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1. At a Glance
Soma Textiles switched owners in October 2025 — Roadway Solutions India Infra (the parent of a highway construction outfit under NHAI order scrutiny) bought 75% for ₹87.67 crore. The company’s FY26 sales jumped to ₹80.88 crore from ₹9.49 crore in FY25. Sounds stellar.
Then you look at receivables: ₹91.88 crore — more than the entire FY26 revenue run. The company has ₹0.58 crore in cash. Operating cash flow is minus ₹102.93 crore.
So the headline is real, but the plumbing is broken. The new promoter pivoted from textiles into two EPC contracts (construction orders of ₹281 crore and ₹62.77 crore announced in December 2025), both related-party deals. The textile business, which collapsed from ₹127 crore in FY17 to ₹5.2 crore in FY23, has been grafted onto what looks like a shell.
The tension: sales and PAT in the latest quarter are real, but almost none of it has been collected.
2. Introduction
Soma Textiles was incorporated in 1969 as a textile manufacturer. For decades it made denim, piece-dyed fabrics, and stretch goods for brands like Indigo Nation, John Players, and Colt. The business was solid once. Then the 2010s happened.
By FY23, sales had crashed to ₹5.2 crore on the back of a decade of margin compression. The company burnt cash, accumulated losses, and ran negative operating profit for years. Net profit was a disaster: FY22 was minus ₹16.42 crore.
Then FY23 arrived with a surprise: ₹165.46 crore profit, entirely from other income (a land development deal). The markets sniffed a turnaround. The stock shot up.
FY24 and FY25 muddled along — ₹21.09 crore and ₹69.27 crore profit respectively, again mostly other income, not operations. Operating profit was still negative.
By mid-2025, the Somany family (who’d controlled Soma since the ’90s) sold their stake to Roadway Solutions India Infra Limited. This is the parent company cited in a Supreme Court order involving NHAI deposit requirements worth ₹20+ crore. In October 2025, Ameet Gadhoke became MD and Teja Gadhoke became Chair. The board was rebuilt.
In December 2025, two construction contracts totalling ₹343.95 crore were announced—both EPC (engineering, procurement, construction) contracts with the new parent’s group company. The textile unit was shelved. The company is now a cash-collection box for construction work.
FY26 (ended March 2026) saw ₹80.88 crore in quarterly sales, with ₹50.82 crore in the final quarter alone. But almost none of it is cash yet.
3. Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
Soma now does two things, and neither is textiles anymore.
Textiles (the original): Denim, piece-dyed fabrics, stretch fabrics, vintage denim, non-stretch goods. Sold to brands like Indigo Nation, John Players, Cherokee, Mossimo, Scullers. This business cratered from ₹127 crore in FY17 to ₹5.2 crore in FY23 and hasn’t recovered. No inventory showed up on the FY26 balance sheet, and segment data vanished.
Construction (the new): Two EPC contracts awarded in December 2025 to Mefcom, a related-party entity. Contract 1: ₹281.18 crore, 24-month tenor. Contract 2: ₹62.77 crore, 12-month tenor. Total ₹343.95 crore. These are the revenue drivers for the forward-looking filings.
The business model is now a holding company for highway-construction work outsourced to a related party. All the legwork happens elsewhere. Soma’s job is to collect money from parent and sub-contractors as work moves from ordered to executed.
The old textile clientele (brands) is obsolete. The new revenue stream is intra-group. This is not a recovery in the textile business; this is an exit from it. The multiple is not priced for a textile firm anymore—it’s priced for a contractor’s balance sheet, less the collection risk.
4. Financials Overview
Figures are consolidated, in ₹ crore.
Quarterly Results (Latest Quarter Ended March 2026)
| Metric | Latest Q (Mar 26) | YoY Change | QoQ Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 50.82 | +1,213% | +2,376% |
| EBITDA* | 3.71 | Not comparable | Not comparable |
| PAT | 4.88 | +966% | +152% |
| EPS | 1.48 | Not comparable | Not comparable |
*EBITDA approximated as Operating Profit (3.68 Cr) + Depreciation (0.03 Cr).
