General information and entertainment, not investment advice. The author is not a SEBI-registered adviser or research analyst. No recommendation, no promised returns. Markets carry risk including loss of capital. Figures may not be current. Consult a registered adviser before acting.
1. At a Glance
Inox Green posted a PAT of ₹103 crore for FY26, a jump of 373% from ₹22 crore in FY25.
The portfolio sits at 13+ GWp of renewable O&M assets. The wind arm carries ₹281 crore in revenue against an operating margin of 8.2%—thin, but stable in an annuity business where monthly service contracts run for 5–20 years.
On the balance sheet, depreciation fell from ₹53 crore to ₹1.7 crore after NCLT approval of a demerger that strips out the evacuation infra business into a sister company. Post-demerger, the income statement will look sharper.
The tension sits here: management guidance says FY27 EBITDA will hit ₹600+ crore post-consolidation of two large O&M acquisitions, but ₹40+ crore of FY26’s reported profit came from “other income”—mainly treasury gains and acquisition-linked gains, not recurring O&M cashflow.
What changed and what to watch: portfolio consolidation post-acquisition and the demerger’s accounting impact on next year’s P&L.
2. Introduction
Inox Green is the listed arm of Inox Wind Limited’s (IWL) operations and maintenance business.
The company, spun out as a subsidiary in 2012, operates wind turbines and associated infrastructure for customers across India—independent power producers, utilities, and corporates. The O&M model is annuity-like: long-term contracts lock in revenue with predictable renewal. The parent, IWL, is a turbine manufacturer and EPC player, offering strategic synergy.
FY26 marked a step-change: revenue grew 19% to ₹281 crore. PAT went from ₹22 crore to ₹103 crore, a 373% jump—pulled partly by ₹57 crore in other income (treasury, acquisitions, value-added services) and a dramatic drop in depreciation post-demerger approval.
The bigger story is two-fold. First, management is mid-acquisition of two large operational O&M portfolios totalling 6.5 GW. Second, the evacuation infra business—a heavy-depreciation drag—is being carved out, simplifying the balance sheet.
Market cap is ₹7,217 crore as of the reference date. The stock trades at 70× earnings on an FY26 EPS of ₹2.55.
3. Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
Inox Green provides three service layers: operation, maintenance, and value-added.
Operation services mean a 24/7 control room monitoring your wind farm and extracting the highest yield in prevailing wind conditions. The company deploys onsite teams to manage turbine health, output and customer relationships.
Maintenance splits into predictive and reactive. Reactive is the old way: wait for failure, repair, take downtime. Predictive means detecting faults before they cascade—detecting bearing wear, blade stress, generator issues weeks early and fixing them during scheduled windows. Downtime shrinks, availability climbs. Inox Green’s reported machine availability for FY26 was 96.5%, consistent across the fleet.
Value-added services include WTG overhauls to extend turbine life, performance optimization, booster sales, carbon credit trading, and hybrid energy solutions. These are margin-accretive: ₹10 crore of FY26’s other income came from value-added services classified as non-operating.
The revenue model, per management: ₹80 crore topline and ₹40 crore EBITDA per 1 GW under management. That math would imply ₹224–280 crore revenue and ₹112–140 crore EBITDA at the current 3.5 GW of operational wind portfolio—close to reported FY26 output if you separate wind from solar and exclude other income noise.
The company is expanding into solar O&M and hybrid asset management, riding tailwinds in India’s renewable capacity push. The parent, IWL, provides critical lift: every turbine sold by IWL becomes a natural inflow to Inox Green’s order book for O&M. The group’s stated target is 10 GW under management within 3–4 years; current announced M&A (Wind World’s 4.5 GW portfolio) and organic growth from IWL orders set the path.
