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Power Grid Corporation:₹32,000 Cr CapEx. Execution Inflection. They Finally Fixed The Transmission Network.

Power Grid Q3 FY26 | EduInvesting
Q3 FY26 Results · 9-Month Performance (Apr–Dec FY26)

Power Grid Corporation:
₹32,000 Cr CapEx. Execution Inflection. They Finally Fixed The Transmission Network.

Highest quarterly revenue ever. Capex guidance raised to ₹32,000 crores. Nearly ₹23,000 crore commissioned in nine months. And they’re positioning for a structural shift from nomination-based to competitive-bid transmission projects worth ₹3.6 lakh crores by 2032.

Market Cap₹2,78,228 Cr
CMP₹299
P/E Ratio17.9x
Div Yield3.01%
ROCE12.8%

The ₹3 Lakh Crore Grid That’s Finally Moving

  • 52-Week High / Low₹322 / ₹250
  • Q3 FY26 Revenue₹12,395 Cr
  • Q3 FY26 PAT₹4,185 Cr
  • 9M FY26 PAT₹11,382 Cr
  • Q3 EPS₹4.50
  • Book Value₹106
  • Price to Book2.81x
  • Dividend Yield3.01%
  • Debt / Equity1.37x
  • 9M CapEx Spend₹26,761 Cr
Executive Summary: Power Grid delivered its best-ever quarterly revenue of ₹12,395 crore with PAT of ₹4,185 crore (+8% YoY). But the real story isn’t the numbers—it’s the execution. Management raised FY26 CapEx guidance to ₹32,000 crore from ₹28,000 crore and committed to exceeding it. They’ve already commissioned ₹18,700 crore of assets as of January 2026 (versus target ₹20,000 crore). RoW constraints that plagued them for three years are finally easing. And they’re preparing for a portfolio shift where 80–90% of future projects will be competitively bid rather than cost-plus. That’s not maintenance—that’s transformation.

India’s Boring Utility That Just Became Interesting

Power Grid Corporation of India owns something most investors never think about: the metal lines that carry electricity across 45% of India’s total power transmission. Maharatna-rated. Government-owned 51.34%. Zero execution drama for most of its 30-year history. That is, until December 2024 when the real growth story started.

For three years, POWERGRID was the investment equivalent of waiting for water to boil. CapEx targets were announced. Projects were commissioned late. Management blamed Right-of-Way (RoW) constraints, land acquisition delays, and equipment supply bottlenecks. Analysts yawned. The stock delivered a measly 0.0% CAGR over a decade despite the business generating ₹36,000+ crore in annual operating cash.

Then something happened. The Government of India issued new RoW compensation guidelines in March 2025. State authorities started actually adopting them. Equipment suppliers bulked up transformer procurement. And suddenly, in Q3 FY26, POWERGRID commissioned ₹18,700 crore of transmission assets—nearly matching the *full year* plan in just nine months. Management is now raising guidance and saying publicly they intend to beat it. When a government CPSU says “we will exceed guidance,” that’s not confidence—that’s evidence that the bottlenecks are actually broken.

This is the story of how a utility company just became a growth story. Not hypergrowth—sensible, tariff-backed, infrastructure-led growth. That’s rarer than you think.

Concall Commentary (Feb 2026): “We are poised to exceed our annual guidance.” The company raised CapEx targets mid-year and immediately suggested they’d beat even those. Management confidence, or reliable commentary? Given the Jan 31 commissioning evidence (₹18,700 crore), this is data-driven confidence.

They Move Other People’s Electricity. Boring. Essential. Profitable.

Power Grid moves electricity. Not generates it. Not distributes it to your home. Moves it—from power plants to regional grids, across state lines, into industrial hubs, and from renewable energy zones to load centres. Think of them as the logistics company for electricity, except the electricity doesn’t lose volume in transit, the system availability is 99.82%, and the customers (distribution utilities and generators) are legally obligated to pay bills through a point-of-connection mechanism backed by letters of credit.

They operate 1,83,174 circuit kilometers of transmission lines. 288 substations. 5,99,016 MVA of transformation capacity. 18 HVDC stations (high voltage direct current—think long-distance power highways). Inter-regional transfer capacity of ~101 GW. They transmit more than 45% of India’s electrical energy. System availability: 99.84%. Annual tripping per line: 0.21 (they claim it’s comparable to global peers). Revenue comes from tariffs charged to state distribution utilities, power generators, and industry. Cost-plus structure for ~94.5% of assets. Return: predictable. Risk: low.

