01 — At a Glance
The Classified Juggler: Four Businesses, One Stock.
- 52-Week High / Low₹1,550 / ₹973
- Q3 FY26 Revenue₹819 Cr
- Q3 FY26 Net Profit₹317 Cr
- Q3 FY26 EPS₹4.19
- Annualised EPS (Q3×4)₹16.76
- Book Value₹750
- Price to Book1.31x
- Dividend Yield0.61%
- Debt / Equity0.01x
- Cash Balance₹4,825 Cr
Auditor’s Opening Note: Info Edge closed Q3 FY26 with ₹819 crore revenue (+13% YoY), ₹317 crore net profit, and a dividend payout step-up to 65% of PAT (from 39% previously). They’re drowning in cash (₹4,825 crore) and are considering it a “problem worth having.” The stock has delivered -28.3% returns over 12 months, down from an all-time high of ₹1,550 just last year. Welcome to a stock that’s priced like a SaaS unicorn but behaves like a boring classified platform.
02 — Introduction
Meet the Classified Kings Who Can’t Classify Their Own Trajectory
Info Edge (India) Ltd is India’s original online classified company. Founded in 1997 by Sanjeev Bikhchandani and Hitesh Oberoi, when “online” was still a theoretical concept and “classified” meant newspaper ads. They built Naukri.com (recruitment), 99acres.com (real estate), Jeevansathi.com (matrimony), and Shiksha.com (education). Call them a conglomerate. Call them a tech portfolio. Call them whatever. They own four of India’s largest vertical classifieds platforms.
The trouble? They own them all simultaneously. Naukri is wildly profitable (59% operating margin). 99acres is actively bleeding (–₹20 crore operating loss in Q3). Jeevansathi just hit break-even after years of sustained losses. Shiksha is getting clobbered by AI but still generating cash. And they’re betting ₹50 crore a year to build JobHai, a platform for informal sector hiring that won’t make money until possibly 2030.
In December 2025, they announced a dividend step-up to 65% of PAT—a move that screams “we have no idea what to do with ₹4,825 crore in cash.” The stock trades at 47x P/E, a premium that suggests the market is pricing in either genius or insanity. The Feb 2026 concall provided remarkable clarity on which one it is.
Concall Highlight (Feb 2026): When asked about margins, management said: “If growth drops to single digits, we might lose some margin.” Translation: their entire margin narrative depends on 10%+ growth. Single-digit growth + flatlining margins = a classic value trap.
03 — Business Model: The Four-Headed Beast
Naukri Prints Money. Everything Else Prints Losses (And Optionality).
Info Edge operates as a portfolio company masquerading as a single business. Here’s the structure: Naukri.com (recruitment) is the cash cow generating ₹548 crore billings in Q3, up 11% YoY, with a 59% operating margin. It’s the crown jewel. Everything else is secondary.
99acres.com (real estate) is losing money quarter-on-quarter (₹20 crore operating loss in Q3) while simultaneously arguing it’s on the cusp of profitability. Traffic share grew to 46% (vs 44% in Q2), but billings growth of 14% isn’t enough to offset the investment burn. It’s a classic “we’re scaling, trust us” story from a company built in 2007.
Jeevansathi + Aisle (matrimony) finally cracked the code. Q3 saw combined billings of ₹46 crore, up 31% YoY, with operating losses down 60% to ₹4 crore—essentially break-even. Management claims they’re positioning for profitability by focusing on conversion rates and pricing. They acquired 100% of Aisle in November 2025 for ₹5.50 crore, consolidating matrimonial assets under one roof.
Shiksha.com (education) is getting hammered by AI. Billings grew only 4% in Q3. Management openly admitted AI has caused a “sharp drop in traffic,” and they’re pivoting toward higher-margin counselling services. This is not a turnaround narrative. This is a business in permanent structural decline.
Naukri67%Revenue Mix
99acres14%Revenue Mix
Matrimony6%Revenue Mix
Shiksha4%Revenue Mix
Revenue Mix Note: Naukri is 67% of revenue but likely 90%+ of profit. This isn’t diversification. This is subsidy. Naukri funds the experiments. Experiments are losing money. Do the math yourself.
💬 If Naukri is this profitable, why doesn’t management spin it off and fund the other businesses independently? Too afraid of the valuation reality?
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: The Narrative Shift
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹4.19 | Annualised EPS (Q3×4): ₹16.76 | Full-year FY25 EPS: ₹14.85
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 819 | 722 | 805 | +13.4% | +1.7% |
| Operating Profit | 294 | 266 | 280 | +10.5% | +5.0% |
| OPM % | 36% | 37% | 35% | -100 bps | +100 bps |
| Other Income | 136 | 141 | 187 | -3.5% | -27.3% |
| PAT | 317 | 288 | 348 | +10.1% | -8.9% |
| EPS (₹) | 4.19 | 3.74 | 4.88 | +12.0% | -14.1% |
The Hidden Narrative: Revenue growth is solid at 13.4% YoY, but here’s the dangerous part: “Other Income” (which includes investment gains and one-time items) fell 3.5% YoY. In Q2 FY26, they had ₹187 crore in other income. In Q3, it’s ₹136 crore. That’s a ₹51 crore decline—roughly 16% of their reported net profit. Strip out timing-driven income items, and the organic profit story is less impressive. Also, PAT fell 8.9% QoQ despite revenue growing 1.7%. Margins contracted quarter-on-quarter. Management’s excuse: “don’t read too much into quarterly numbers.” Our excuse: we’re reading exactly what we should be reading.
05 — Valuation: Fair Value Range
When P/E Goes To 47x, Someone Is Pricing In A Time Machine
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