A 1919 vintage that’s somehow still listed. Once a managing agency, now a Government-owned multi-vertical curiosity selling tea, transformers, fans, and pollution control gear. Market cap ₹1,277 Cr, but 89% is promoter (Govt) — so public float is smaller than its Darjeeling estate. ROE negative, sales flat for 5 years, and yet a P/E of 64. Because PSU logic.
2. Introduction
If there was an award for “Most Random Product Portfolio,” Andrew Yule would be sipping the trophy. This CPSE juggles:
Tea from Assam, Dooars, and Darjeeling
Transformers and electrical gear
Heavy fans & pollution control systems
Tea machinery (meta!)
It’s the corporate version of a vintage trunk in your grandparents’ attic — full of relics, some still useful, others just collecting dust.
Acquired by the Govt in 1979 after losing its original business model, it’s been in survival mode ever since — closing unviable units, merging a printing company for reasons unknown, and still trying to double tea business by 2032. The problem? At its current sales growth rate of 0.83% CAGR, that’s a fantasy novel.
3. Business Model (WTF Do They Even Do?)
Tea Division (58% revenue): 12 estates, orthodox & green tea, recently dipped into specialty blends. Competes with private players who can market better and don’t have to wait for government approvals to buy a tea spoon.
Engineering Division (27%): Fans, ESPs, pollution control. Order book ~₹55 Cr, 6% market share.
Electrical Division (15%): Transformers from 8 MVA to 63 MVA capacity. Order book ~₹75 Cr in 2023, but low market share.
Revenue is split across cyclical engineering orders and seasonal tea sales. Margins are… well, non-existent most years, saved only by “Other Income” — basically PSU for “let’s sell some assets or get subsidies.”
4. Financials Overview
Metric
Q1 FY26
Q1 FY25
Q4 FY25
YoY %
QoQ %
Revenue (₹ Cr)
56.1
55.5
98.0
1.1%
-42.8%
EBITDA (₹ Cr)
-28.0
-12.0
-42.0
-133%
33.3%
PAT (₹ Cr)
20.1
2.03
-1.0
890%
2,110%
EPS (₹)
0.41
0.04
-0.01
925%
—
EPS Ann. (₹)
1.64
—
—
—
—
Commentary: PAT explosion thanks to ₹60 Cr “Other Income.” Without that, the loss party continues. QoQ revenue collapse is seasonal tea off-season + lumpy engineering orders.
5. Valuation (Fair Value RANGE only)
P/E Method: EPS Ann. = ₹1.64 Industry P/E ≈ 16.5 FV = ₹27.1
EV/EBITDA Method: EV = ₹1,344 Cr EBITDA Ann. = negative → not meaningful
DCF: Cash flows too erratic; tea + engineering volatility kills forecast reliability. Rough FV from asset value ≈ ₹22–₹25.
