Naga Dhunseri Group Ltd Q2 FY26 – A ₹346 Cr Investment Saga with 4,406% Sales Growth, -135% Profit Crash, and a ₹13,064 Book Value Per Share That Can Buy You a Small Island
Welcome to the glittering world of Naga Dhunseri Group Ltd (NDGL) — where numbers behave like soap bubbles: shiny, floating high, and popping unexpectedly. The company’s Q2 FY26 results left analysts blinking — Sales jumped 4,406% YoY to ₹168.5 crore while Profit After Tax (PAT) nosedived 135% YoY to ₹7.34 crore. That’s right, a company with ₹13,064 book value per share (yes, you read that right) is somehow trading at ₹2,954, or just 0.23x its book value.
NDGL sits on a ₹295 crore market cap, ₹234 crore in debt, and a price-to-earnings ratio of 10.3 — which sounds fine until you realize the return on equity (ROE) is a sleepy 3.19%. The company is a registered NBFC but operates more like a wealthy retiree — content collecting dividends, playing around in equities, and occasionally buying or selling subsidiaries like an overenthusiastic art collector.
The stock has been on a slide, down -42.6% in one year and -24% in just three months, proving once again that even investment companies can’t escape market mood swings.
So what exactly happened in this quarter? Why did revenues skyrocket but profits trip over their own shoelaces? Grab your calculator (and maybe a drink) — we’re diving in.
2. Introduction
Naga Dhunseri Group Ltd — a name that sounds like a royal tea dynasty but actually runs an NBFC investment portfolio — has been around since 1995. Think of it as a quiet investor that prefers dividends and long-term holdings over risky lending or tech adventures.
In Q2 FY26, the company delivered one of the most dramatic quarter-on-quarter swings in the NBFC space. Sales ballooned from ₹119.6 crore in June 2025 to ₹168.5 crore in September 2025, while profits did a cartwheel in the opposite direction — from ₹33.9 crore profit to ₹7.34 crore loss.
It’s like running a race with jet boosters only to trip at the finish line. But NDGL isn’t new to volatility — its financials have historically behaved like the Sensex during budget week.
And yet, under the chaos lies a calm, calculated investor mentality. With 74% of its assets in associates (like Dhunseri Investments Ltd) and 22% in quoted equities, NDGL is basically a family office wearing an NBFC badge. It earns money from dividends (23%), rentals (3%), and net trading gains (61%).
But can an investment house sustain itself on fluctuating market gains? Let’s break down the math — and the madness.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
Let’s be honest: explaining NDGL’s business to your parents would be like explaining crypto to your grandparents. “They invest in investments,” you’d say — and that’s basically correct.
NDGL is a Non-Systemically Important Non-Deposit Taking NBFC, which is a fancy way of saying:
“We don’t take your money, we just play with ours.”
Their primary job is to invest in shares, debentures, and bonds, often within the Dhunseri ecosystem — think Dhunseri Investments Ltd and Dhunseri Tea & Industries Ltd (DTIL). In November 2024, NDGL went full Bollywood — acquiring a 45.77% stake in Dhunseri Tea, making it a subsidiary, while simultaneously selling 8.79% of Dhunseri Ventures Ltd (DVL). Drama, diversification, and dividends — the holy trinity of NBFC life.
Apart from this, NDGL also owns real estate, which explains its tiny slice of rental income.
In short, NDGL makes its money like a pro portfolio manager with a caffeine habit — juggling equities, associates, and corporate shares while sipping dividend tea from its own subsidiaries.
4. Financials Overview
Quarterly Comparison Table (Consolidated Figures in ₹ Crore)
Metric
Sep’25 (Latest Qtr)
Sep’24 (YoY)
Jun’25 (Prev Qtr)
YoY %
QoQ %
Revenue
168.5
3.74
119.6
+4,406%
+41%
EBITDA
26.2
3.3
28.1
+695%
-6.7%
PAT
7.34
16.68
33.87
-56%
-78%
EPS (₹)
-20.1
166.8
273.5
-112%
-107%
Commentary: NDGL’s revenue numbers look like they swallowed a rocket, but the PAT crashed harder than a midcap on results day. The story here is simple: gains from investments ballooned, but mark-to-market adjustments and higher expenses clipped profits.
The company’s Operating Profit Margin (OPM) for the quarter stood at 15.6%, down from a mighty 23.5% last quarter — showing how quickly fortunes shift when your “products” are shares.
And that negative EPS? Classic sign of market-to-market losses despite solid operating income.
5. Valuation Discussion – Fair Value Range Only
Let’s play valuation three ways:
(a) P/E Method
EPS (TTM): ₹310 Industry P/E: 21.1 Current P/E: 10.3 So, if NDGL were valued at industry average: Fair Value = ₹310 × 21.1 = ₹6,541 At current P/E of 10.3: Fair Value = ₹310 × 10.3 = ₹3,193
✅ Fair Value Range: ₹3,200 – ₹6,500 per share
(b) EV/EBITDA Method
EV = ₹512 Cr EBITDA (TTM) = ₹74 Cr EV/EBITDA = 6.9 (Current) If sector median is ~10x: Fair Value Range (EV basis): ₹510 – ₹740 Cr → ₹2,940 – ₹4,300 per share
(c) DCF (Simplified)
Assuming 5% perpetual growth, 10% cost of capital, and ₹40 Cr free cash flow: FV = FCF × (1+g)/(r–g) = 40 × 1.05 / 0.05 = ₹840 Cr Divided by 1 million shares → ₹8,400/share theoretical ceiling