The final quarter of FY26 is the breakout: ₹50.82 crore in sales, ₹4.88 crore in profit. This is the construction order beginning to flow through. The quarterly pattern beforehand was tiny (₹0.59–₹3.87 crore per quarter).
Operating profit hit positive ₹3.68 crore in the quarter—the first time in recent memory. OPM was 7.24%, a turnaround from the consistent negative single digits (–77% to –32% in prior quarters).
But look at the balance sheet. Receivables sit at ₹91.88 crore—nearly 1.8x the quarter’s revenue annualized. The company collected almost nothing on the ₹50.82 crore sale. This is a classic EPC problem: revenue is recognized on billing, not on cash receipt. The contractor books the sale when work is certified, but the purchaser (or the parent) pays slowly or in tranches tied to milestones.
Tax was ₹1.07 crore on ₹5.95 crore PBT (effective 17.98%). The company has carried forward losses from prior years, but they are being depleted fast.
5. Market Expectations & Historical Multiples
This section describes how the market is currently pricing the company and how that compares with its own history and peer group. It is descriptive, not predictive.
| Metric | Current | 3-Yr Average | Peer Median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 75.95 | Not meaningful | 25.16 |
| EV/EBITDA | 63.3 | Not meaningful | Not applicable |
| P/B | 1.96 | Not meaningful | Variable |
| ROE | 2.65% | 1.21% (last 3 yrs) | ~8% sector median |
| ROCE | 2.98% | Negative to low | ~8.99% sector median |
The market currently pays 75.95x trailing earnings here, against a peer textile median of 25.16x. This is the largest multiple divergence in the dataset. Peers like KPR Mills (45.46x), Vardhman (25.40x), and Trident (35.28x) trade at one-third to one-half this level.
The divergence reflects the pivot: the market may be pricing recovery (a construction contractor with ₹343 crore in orders) rather than a textile firm. Textile firms are valued on margin expansion and volume growth. Contractors are valued on order conversion and cash collection.
ROE (2.65%) and ROCE (2.98%) remain depressed—the company’s capital is working slowly. The company carried cumulative losses of ₹49.31 crore in FY17; by FY26 it has a net worth of ₹167.67 crore (Equity Capital ₹33.23 + Reserves ₹134.44), a swing of ₹217 crore. That swing is almost entirely other income from the FY23 land deal and the new construction orders, not reinvested operating profit.
The sector median ROCE is 8.99%. Soma sits at 2.98%. The gap suggests the company’s asset base—now largely cash, receivables, and related-party exposure—is not earning operationally.
The fact that the market is willing to value this firm at a 200% premium to sector peers, despite lower returns on capital, implies it is pricing in either a construction turnaround or hedging against a textile renaissance. Neither is obvious from the filings.
The pricing reflects a disconnect between the headline (₹50.82 crore quarterly sales) and the reality (₹91.88 crore uncollected, ₹0.58 crore cash, minus ₹102.93 crore operating cash flow for the full year).
6. What’s Cooking
Ownership & Management Shift (October 2025): Roadway Solutions India Infra bought 74.98% for ₹87.67 crore off-market. Ameet Gadhoke (MD) and Teja Gadhoke (Chair, related to Ameet) took over. New independent directors appointed. The old Somany/Gadhoke family stakes were folded into Roadway Solutions’ structure.
EPC Construction Orders (December 2025): Two material RPT contracts announced on the same day: ₹281.18 crore 24-month EPC and ₹62.77 crore 12-month EPC. Total ₹343.95 crore. Both issued by Mefcom (related party). These are now the company’s primary revenue engine, not textiles.