4. Financials Overview
Figures are consolidated, in ₹ crore.
| Metric | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | YoY Growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 224.3 | 220.2 | 281.0 | 27.6% |
| EBITDA | 75 | 122.8 | 209.7 | 70.8% |
| Profit After Tax | 27.9 | 21.9 | 103.4 | 372.1% |
| EPS (Annual) | 0.95 | 0.54 | 2.55 | 372.2% |
Q4 FY26 (Jan–Mar 2026):
| Metric | Q4 FY26 | Q4 FY25 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 68.7 Cr | 64.5 Cr |
| EBITDA | 57.0 Cr | 29.6 Cr |
| PAT | 28.1 Cr | 6.4 Cr |
The quarter-on-quarter PAT spike (from ₹25.2 Cr in Q3 to ₹28.1 Cr in Q4) came partly from ₹50.8 crore in other income in Q4—a spike that management attributed to ₹40 crore in “acquisition-related gains” (debt acquired on subsidiaries), ₹10 crore from value-added services, and ₹10 crore from treasury income.
Reported earnings quality: When depreciation collapsed from ₹53 crore in FY25 to ₹1.7 crore in FY26, the PAT jump looked steeper than the operating business warranted. This is an accounting artifact: the NCLT-approved demerger of evacuation infra (asset-heavy, high depreciation) eliminates that drag. Operating EBITDA grew healthily (71%), but the PAT multiplier was inflated by one-time demerger effects and acquisition-linked treasury gains.
Management guided FY27 EBITDA at ₹600+ crore post-acquisition consolidation, implying that the acquired O&M assets will contribute a large jump. But again, a portion of that earnings flow will be “other income” until the acquisitions are fully integrated.
5. Market Expectations & Historical Multiples
This section describes how the market is currently pricing the company and how that compares with its own history and peer group. It is descriptive, not predictive.
| Metric | Current | Historical Average (5yr) | Peer Median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 70.5x | 168x | 27.0x |
| EV/EBITDA | 40.4x | – | – |
| P/B | 4.23x | – | 2.0x |
| ROE | 5.62% | 3.19% (3yr) | 5.62% |
| ROCE | 8.42% | – | 7.09% |
The market currently pays 70.5× earnings here, a steep compression from the 5-year average of 168× but still 2.6× the peer median (power generation utilities average 27×).
The high multiple reflects several embedded expectations. First, the company is India’s only listed pure-play renewable O&M provider—a category with few comparables. Second, the portfolio is set to grow from 3.5 GW (operational) to 10+ GW (post-acquisition and organic), and the rule-of-thumb ₹40 crore EBITDA per GW implies per-GW profitability will remain steady or improve. Third, the parent company’s order book (3.1 GW for IWL, with group demand of 1/3 of execution going to IGESL-managed projects) provides multi-year revenue visibility.
On the other side, ROE of 5.62% and ROCE of 8.42% sit below cost of equity and weighted average cost of capital, respectively. The company is returning capital it deploys without a meaningful spread. However, management attributes this to (a) heavy upfront capex in the demerged evacuation infra (now removed from the balance sheet), and (b) working capital drag from high debtor days (216 days). Both are expected to improve post-demerger and post-acquisition integration.
The market also appears to be pricing in the demerger and acquisition consolidation as substantially complete by mid-FY27. Until those happen, the stock carries execution risk and accounting noise.
6. What’s Cooking
Wind World acquisition (announced Feb 2026, NCLT resolution approved): Inox Green to acquire ~4.5 GW of operational wind O&M assets from the distressed Wind World portfolio via NCLT resolution. Deal size not disclosed; expected to close by end of FY27. This is the largest announced acquisition and drives management’s ₹600+ Cr EBITDA guidance for FY27.
Demerger of evacuation infra (NCLT approved March 2026, effective May 4, 2026): Inox Green is hiving off its common infrastructure business (substations, power evacuation) into Inox Renewable Solutions (IRSL). IRSL will be separately listed post remaining regulatory clearances. This strips ₹1,000 crore in gross block and ₹50–55 crore annual depreciation from Inox Green, making the O&M business appear leaner and more profitable on paper.
Second acquisition (details limited): Management flagged investments in a second operational O&M asset acquisition alongside Wind World, expected to consolidate post-FY26. The combined 6.5 GW target was set in concalls; details are sparse. Both acquisitions are being funded from cash reserves and internal accrual.
Inox Clean Energy orders (internal demand): The parent’s IPP arm (Inox Clean Energy) targets 14 GW of operational capacity by FY29, adding ~3 GW annually. Wind is expected to be 20–30% of additions, implying ~600–900 MW annual wind O&M inflows to Inox Green. This has been positioned as de-risking revenue and smoothing the working capital cycle.