Emerging businesses: Battery Energy Storage Systems (just won first 150 MW project), data centres, renewable energy transmission through BOOM model (Build, Own, Operate, Maintain), and international transmission PPP partnerships (starting with Kenya). These are nascent but directionally important.

Network Length1,83,174 CkmTransmission Lines
System Availability99.84%Industry Standard
Transformation Capacity5,99,016 MVASubstations & More
The boring reality: transmission is not exciting, which is precisely why it’s excellent. No one is disrupting it. No one is building competing networks. The tariff is regulated, costs are recovered, and the government backs your collection with a payment security mechanism (letters of credit worth 1.05x monthly billing). This is the closest Indian equities get to a government-backed monopoly with growth.
💬 If you run a solar farm in Rajasthan or a coal mine in Chhattisgarh, how does your power reach Mumbai? POWERGRID is the answer. Boring? Yes. Essential? Absolutely.

Q3 FY26: Numbers & What They Mean

Result type: Quarterly Results  |  Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹4.50  |  Annualised EPS (Q3×4): ₹18.00  |  9M FY26 EPS: ₹12.24

Source table
Metric (₹ Cr) Q3 FY26
Dec 2025
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025
YoY % QoQ %
Revenue12,39511,23311,476+10.3%+8.0%
EBITDA10,6079,5339,055+11.3%+17.2%
OPM %86%85%79%+100 bps+700 bps
PAT4,1853,8623,566+8.4%+17.3%
EPS (₹)4.504.153.83+8.4%+17.5%
The Inflection Data: Revenue hitting ₹12,395 crore is the highest quarterly number ever. EBITDA jumped 11.3% YoY and operating margins expanded to 86% from 85% YoY (and from a dismal 79% in Q2, indicating clearing bottlenecks). PAT grew 8.4% YoY despite flat profit growth over three years. Annualised Q3 EPS of ₹18 is meaningless (Q3 always benefits from project commissioning timing), but the trend is directional. What matters: high-margin revenue is finally scaling after three years of stagnation. The bottleneck is breaking.

What’s The Grid Company Actually Worth?

Method 1: P/E Based

CY25 full-year EPS = ₹16.68. Current P/E = 17.9x (CMP ₹299). Sector median P/E for power/transmission = 17.9x. POWERGRID trades at sector median, not premium, despite Maharatna status and monopoly transmission footprint. Conservative 16x–19x band.

Range: ₹267 – ₹317

Method 2: EV/EBITDA Based

TTM EBITDA = ₹38,958 Cr. Current EV = ₹4,05,385 Cr → EV/EBITDA = 10.4x. Quality infrastructure / utilities trade at 8x–12x. Near-zero regulatory risk given government backing.

EV range (9x–11x): ₹3,50,600 Cr – ₹4,28,500 Cr → Per share (930Cr shares):

Range: ₹376 – ₹460

Method 3: DCF Based

Base FCF: ₹36,223 Cr (FY25 OCF). Growth: 5–7% for 5 years (elevated capex phase). Terminal growth: 3%. WACC: 9.5% (low risk).

→ PV of 5-year FCFs at 9.5%: ~₹1,75,000 Cr
→ Terminal Value (3% growth / 6.5% cap rate): ~₹2,65,000 Cr
→ Total EV: ~₹4,40,000 Cr (after debt of ₹1,35,984 Cr)

Range: ₹310 – ₹370

Fair Min: ₹267 CMP: ₹299 Fair Max: ₹460
CMP ₹299
⚠️ EduInvesting Fair Value Range: ₹267 – ₹460. CMP ₹299 sits in the lower quartile, indicating room on the upside if execution accelerates and debt ratios improve. This fair value range is for educational purposes only and is not investment advice. Please consult a SEBI-registered investment advisor before making any financial decision.

