1. At a Glance
There are turnaround stories. Then there are zombie-to-zillionaire stories. Indosolar belongs in the second category.
This is a company whose factory was shut since May 2018. For years, Indosolar looked like one of those forgotten industrial skeletons lying in Greater Noida — dusty machinery, mounting losses, lenders circling, and annual reports that felt like obituaries.
Then entered Waaree.
After CIRP, relisting drama, public shareholding issues, demat delays, office shifts, CFO resignations, CEO exits, auditor changes and promoter OFS chaos, Indosolar has suddenly become one of the hottest solar turnaround stories in the market.
FY26 numbers are wild.
Revenue jumped 110% to ₹679.85 crore. EBITDA surged 185% to ₹270.75 crore. PAT exploded 350% to ₹246.60 crore. ROE is standing at a ridiculous 151%. ROCE is 124%. Debt has collapsed to almost nothing at just ₹3 crore.
And the market has noticed. Despite all the operational drama, the stock trades at just 8.65 times earnings while the broader peer group trades around 36 times.
Sounds too good to be true?
Well, the company’s Q4 revenue actually fell 57% YoY to ₹83 crore. Debtor days ballooned to 113 days. Working capital days have stretched to 106 days. Promoter holding crashed from 95% to 75% because Waaree had to sell shares to meet public shareholding norms.
Also remember: this company has only recently restarted operations. Commercial operations at Greater Noida began from July 11, 2024. That means FY26 is not a “normal” year. It is the first full year after revival.
So investors are basically staring at a newly restarted solar business with massive margins, extremely low debt, huge promoter backing, and yet still carrying the scent of its old bankruptcy days.
The big question is simple.
Is Indosolar now a genuine solar manufacturing turnaround story?
Or is this one of those cases where the first year after revival looks spectacular because everything is compared against a dead business?
That is where things get interesting.
2. Introduction
Indosolar was incorporated in 2005 as a solar photovoltaic cell manufacturer. Back then, India’s solar sector was still tiny, and companies were pitching solar as the next big thing long before rooftop solar became fashionable.
Unfortunately, being early is not always profitable.
The company struggled badly, operations collapsed, and by May 2018 its Greater Noida manufacturing facility was shut down. For years, revenue was almost non-existent. The company survived on scraps like forex gains, interest income, liabilities no longer payable, and even scrap sales.
In FY24, it had effectively no real operating business.
Then came insolvency proceedings.
NCLT admitted the company under CIRP, and eventually Waaree Energies stepped in. Waaree’s resolution plan got approved in April 2022. Slowly, the company started coming back from the dead.
But even that process was messy.
Relisting approvals were delayed because Waaree held 96.15% stake, leaving public shareholding at just 3.85%. Exchanges wanted minimum public shareholding norms to be met. Then came corporate actions, demat delays, OFS announcements, and promoter stake dilution.
Finally, Indosolar resumed trading in June 2025.
Today, Waaree still owns nearly 75% of the company, which means Indosolar is effectively a Waaree satellite vehicle focused on module manufacturing.
The biggest change came after commercial operations restarted in July 2024. Suddenly, sales appeared. Production volumes jumped. Module manufacturing capacity increased from 1 GW to 1.3 GW. Margins exploded.
In FY25, revenue was ₹324 crore. In FY26, it became ₹680 crore.
But here is where investors need to stay cautious.
When a company goes from “dead” to “alive,” the percentage growth numbers become absurd. A company going from ₹1 crore to ₹100 crore can show 9,900% growth. That does not automatically make it a great business.
The real test for Indosolar will come in FY27 and FY28.
Can it maintain these margins?
Can it keep growing without becoming too dependent on Waaree group transactions?
Can debtor days come under control?
Can it sustain module demand in a market where everybody and their uncle suddenly wants to manufacture solar modules?
Because in India right now, solar manufacturing has become the new real estate brochure business. Everyone is announcing gigawatts. Everyone is talking about PLI. Everyone is promising integrated capacity. But not everyone will survive.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
Indosolar manufactures solar photovoltaic modules.
That is the simple answer.
The more detailed answer is that the company is now essentially a manufacturing arm within the Waaree ecosystem.
Historically, Indosolar used to manufacture solar photovoltaic cells. But after the shutdown and restart, the company is now focusing on module manufacturing.
The company currently has module manufacturing capacity of 1.3 GW at its Greater Noida facility.
During FY26, module production reached 1,051 MW compared to 589 MW in FY25. That means the factory is finally being utilized in a meaningful way.
The company also upgraded to G12 solar module manufacturing technology, which helps manufacture larger and more efficient solar modules. In the solar industry, bigger wafers and higher efficiency are critical because customers increasingly want more output per panel.
Indosolar operates in only one business segment: manufacturing and trading of solar photovoltaic modules. The company itself has confirmed that it has only one reportable segment.
But here is the interesting part.
A lot of Indosolar’s business appears to be linked to Waaree.
Related party transactions are huge.
- Sale of modules and job work services to Waaree: around ₹750 crore
- Purchase of modules: around ₹500 crore
- Raw material purchases and services: around ₹25 crore
- Inter-corporate deposits from Waaree: around ₹35 crore
So when you buy into Indosolar, you are not buying a fully independent solar manufacturing brand.
You are buying into a Waaree-linked manufacturing extension.
That can be both good and bad.
Good because Waaree can provide business visibility, order flow, supply chain support and financing.
Bad because if most of the business comes from one group company, then minority shareholders need to constantly watch whether
