a hungry contractor at a wedding buffet?
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
HMPL operates as an EPC contracting player (specifically a sub-contractor in many cases) focused on road construction for national highway projects. Their core competency as construction of roads, with intentions to expand into other infrastructure EPC verticals.
What they actually do (in normal human language)
They take a road package (or a portion of it).
They execute the on-ground work: construction, engineering, designing, and related activities.
They get paid based on contract terms (which can be milestone-based, and often involves delays in the real world).
Projects Undertaken
Samruddhi Mahamarg (Mumbai–Vidarbha Expressway) HMPL was awarded an EPC contract for the Kopergan/Ahmednagar section (29.93 km).
Rehabilitation & Upgradation (NH-548A) Work includes upgrading the Wakan–Pali–Khopoli section, length 40.680 km, to 2-lane with paved shoulder / 4-lane standards on EPC basis.
Revenue concentration (the “one-client/one-project risk” cousin)
In FY23, the company generated ~93% of revenue from construction of Mumbai–Nagpur Expressway. So historically, this has not been a “diversified annuity machine.” It’s been more like: one big job = most of the money.
Now a question: if 93% of your revenue once came from one expressway project, what happens when that project ends—do you smoothly replace it, or do you suddenly discover spirituality and “other income”?
NM = Not meaningful because the previous quarter had negative values, so percentage comparison becomes comedy, not analysis.
Witty but painful observations
Revenue is down YoY, but PAT is up YoY. That’s fine… until you realize interest cost in Dec 2025 is ₹22.85 Cr, up from ₹4.55 Cr in Dec 2024 and ₹5.90 Cr in Sep 2025. That is not “normal quarterly movement.” That is a “who touched the borrowing switch?” moment.
EBITDA margin improved sharply in Dec 2025 (21.12%) vs Dec 2024 (6.05%). Nice. But profit before tax is only ₹6.13 Cr despite EBITDA ₹29.36 Cr, because interest is doing WWE moves on the P&L.
So… are they improving operations, or just getting lucky with timing and accounting line-items while finance cost quietly body-slams earnings?
5. Valuation Discussion – Fair Value Range Only (Educational)
We’ll do three methods: P/E, EV/EBITDA, and a DCF-style sanity check (reverse DCF). No heroic assumptions about future sales because the rules are clear: no fake numbers.
Step 1: EPS rule check
Latest quarter is Dec 2025 = Q3 Rule: Q3 Annualised EPS = Average of Q1, Q2, Q3 EPS × 4