The RoW Miracle & The TBCB Portfolio Flip

🟢 The Execution Inflection: Finally Breaking Through

For three years, POWERGRID missed capex targets due to Right-of-Way (RoW) constraints, land delays, and transformer supply bottlenecks. All three are now improving. Government of India issued revised RoW compensation guidelines in March 2025 (and again in December 2025). States adopted them. Market-rate compensation is now standard. The result: commissioning jumped to ₹18,700 crore in 9M (vs ₹7,423 crore last year). Management confidence is warranted. They’re raising FY26 targets to ₹32,000 crore CapEx and >₹22,000 crore capitalization, and publicly stating intent to exceed both.

✅ Critical Assets Commissioned

  • • 765 kV D/C Khetri–Narela (8.1 GW Rajasthan solar evacuation)
  • • Khavda II-B & II-C (9 GW renewable evacuation)
  • • Ahmedabad–Lakadia & Navsari lines (critical for UMPPS)
  • • 1500 MVA 765/400 kV transformers at 5 locations
  • • New substations: Narela, Ananthapuram

⚠️ Portfolio Shift: The Real Transformation

  • • Backlog ₹1,45,513 Cr: 80–90% TBCB, 10–20% RTM
  • • TBCB = Tariff-Based Competitive Bidding (variable returns)
  • • RTM = Regulated Tariff Mechanism (cost-plus, 14.5% return)
  • • Future pipeline ~₹3.6 lakh Cr bidding over 4 years
  • • Market share guidance: maintain 50–60% win rate

✅ New Growth Vectors

  • • Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS): First 150 MW/350 MWh Kalikiri win
  • • Data Centres: Pilot in Manesar; renewable self-consumption 50% achieved
  • • Green Hydrogen: Pilot at Neemrana
  • • International PPP: Kenya transmission project with Africa50 (₹311 cr estimated)
  • • ESG tech: Ester-oil transformers, 35–40% ROW reduction via monopoles

⚠️ Regulatory Headwinds

  • • HVDC bidding delayed due to equipment sourcing (only 3 global suppliers)
  • • Transformer capacity constraint: India capacity ~2.28 lakh MVA, demand ~4.21 lakh MVA
  • • Fines: BSE/NSE fined ₹5.42 lakh each for Reg 17(1) non-compliance (Feb 2026)
  • • Terrain challenges: Leh-Ladakh, desert geographies, forest clearances remain “pain points”
💬 Here’s the question: Does a TBCB portfolio shift (where 80–90% of future projects are competitively bid) strengthen or weaken POWERGRID’s earnings visibility? Drop your view.

Large CapEx Means Larger Borrowings

Source table
Item (₹ Cr) Mar 2023 Mar 2024 Mar 2025 Sep 2025 (Latest)
Total Assets252,225250,829266,019278,412
Net Worth (Eq + Reserves)83,02687,14692,66398,906
Borrowings128,584123,516131,030135,984
CWIP (Capital Work In Progress)13,77218,19733,58543,808
Debt / Equity1.55x1.42x1.41x1.37x
📈 CWIP Exploded
Capital Work-in-Progress ballooned from ₹33,585 Cr (Mar’25) to ₹43,808 Cr (Sep’25). This is the commissioning pipeline. As these projects move from CWIP to fixed assets, they’ll generate tariff income. Pipeline is real.
💰 Debt Improving
Despite massive capex, debt-to-equity improved from 1.55x (Mar’23) to 1.37x (Sep’25). Internal accruals (~₹36k Cr annual OCF) are covering significant capex. Government is funding ~70–80% of capex through debt; rest through internal.
📊 Asset Quality
Gross fixed assets are now ₹3,04,336 Cr (CMD cited crossing ₹3 trillion). Largely cost-plus tariff assets (94.5% of gross block), meaning revenue recovery is contracted upfront.

₹36,000 Crore OCF. Then What?

Source table
Cash Flow (₹ Cr)FY23FY24FY259M FY26
Operating CF+40,203+37,290+36,223+26,761*
Investing CF-7,138-13,114-23,533-26,761*
Financing CF-30,450-25,903-12,357-12,000*
Net Cash Flow+2,615-1,728+333-12,000*
✅ ₹36k–40k Cr Operating CFStable, predictable, large. Reflects tariff-based model and early cash collection from customers (state distribution utilities backed by LoC mechanism). This is the foundation funding capex and dividends.
⚠️ CapEx PhaseInvesting CF swung to -₹26,761 Cr in 9M FY26 (vs -₹13,114 Cr in FY25). This is the big build-out. Management guided ₹32,000 Cr for full FY26; ₹37,000 Cr for FY27; ₹45,000 Cr for FY28. Intentional and funded, but debt will climb.
📊 Financing In ControlFinancing CF of -₹12,357 Cr (FY25) reflects dividend payout (~62.6% payout ratio) and some debt management. Not aggressive. As capex decelerates post-FY28, surplus cash will flow to shareholder returns.
📈 Collection StrengthTrade receivable days have reduced to “lowest ever” 24.65 days. Realization at 103% vs billing. Cash collection efficiency well above 100%. Zero delinquency risk given PoC mechanism.