Life extension overhaul packages (new offering): Launched commercial overhaul programs to extend turbine life and improve output. Management said this has “substantial potential,” but no revenue contribution was quantified yet.
Warrant conversion and equity issuance (Feb 2026): Allotment of ~19.9 crore shares at ₹145 on warrant conversion, increasing paid-up capital. Shareholding slightly diluted, but capital raised supports acquisition funding.
7. Balance Sheet
| Item | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | 2,083 | 2,487 | 2,113 |
| Net Worth (Equity + Reserves) | 1,346 | 1,967 | 1,707 |
| Borrowings | 174 | 181 | 88 |
| Other Liabilities | 564 | 339 | 317 |
Assets check: Total assets of ₹2,113 crore balance gross liabilities of ₹2,113 crore (equity ₹1,707 Cr + borrowings ₹88 Cr + other liabilities ₹317 Cr). The math holds.
Three observations:
Equity is shrinking faster than the business is growing. Net worth fell from ₹1,967 crore in FY25 to ₹1,707 crore in FY26 despite a ₹103 crore profit, because the company is returning capital to promoters and funding acquisitions from cash. The ₹260 crore drop in FY25 reflects demerger-related balance sheet cleanup and prior equity infusions getting written down.
Debt is now trivial at ₹88 crore, down from ₹174 crore in FY24. The company has delevered aggressively, using equity raises and cash reserves to fund acquisitions. Interest expense fell from ₹25 crore to ₹8.8 crore. This is strategically sound but leaves the company equity-intensive: return on equity of 5.62% is weak for an equity-heavy firm.
The depreciation cliff is real. Net block fell from ₹755 crore (FY24) to ₹704 crore (FY25) to ₹15 crore (FY26). The demerger eliminated the heavy-depreciation evacuation infra assets, flattening the P&L for next year in a way that will confuse comparatives.
8. Cash Flow: Sab Number Game Hai
| Year | Operating | Investing | Financing |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY24 | -8 | -63 | 79 |
| FY25 | 60 | -637 | 572 |
| FY26 | 67 | -293 | 307 |
Operating cash turned positive in FY25 and FY26 (₹60 Cr and ₹67 Cr respectively), a shift from the ₹8 crore outflow in FY24. The O&M business is now self-funding, though still modest in absolute terms.
Investing cash is a story of acquisition. FY25 saw ₹637 crore outflow on the acquisition of two large O&M companies. FY26 saw ₹293 crore more—continuing consolidation and capex on common infra. Financing activity (equity raises and debt reduction) offset the capex burn.
The wisdom here is that acquisition cash is coming from balance sheet cash reserves (₹505 crore in hand as of the reference date), not debt. This puts a ceiling on how quickly the company can deploy: FY27 guidance of ₹600+ Cr EBITDA assumes the Wind World deal closes and starts contributing within 12 months. If there are regulatory delays, cash could tighten.
9. Ratios: Sexy or Stressy?
| Ratio | FY26 | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| ROE | 5.62% | Equity is working at 5.6 paise per rupee—below cost of capital. Much of this is a timing artifact: pre-demerger capex in common infra drags returns; post-demerger, the same equity base supports a leaner, higher-margin O&M business. Management targets ROCE to improve materially post-consolidation. |
| ROCE | 8.42% | Capital employed returned 8.4%, another miss against weighted cost of capital (~9–10% implied). Again, elevated depreciation pre-demerger inflated the capital base relative to earnings. Post-demerger and post-acquisition, the metric should improve. |
| P/E | 70.5× | The market is pricing in a near-term earnings step-up from acquisitions and a normalization of returns post-demerger. Historical P/E has ranged from 27× to 168×; current 70× sits mid-range but still 2.6× peer average, reflecting unique growth profile and lower comparables universe. |
| PAT Margin | 36.8% | Net margin is flattered by other income. Operating margin (EBITDA/Sales) is 8.2%—thin and appropriate for an annuity business with moderate pricing power. Underlying operational margin is the truer guide. |
| D/E | 0.05 | Debt-to-equity is trivial. The company is nearly equity-financed, a strength for credit but a drag on returns given low ROCE. |
10. P&L Breakdown: Show Me The Money
| Year | Revenue | EBITDA | PAT |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY24 | 224 | 75 | 28 |
| FY25 | 220 | 123 | 22 |
| FY26 | 281 | 210 | 103 |
Revenue took a dip in FY25 (₹220 Cr vs ₹224 Cr in FY24), a blip attributed to execution delays and one-time project issues. FY26 rebounded with 27.6% growth to ₹281 crore—the first multi-year organic growth in the reported segment.