Receivables Bloat (March 2026): Receivables jumped from ₹3.02 crore (Mar 2025) to ₹91.88 crore (Mar 2026)—a 30x increase in one year. Of the ₹80.88 crore FY26 revenue, ₹91.88 crore is still owed. The collection cycle is broken.
NHAI Legal Exposure (Ongoing): The promoter (Roadway Solutions) is named in a Supreme Court order (Feb 2026) requiring deposit of 50% of an award (₹1,019 crore) plus interest (₹1,198 crore) in a separate NHAI dispute. Final hearing is 14 July 2026. This liability attaches to Roadway Solutions, not directly to Soma, but could affect the parent’s ability to inject capital or support operations.
Cash Flow Collapse (Full Year FY26): Operating cash flow was minus ₹102.93 crore. Investing activity was plus ₹104.44 crore (mostly reversal of old investments). Net cash flow was minus ₹1.24 crore. The company is burning cash operationally despite ₹80.88 crore in sales recognition.
Dividend Recommendation (June 2026): Board recommended a 5% final dividend (₹0.5 per share) on 12 June 2026. This is a messaging signal — paying out cash while receivables are ₹91 crore and cash is ₹0.58 crore is unusual, unless the parent is subsidizing liquidity.
7. Balance Sheet
| Item | Mar 2024 | Mar 2025 | Mar 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | 111.50 | 161.72 | 228.81 |
| Total Liabilities | 111.50 | 161.72 | 228.81 |
| Net Worth | 88.53 | 157.84 | 167.67 |
| Borrowings | 1.62 | 2.90 | 0.29 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 11.97 | 4.48 | 0.58 |
The balance sheet looks debt-free (₹0.29 crore in borrowings, down from ₹1.62 crore two years prior). But the composition is dangerous.
Receivables are ₹91.88 crore—the single largest asset. Cash is ₹0.58 crore. The company’s “assets” are mostly customer IOUs from related-party construction contracts. If Mefcom or the parent delays payment, Soma has no buffer.
Other liabilities jumped to ₹60.85 crore (from ₹0.98 crore in FY25). This is likely advances from customers or inter-company payables. Working capital is a maze.
Three bullets:
- The receivables trap. ₹91.88 crore owed, ₹0.58 crore in hand. A 10-week collection gap at current burn rate empties the till.
- The reserves paradox. Net worth is ₹167.67 crore, up from minus ₹49.31 crore in FY17. This is not reinvested profit; it is unrealized gains (land revaluation, other income, parent support). Operating capital is rotting.
- The delisting ghost. The company filed for voluntary delisting from BSE in 2012; the application is still pending. Unclear why or whether the new promoter will pursue it.
Wisdom: A balance sheet with nothing to hide is hiding something.
Net cash is effectively zero. The company is living on promised receivables from related parties.
8. Cash Flow: Sab Number Game Hai
| Year | Operating | Investing | Financing | Net |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY24 | 25.93 | 3.54 | -18.17 | 11.30 |
| FY25 | -5.96 | -0.54 | -3.65 | -10.15 |
| FY26 | -102.93 | 104.44 | -2.75 | -1.24 |
FY24 was the last time the company generated positive operating cash. Since then, it has been cash-negative on operations, despite positive P&L.
FY26 is the worst: minus ₹102.93 crore from operations. How does a company with ₹80.88 crore in revenue and ₹9.82 crore in PAT burn ₹102.93 crore in cash?
Working capital. The ₹80.88 crore was almost entirely sold to the parent or related parties, mostly uncollected. As receivables grew, the company had to carry working capital (supplier payables, employee accruals, inter-company advances). The cash burn reflects the receivables dilution: you invoice ₹80 crore but only collect ₹0 crore, and your suppliers still want cash. The gap is absorbed by operating burn.
Investing activity was plus ₹104.44 crore—this is the reversal of the ₹93.23 crore investment position from FY25 (likely parent securities or related-party deposits). The company liquidated these to cover the operating burn. It worked, barely: net cash outflow was only ₹1.24 crore.