How Does A Utility Score Against Itself?

ROE17.0%5yr avg: 18.5%
ROCE12.8%vs 13.0% Mar’25
P/E17.9xSector Median
OPM82.3%Stable, Exceptional
Debt / Equity1.37xRising (CapEx phase)
EV/EBITDA10.4xFair for Utilities
Dividend Yield3.01%Sustainable Payout
Interest Coverage3.27xComfortable
Utilities aren’t judged by ROCE alone. POWERGRID’s ROCE of 12.8% is lower than, say, a telecom company (but utilities are capital-intensive and regulated). What matters: ROE of 17%, operating margins of 82%, zero default risk, and tariff-backed cashflows. The debt climb is temporary and intended. Post-FY28, capex normalizes and debt ratios stabilize.

Annual Trends — FY23 to 9M FY26

Source table
Metric (₹ Cr)FY23FY24FY259M FY26
Revenue45,60345,84345,79235,714
EBITDA39,57639,24438,83729,846
EBITDA Margin %87%86%85%84%
PAT15,42015,57315,52111,382
EPS (₹)16.5816.7416.6912.24 (annualized: 16.3)
Revenue CAGR (3yr)+0.3%Stagnant (Bottlenecks)
PAT CAGR (3yr)+0.07%Completely Flat
9M FY26 Annualised₹47,619 CrRevenue (if flat Q4)

This is the picture of a company that was growth-capped for three years. FY23, FY24, FY25 revenue was essentially identical (~₹45.8k Cr). But the 9M FY26 pace suggests a potential acceleration. If they sustain this trajectory into FY27–28 with all the TBCB wins in the backlog, the growth story will restart.

POWERGRID vs The Other Grid Guys

IndiGrid TrustP/E 57.5xROCE 7.5%₹187 Bn
Powergrid InfraP/E 6.1xROCE 16.0%₹83 Bn
REC LtdP/E 10.2xROCE 14.2%Financier
Median UtilityP/E 16.5xROCE 11.2%Sector Avg
Source table
CompanyQtr Revenue (₹ Cr)Qtr PAT (₹ Cr)P/EROCE %Market Cap (₹ Cr)
Power Grid Corpn12,3954,18517.9x12.8%2,78,228
IndiGrid Trust (Infrastructure)86210057.5x7.5%18,725
Powergrid Infrastructure3171986.1x16.0%8,308
Median (4 Utilities)58914817.9x10.1%13,517

POWERGRID is the king by scale. IndiGrid Trust is a pure-play infrastructure trust trading at a premium multiple and lower ROCE. Powergrid Infrastructure (subsidiary) is tiny and cheaper. POWERGRID trades at sector median, not a significant premium—despite owning 45% of India’s transmission network.

Who Owns The Grid?

Govt 51.3% President of India
  • President of India (Promoter)51.34%
  • Public (Retail & Institutional)3.67%
  • FIIs24.73%
  • DIIs (incl. LIC)20.19%

Promoter pledge: 0.00%. Shareholders: 13.74 million (and climbing). Government is the majority owner but runs the company like a listed entity with transparency and dividend discipline.

Promoter: Government of India (51.3%)

President of India as nominee. Maharatna CPSU status. Works for Ministry of Power. Strategic importance: ensures energy security and transmission network continuity. The government isn’t exiting. This is a permanent structure.

Foreign Ownership at 24.7%

FIIs hold nearly one-quarter of the company. LIC (through various funds) is a significant DII investor. Institutional participation is strong, indicating institutional confidence in the dividend yield, tariff-backed model, and India’s infrastructure thesis.

How Clean Is The Cupboard?