EBITDA grew faster than revenue (71% vs 27%), signaling margin expansion. The jump is partly operational (better portfolio utilization, efficiency gains) and partly accounting-driven (depreciation collapse post-demerger approval). Underlying operational EBITDA margin, stripping out other income effects, sits around 35–40% if you back out the ₹57 crore in other income.
PAT multiplied 373% but is distorted by other income (₹57 Cr of a ₹103 Cr PAT) and the depreciation collapse (₹52 crore swing year-on-year). Stripping out both effects, normalized PAT would be ₹50–60 crore, still a solid 25%+ YoY improvement on the underlying O&M business.
The trajectory shows a stabilizing platform: the core O&M business (₹281 Cr revenue, ₹35–40 Cr underlying EBITDA) is maturing. Acquisitions and demerger will provide the next inflection.
11. Peer Comparison
| Company | Revenue | PAT | P/E | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NTPC | 187,385 | 27,053 | 12.6× | 14.4% |
| Adani Green | 12,928 | 1,831 | 130.9× | 14.2% |
| JSW Energy | 18,901 | 2,283 | 44.4× | 12.1% |
| NTPC Green | 2,858 | 523 | 156.6× | 18.3% |
| NHPC | 11,615 | 3,766 | 19.2× | 32.4% |
| NLC India | 17,490 | 3,522 | 12.2× | 20.2% |
| Inox Green | 281 | 103 | 70.5× | 36.8% |
Inox Green is smallest by revenue but trades at a higher P/E than most peers except Adani Green and NTPC Green. This reflects scale premium: Adani Green and NTPC Green are capacity-driven stories with near-term earnings growth headroom; Inox Green is a service play and lacks the scale of large integrated utilities.
On margin, Inox Green’s 36.8% is inflated by other income. Underlying operational margin is 35–40% on EBITDA, sitting between high-margin utilities (NHPC 32%, NLC 20%) and lower-margin large-cap generalists (NTPC 14%, JSW 12%). The premium makes sense: O&M is lower-capex, annuity-based, and less cyclical than generation.
The tension: Inox Green’s P/E discount vs Adani Green and NTPC Green (both closer to 130–156×) reflects smaller size, execution risk on acquisitions, and the fact that growth is inorganic (buy other portfolios) rather than organic (build new capacity). Peer comparables underline the stock’s premium-to-median but discount-to-growth-rated peers dynamic.
12. Miscellaneous: Shareholding & Promoters
| Holder | % |
|---|---|
| Promoters | 56.1% |
| FIIs | 8.7% |
| DIIs | 1.5% |
| Public | 33.6% |
Promoters (Inox Wind Limited, ~51%, plus minor holdings): IWL’s ownership is stable and aligned. The parent has absorbed losses in prior years and supported equity infusions to turn the unit around. No governance red flags. The promoter has not pledged holdings (0% pledged per Screener).
Inox Group history: The parent Inox group (INOXGFL) is a 90+ year old conglomerate spanning chemicals (GFL), wind turbines (IWL), and renewables (Inox Clean). The group has weathered several cycles and maintained strategic control. No recent major scandals or exit hints. The group is expanding rather than trimming the renewable platform.
Small caveat: the subsidiary structure (Inox Green is a subsidiary of IWL, which is 56% owned by INOXGFL) creates layered ownership and potential for capital allocation decisions at the parent level to diverge from minority shareholder interests. History suggests the group favors long-term value over quick exits.
13. Corporate Governance: Angels or Devils?
Auditors: Deloitte Haskins & Sells (FY26). Clean audits with no qualifications.