Wisdom: Revenue recognition and cash collection are not friends in EPC contracts. One is an accrual; the other is a liquidity event. Soma is recognizing revenue under the accrual method while collecting on the cash method. The gap is filled by parent support.
9. Ratios: Sexy or Stressy?
| Ratio | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| ROE | 2.65% | The ₹167.67 crore net worth earned ₹2.65 crore last year (approximately). Equity is asleep. |
| ROCE | 2.98% | Capital employed (₹167.67 Cr) generated ₹5 crore in EBIT. Returns are buried. |
| P/E | 75.95 | The market pays ₹75.95 for every rupee of reported earnings. This assumes earnings are real and repeatable. |
| OPM | 7.24% (Q4) / -1.81% (FY) | Operating margin in the final quarter was positive for the first time in years. For the full year, it was barely negative due to the prior quarters’ losses. |
| D/E | ~0% | Debt is ₹0.29 crore; equity is ₹167.67 crore. The company is unlevered, which is conservative but also means no leverage to amplify returns. |
ROE of 2.65%—the company earned ₹2.65 crore on ₹167.67 crore of shareholder capital. That is a part-time return. For context, FDs in India earn 6–7% risk-free. The company’s equity is working at one-third the rate of a bank deposit.
ROCE of 2.98%—slightly better, but the gap between ROE and ROCE (0.33 percentage points) suggests the company has minimal financial leverage working in its favor. It is a capital-intensive model with low returns.
P/E of 75.95 is the elephant: the market is paying for future recovery, not current earnings. If the company sustains ₹9.82 crore in annual PAT (or higher, as the construction orders ramp), the multiple will compress. If PAT falls or becomes negative again, the multiple will evaporate.
OPM turning positive in Q4 (7.24%) is the headline the promoters will push. For the full year it was –1.81%, dragged by three negative quarters. One good quarter does not a trend make.
10. P&L Breakdown: Show Me the Money
| Year | Revenue | EBITDA | PAT |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY24 | 5.73 | -0.04 | 21.09 |
| FY25 | 9.49 | -5.36 | 69.27 |
| FY26 | 80.88 | 3.71 | 9.82 |
(EBITDA = Operating Profit + Depreciation + Interest. FY24 and FY25 EBITDA is negative or low because operating profit was negative; the large PAT is from other income.)
The story jumps off the chart in FY26: revenue is 8.5x FY25. EBITDA flipped positive (₹3.71 crore). PAT dropped to ₹9.82 crore, but that is because other income fell to ₹12.74 crore (from ₹74.65 crore in FY25). The operating business itself is improving.
But there is a catch. The ₹80.88 crore revenue is almost entirely the construction contract recognized in the final quarter. Months 1–11 of FY26 saw only ₹30 crore in sales. Month 12 (Mar 2026) saw ₹50.82 crore — a frontloading that suggests either accelerated billing or a one-time contract milestone.
Is the company’s operating business sustainable at ₹80+ crore per annum, or was FY26 a spike? The Mefcom contracts run through 2027–2028, so there should be consistent revenue. But the receivables buildup suggests work is being done and billed faster than it is being paid.
The trajectory from FY24 to FY26 is: collapse → stabilize → spike. None of these are “trend” yet. The company needs to show three consecutive years of positive operating profit and positive cash conversion to move from “turnaround play” to “recovery confirmed.”
11. Peer Comparison
| Company | Revenue (Latest Q) | PAT (Latest Q) | P/E |
|---|---|---|---|
| KPR Mills | 1,784.65 | 227.17 | 45.46 |
| Vardhman Textile | 2,497.98 | 189.26 | 25.40 |
| Welspun Living | 2,435.43 | 106.16 | 70.77 |
| Trident | 1,632.53 | 101.98 | 35.28 |
| Garware Tech | 426.41 | 57.26 | 37.40 |
| Indo Count | 1,057.68 | 24.20 | 61.60 |
| Alok Industries | 982.97 | -192.54 | — |
| Soma Textiles | 50.82 | 4.88 | 75.95 |
| Peer Median | 1,345 | 80 | 25.16 |
Soma is micro-scale: latest quarterly revenue is ₹50.82 crore against a peer median of ₹1,345 crore. It is 3.7% the size of the peer set. PAT of ₹4.88 crore is 6% of the peer median (₹80 crore).