✅ The Boring Excellence

  • ✓ AAA Credit Rating (ICRA, reaffirmed Dec 2025) — highest safety
  • ✓ 37 straight years of dividend payouts (since IPO). Current yield 3.01%
  • ✓ Clean audit history — no material qualifications or reservations
  • ✓ Zero promoter pledge — 0.00% throughout
  • ✓ Collection efficiency >100% — PoC mechanism + LoC security
  • ✓ Interest coverage of 3.27x — comfortable debt service
  • ✓ ROE of 18.5% (5yr avg) — capital efficiently deployed

⚠️ The Watch Items

  • ⚠ Recent fines (Feb 2026): BSE/NSE fined ₹5.42 lakh each for Reg 17(1) non-compliance
  • ⚠ Capex execution risk: CWIP at ₹43,800 Cr. Commissioning delays hit earnings
  • ⚠ TBCB portfolio shift: 80–90% of future projects are competitively bid (variable returns)
  • ⚠ Debt rising: D/E at 1.37x. Will climb further in capex cycle
  • ⚠ Transformer supply constraint: India capacity vs demand gap exists through FY27

India’s Energy Transition & Why The Grid Is The Bet

India is adding ~120 GW of renewable capacity annually. Solar and wind are cheap, abundant, and distant from load centres. Transmission capacity to evacuate this power is the constraint, not generation. POWERGRID’s ₹3.6 lakh crore pipeline by 2032 is essentially the transmission backbone required to make India’s 500 GW renewable target feasible. No competing network can be built. Regulatory approval is guaranteed. Tariffs are indexed to inflation. This is not a commodity business—it’s infrastructure that the system *must* have.

🌿 The Renewable Evacuation Play

POWERGRID’s ₹1.09 lakh crore in TBCB projects are largely renewable evacuation lines. Khavda (9 GW), Khetri (8.1 GW), Rajasthan–Mumbai corridor, Bhadla II–III extensions—these are all solar/wind evacuation. Every megawatt of renewable energy that flows to the grid passes through a POWERGRID line. This is the definition of a captured growth opportunity. As renewable capacity scales (and it will), POWERGRID tariffs and project awards auto-scale proportionally.

⚡ The TBCB Risk (But Not Really)

Competitive bidding means lower returns on individual projects compared to cost-plus (14.5% RoE). But execution risk is transferred to the lowest bidder. Win probability scales with POWERGRID’s execution reputation. They’ve won 50–60% of bids despite competing against REC and others. Lower per-project margin, but 10x more project volume in the pipeline. It’s a scale-up strategy disguised as a risk. Management confidence in maintaining 50–60% market share suggests they believe their execution moat is defensible.

🔋 Emerging Vectors (BESS, Data Centre, Green Hydrogen)

POWERGRID’s first Battery Energy Storage win (150 MW/350 MWh Kalikiri) is instructive. They’re positioning for a future where grid stability becomes as critical as transmission capacity. Data centre immersion cooling (pilot at Manesar) and green hydrogen (pilot at Neemrana) are early bets on India’s energy mix evolution. Not meaningful today, but optionality for 2030+ is real.

⚠️ Execution Headwinds: Can They Stay Broken?

Three years ago, POWERGRID couldn’t execute because of RoW delays, land acquisition friction, and transformer supply gaps. Recent improvement is evident. But history teaches caution: the moment capex targets get aggressive, bottlenecks resurface. Equipment sourcing is still constrained (only 3 global HVDC suppliers; transformer capacity gap persists). Management is betting that bulk procurement, state-level RoW adoption, and dedicated execution cells will sustain the current velocity. Worth watching quarterly.

Competitive moat: POWERGRID owns 45% of India’s transmission network. Regulation prevents duplication. Government backing ensures credit quality. Scale gives them leverage with equipment suppliers. Execution track record (despite recent delays) is stronger than peers. This is not a competitive industry—it’s a regulated near-monopoly with growth kickers.

💬 Here’s the thing: If RoW constraints ease and transformer supply improves, POWERGRID’s capitalisation could accelerate to ₹30k–35k Cr annually. Does that change the valuation calculus? What’s your base case?

The Grid Wakes Up

Power Grid was in the penalty box for three years. Capex targets missed. Commissioning delayed. Analysts complained. The stock returned 13.6% annually but didn’t deliver earnings growth. Q3 FY26 changed the narrative. Execution inflected. Management raised guidance. RoW constraints are actually easing. CWIP at ₹43,800 Cr is being systematically commissioned. This is not hype. This is data-driven confidence backed by ground reality (new assets being energised every quarter).