Board: Mukesh Manglik (whole-time director, renewed Feb 2026 for two-year term, no remuneration) chairs management. Other board details are light in the filings, but the whole-time director model is lean and appropriate for a subsidiary.
NCLT approvals: The demerger and acquisition schemes have all passed NCLT review (March 2026 and May 2026 respectively). No opposition flagged. Regulatory quality is sound.
Related-party transactions: Limited disclosures in the filings. The key related party is IWL (parent), which provides referrals and coordination on O&M contracts for its turbine sales. This is a natural benefit and a source of cost efficiency, not a red flag.
Pledging: 0% shares pledged. No promoter collateral risk.
Litigation / tax demands: No material outstanding demands flagged in recent announcements.
Dividend policy: Zero dividend since inception. All earnings are retained and deployed into acquisitions and balance sheet strengthening. This is appropriate for a growth-stage subsidiary but leaves public shareholders with no income yield and full exposure to the stock’s appreciation.
14. Industry Roast & Macro Context
India’s wind sector is expanding at its fastest pace in a decade. FY26 saw 6.05 GW added, the highest ever. The government targets 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030 and 1,800 GW by 2047, with wind expected to grow to 110 GW by 2030 (vs 56 GW today) and 400 GW by 2047.
Domestication mandates (ALMM) are pushing turbine component sourcing into India, locking in long-term manufacturing and O&M spend. Hybrid and RTC (round-the-clock) projects are gaining traction, offsetting solar’s variability with wind’s complementarity. This is a multi-decadal tailwind.
Where the sector chokes: interconnection delays, land and right-of-way disputes, and receivables cycles remain brutal. Debtor days of 216 (Inox Green) reflect the reality that wind projects often involve government off-takers or large corporates slow on payment. The grid, despite expanding capacity, struggles to evacuate power efficiently in peak seasons.
O&M is a small but growing slice of the larger wind pie. Traditional large turbine OEMs (GE, Siemens) have O&M arms, but Inox Green is India’s only listed pure-play. This scarcity value is real. However, competition from captive O&M (developers managing their own fleets) and new entrants (foreign O&M firms setting up India shops) is rising. Margins will compress as the market matures, but for the next 3–5 years, scarcity and the parent’s synergies should hold pricing power.
15. EduInvesting Verdict
| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|
| Annuity-based O&M contracts provide steady, long-term revenue visibility (5–20 year tenor). | ROE of 5.6% and ROCE of 8.4% are below cost of capital; the business is not generating economic profit. |
| Portfolio at 13+ GWp with 96.5% machine availability; track record of stable operations over 10+ years. | Working capital cycle is brutal—216 debtor days tie up ₹166 crore in receivables against ₹281 crore annual revenue. |
| Acquisitions of 6.5 GW (announced and funded) provide near-term EBITDA multiplier and offset organic growth plateau. | Acquisition integration risk is real; Wind World deal depends on timely NCLT closure and consolidation. |
| Demerger will reduce balance sheet depreciation by ₹50–55 crore, lifting reported P&L significantly. | Other income of ₹57 crore in FY26 inflates PAT; recurring O&M cashflow is more like ₹45–50 crore. |
| Parent (IWL) provides strategic synergy via customer referrals and order book visibility (~1/3 of execution). | P/E of 70.5× is steep; expects multi-year earnings step-up that depends on M&A close and demerger simplification. |
| Balance sheet is strong: ₹505 crore cash, ₹88 crore debt, D/E of 0.05. | Dividend history: zero payout, no income yield for public shareholders. |
Closing observation:
A company in the middle of two major corporate actions—a demerger and a multi-gigawatt acquisition—tends to have a compressed stock price that reprices once the actions land. Inox Green sits between execution risk and earnings inflection. The O&M platform itself is defensible: long contracts, reasonable margins, and a tailwind in India’s wind buildout. But the ₹7,200 crore market cap prices in near-perfect execution and meaningful improvement in returns on capital. Any slippage on acquisition close, any deterioration in debtor days post-consolidation, or any margin squeeze as the sector matures could reset expectations sharply. Equally, a clean close on Wind World and the demerger simplification could unlock a different multiple by mid-2027. The central tension is between a mature, stable business and a stock priced for growth. That tension will resolve within 12–18 months.