Yet the P/E is 75.95 — three times the peer median of 25.16x.
Even Welspun Living, a home textiles play that trades at a premium for scale and brand (70.77x), is cheaper than Soma. KPR Mills (a staple denim/yarn exporter, the closest peer) trades at 45.46x.
The P/E gap cannot be explained by industry dynamics. It reflects the market’s bet on Soma’s parent (Roadway Solutions) using this shell for construction revenues at higher margins, or the belief that collection will normalize and the “real” earnings are higher. Both are speculative.
If Soma achieves peer-scale revenues (₹1,345 crore per quarter), with even modest PAT margins (8%), it would earn ₹1,075 crore per annum. At the current price of ₹99.10 and ₹328 crore market cap, that would imply a P/E of 0.3x. That is not reasonable; it implies either a rerating downward or a moonshot in earnings. Neither is guaranteed.
12. Miscellaneous: Shareholding & Promoters
| Holder | % (Latest) |
|---|---|
| Promoters | 80.60% |
| FIIs | 0.00% |
| DIIs | 0.04% |
| Public | 19.36% |
Promoter Breakdown:
- Roadway Solutions India Infra Limited: 56.62%
- Ameet Harjinder Gadhoke: 18.00%
- Teja Ranade Gadhoke: 5.98%
- Others: ~0%
The Somany family exited in October 2025. Roadway Solutions (a parent company) now owns the majority. Ameet and Teja Gadhoke, who appear to be related, are the executive faces. Ameet is MD; Teja is Chair.
Roadway Solutions is named in a February 2026 Supreme Court order against NHAI (National Highways Authority of India) involving a deposit requirement of ₹1,019 crore plus interest (₹1,198 crore). Final hearing is July 14, 2026. This is not a settled matter.
The family has zero pledged shares, which is a minor positive (they are not borrowing against the stock). But the concentration (80.6%) and the parent company’s legal exposure are red flags for minority shareholders.
13. Corporate Governance: Angels or Devils?
Board: Ameet Harjinder Gadhoke (MD, appointed Oct 2025). Teja Ranade Gadhoke (Chair, appointed Oct 2025). Two independent directors appointed in Nov 2025. Several directors resigned on the same day the new ones took over, consistent with a change-of-control scenario.
Auditors: Not explicitly stated in the filings; typically B S R & Co. LLP for Screener-indexed firms, but verify from latest audit report.
Related Parties: Material RPTs approved in Nov 2025: two EPC contracts (₹281 Cr and ₹62.77 Cr) awarded to Mefcom. Both are related-party entities. The RPT approvals were done by a reconstituted board with new independent directors, so procedurally they appear compliant. Substantively, the company is outsourcing its core operations to a related party, which is a governance concern: the pricing and terms are not market-tested, and Mefcom’s performance directly affects Soma’s receivables.
Tax & Regulatory: A SEBI direction from Feb 2021 debarred promoter and executive directors from the 2006–07 period (when Soma issued GDRs that violated regulations) for 3, 2, and 1 years respectively. Those bans have lapsed. The current promoter (Roadway Solutions, appointed Oct 2025) was not subject to the original ban.
Pledges: Zero pledged shares, which is good.
Delisting: The company applied for voluntary delisting from BSE in 2012. The application is still pending approval from BSE. No recent movement. The new promoter has not disclosed a delisting strategy.
CFO Resignation (Historical): Meghraj Parakh resigned as CFO on 14 Oct 2021; replaced by Shrikant Bhairaveshwar Bhat on 01 Dec 2021. This is old history, but suggests some churn in the finance function.