The Capex Supercycle Story: FY26 ₹32,000 Cr → FY27 ₹37,000 Cr → FY28 ₹45,000 Cr. This is the intentional ramp-up to capture India’s renewable evacuation opportunity. Post-FY28, capex should normalise to ~₹15k–20k Cr annually. The elevated spend is temporary and funded. Debt-to-equity will peak in FY27–28, then decline as depreciation kicks in and interest coverage remains comfortable at 3.27x.

The TBCB Portfolio Shift: Moving from 100% cost-plus (14.5% RoE guaranteed) to 80–90% TBCB (variable returns, higher execution risk) sounds scary. It’s not. Larger project volumes, proven execution track record (50–60% win rate), and near-monopoly position in transmission mitigate risk. Lower margin per project, but 10–15x project count. Net effect: scale-up in earnings power over the medium term.

Valuation Context: CMP ₹299 is at sector median P/E of 17.9x. Fair value range ₹267–₹460 (depending on terminal CapEx profile and TBCB win probability). Dividend yield of 3.01% is sustainable (62.6% payout ratio). The stock has delivered 13.6% CAGR over 1 year, 20.5% over 3 years, 19.3% over 5 years—driven by dividend yield + modest price appreciation. That pattern likely continues if execution holds.

✓ Strengths

  • 45% of India’s transmission network — near-monopoly
  • ₹36k Cr annual operating cash flow — fortress financials
  • Tariff-backed revenue for 94.5% of assets
  • ₹3.6 lakh Cr pipeline aligned to renewable energy rollout
  • Execution inflection showing in Q3 FY26 results
  • AAA credit rating + 51.3% government backing
  • 37 years of unbroken dividend payouts

✗ Weaknesses

  • Low ROCE at 12.8% (vs 15%+ for quality industrials)
  • Revenue growth stagnant (0.3% CAGR FY23–FY25)
  • TBCB portfolio shift lowers margin visibility
  • Debt climbing (D/E rising from 1.37x to TBD in FY27)
  • Execution history: missed targets for 3 years
  • Transformer supply gap (capacity vs demand)
  • International expansion nascent (Africa PPP only at pilot stage)

→ Opportunities

  • India’s 500 GW renewable target = renewable evacuation demand
  • HVDC projects (Barmer II, Bikaner V, Paradeep–Andaman)
  • BESS & energy storage (first win; uptake expected)
  • Data centre cooling (immersion fluid business 4–5 years out)
  • Green hydrogen transmission infrastructure
  • International PPP (Africa, SAARC, Southeast Asia)
  • Tariff escalation tied to WPI/inflation

⚡ Threats

  • Execution relapse (RoW delays resurface)
  • Equipment supply bottleneck persists (HVDC, transformers)
  • Competitively bid projects compress margins faster than expected
  • Interest rate environment (INR weakness, borrowing costs)
  • State distribution utility defaults (counterparty risk)
  • Regulatory delays (forest clearances, CERC approvals)
  • Data centre/green hydrogen bets don’t materialise on timeline

Power Grid Corporation is no longer a boring dividend machine. It’s a scaled execution story with optionality.

The company is positioned at the centre of India’s renewable energy transition. Transmission is the constraint, not generation. The government is backing them. The capex is funded. Execution is finally improving. And the stock trades at sector median valuation despite owning a near-monopoly in critical infrastructure.

Fair value range ₹267–₹460 reflects three scenarios: conservative (current trajectory), base case (TBCB wins at 50–60% probability), and bull case (capex acceleration + renewable boom). CMP ₹299 is squarely in the lower range of fair value, suggesting upside if execution sustains or accelerates.

The dividend yield of 3.01% plus price appreciation from earnings growth should deliver mid-to-high teens returns over a 3–5 year horizon. This is not a rocket-ship stock. It’s a well-managed government CPSU with improving execution, fortress finances, and a growth kicker tied to India’s energy transition. That’s worth paying attention to.

⚠️ EduInvesting Fair Value Range: ₹267 – ₹460. This analysis is strictly for educational purposes and does not constitute investment advice. Please consult a SEBI-registered investment advisor before making any financial decision.

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