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1. At a Glance
Indowind Energy closed FY26 with revenue of ₹40.75 crore, the highest top line in the ten years on the sheet, and a full-year net profit of ₹0.01 crore — a number so small it needs rounding to appear at all. Between those two facts sits the whole entry.
The company runs windmills, sells green power, and this year raised ₹49.42 crore through a rights issue that expanded the share count from roughly 12.88 crore shares to 16.10 crore. It returned to quarterly profit in Q3, then booked a ₹7.46 crore loss in Q4. The statutory auditors signed the annual results with a qualified opinion — for the third year running, the same three qualifications.
One of those qualifications concerns a ₹74.55 crore goodwill line, inherited through a merger, that has never been put through an impairment test. Net worth stands at ₹307.41 crore. The auditors’ own adjusted figures put net profit at negative ₹22.20 crore once the disputed items are corrected.
The market caps the whole thing at ₹151 crore — about half its stated book value. A high-revenue year that ends at a rounding error, and a balance sheet carrying items its own auditor won’t vouch for. The rest of this entry lays the numbers out in order.
2. Introduction
Indowind Energy was incorporated in 1995 and operates as an independent power producer in wind energy — building wind farms, managing wind assets, and selling green power to utilities and corporate customers across Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. It has been at this for three decades.
FY26 was, on the surface, a year of raising and planning. In December 2025 the company allotted 3,22,00,434 rights shares at ₹15.35 each, raising ₹49.42 crore. The board then approved a wider capital framework: authorised capital lifted from ₹175 crore toward ₹275 crore, an overseas bond programme of up to USD 70 million, and a borrowing headroom raised to ₹1,500 crore — sizeable ambitions for a company whose actual borrowings sit at ₹9.53 crore.
To house the overseas raise, the board incorporated a wholly owned UK subsidiary, Nova Future Power Ltd, on 16 April 2026, for a consideration of one pound. It is yet to commence operations. The company also secured Karnataka government approval for a 4-megawatt solar project and flagged a proposed 20% stake in EverOn Power, holding roughly 19 MW of assets, for up to ₹57 crore.
Plans, in short, arrived faster than profits. The record of what actually happened to the numbers follows.
3. Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
Indowind builds wind farms and sells the electricity. That’s the core. Around it, management has bolted on adjacent services: operating and maintaining wind assets, billing and revenue collection for project customers, supplying green power, and trading carbon credits. FY23 disclosures put roughly 98% of revenue as sale of electricity — the diversification exists mostly on the services page, not the revenue page.
The economics are seasonal in a way management is candid about. Per the concall, wind runs through roughly nine months across two seasons, and the promoter explained that the company front-loads depreciation into Q1 and Q2 to smooth the yearly picture — which is why Q3 and Q4 show the wind slackening but carry less depreciation drag. It is an accounting rhythm built around a weather pattern.
The newer wrinkle is the SPV structure. Rather than sell 4 MW of solar power at the government-fixed rate of around ₹340 levels, management said it will route the project through a subsidiary to sign a corporate client directly and capture 15–20% higher realisation. The captive-customer model is the pitch: better price, longer tie-up, consolidated back into Indowind’s books.
Then there is the O&M team, built in-house from the start, which the promoter said delivers roughly 15% savings versus outsourcing. The one machine handed to an outside vendor — 18 MW to Suzlon — is also, not coincidentally, the counterparty in the arbitration case that dominates the audit report. A business that maintains its own turbines and litigates the one contract it didn’t.
Does a company with 123–125 windmills need a UK subsidiary and a ₹1,500 crore borrowing limit, or