Temporary Closure (Historical): In Nov 2021, Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation disconnected the company’s wastewater discharge, forcing temporary closure. The company resumed operations after. The textile unit is a non-factor now, so this is immaterial.
The governance is transitional. A change-of-control in Oct 2025 brought in a new board and new management. Procedures are being followed (RPT approvals, independent director appointments), but the substance (related-party contract awards, parent company legal exposure) introduces uncertainty. Minority shareholders have minimal recourse if the parent company’s NHAI case goes against it.
14. Industry Roast & Macro Context
Indian Textiles Sector: The sector is fragmented, margin-compressed, and export-dependent. Global demand is weak (China is dumping denim), labor costs in India are rising, and water/pollution regulation is tightening. Soma itself abandoned textiles because there was no money in it. Even KPR Mills, the sector leader, trades at 45x, which is a bet on export recovery and yarn quality, not textiles as a category.
Soma’s move into construction is a vote of no-confidence in textiles. The company could not compete, so it became a pass-through vehicle for parent-company work. This is not unique (many textile mills have become real-estate or trading vehicles), but it is an admission of structural decline.
EPC (Engineering, Procurement, Construction) Sector: India’s highway construction is booming. NHAI has ₹10+ lakh crore in planned capex. Margins in EPC are typically 5–8% EBIT (before subs and financing), higher than textiles. But cash collection is slow (120–180 days typical for milestone-based billing). Soma’s ₹343 crore contract backlog should yield ₹25–27 crore in EBIT if executed. But the backlog is with a parent company, not a market counterparty.
The risk: if the parent company (Roadway Solutions) loses focus due to the NHAI litigation, Soma becomes a ghost. If the NHAI order goes against the parent and forces a large cash outlay, the parent may deprioritize the Mefcom contracts and starve Soma of cash.
Regulatory: The Voluntary Delisting application from 2012 is a wild card. If BSE approves it, the company delists from BSE but remains on NSE. This would reduce liquidity and raise questions about why the new promoter is not accelerating the process. If it remains pending, the company stays listed, but the ambiguity is a drag on institutional interest.
15. EduInvesting Verdict
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| Debt-free balance sheet (₹0.29 Cr borrowing). Turnaround in operating profit (Q4 FY26 positive). Parent company with capex exposure (highways). Order backlog of ₹343 Cr provides 2+ years of revenue visibility. | Receivables of ₹91.88 Cr against ₹0.58 Cr cash — collection risk is acute. ROE and ROCE both ~2.6–3%, far below peer median. P/E of 75.95x is unsustainable unless earnings double. Operating cash flow was minus ₹102.93 Cr in FY26 despite positive PAT. |
| Opportunities | Threats |
| Highway sector is booming; parent company has NHAI exposure. Margin profile of EPC (5–8% EBIT) is higher than textiles. If receivables normalize and cash conversion improves, the company could be a dividend machine. Possible re-rating if parent company’s litigation resolves positively. | Parent company (Roadway Solutions) faces a July 2026 NHAI hearing with ₹2,200+ Cr at stake; adverse ruling could starve cash. Related-party EPC contracts have no external validation of terms or pricing — execution risk is one-sided. Voluntary delisting application pending since 2012 — resolution is unclear, and delay suggests internal friction. Textile business is extinct; all leverage is on construction contracts with parent. |
The company has traded its identity. It was textiles; now it is a construction contract vehicle. The receivables are real (they are owing); the cash is not (it sits with the parent or Mefcom). The revenue is real (it was billed); the profit is not (it is accrual-based, not cash).
A balance sheet with ₹91.88 crore receivable and ₹0.58 crore cash is living off the parent’s patience. The parent is under legal stress (NHAI), so patience is not guaranteed.
The P/E of 75.95x presumes the company has found a durable new business. The data so far (one quarter of construction revenue, massive receivables, negative cash flow) suggests it is still searching.