Gowra Leasing & Finance Ltd is that low-profile Hyderabad uncle who suddenly shows up at a wedding wearing a Rolex and everyone whispers, “Arre yeh itna paisa kab kama liya?” With a market capitalisation of ₹59.8 crore, a current price hovering around ₹110, and a three-month return of nearly 10%, this tiny NBFC has quietly gone from sleepy to spicy. The latest September 2025 quarterly results show ₹2.87 crore revenue, ₹1.19 crore PAT, and operating margins that would make even SaaS startups uncomfortable at 83–90%. The loan book suddenly woke up in FY25 with ₹51.2 crore disbursed, a massive 267% jump YoY, funded by fresh borrowings and a chunky preferential issue. ROE is 16.9%, ROCE 18.3%, debt-to-equity 0.74, and P/E a modest ~10x, which is awkwardly low in an industry where even mediocrity trades at a premium. This is a base-layer NBFC with assets under ₹100 crore, but ambitions clearly larger than its balance sheet size. Question is: is this controlled aggression or just financial Red Bull?
2. Introduction – The Return of the Lending Dinosaur
Gowra Leasing was incorporated in 1993, which means it has survived Harshad Mehta, Ketan Parekh, IL&FS, DHFL, and about fourteen RBI circulars that scared half the NBFC sector into therapy. For years, this company existed in that forgotten corner of the market where liquidity is thin, news flow is thinner, and nobody bothers asking questions. Then FY25 happened.
Suddenly, revenues jumped, profits exploded, loan disbursements went ballistic, borrowings appeared on the balance sheet after years of near-zero debt, and promoters said, “Boss, let’s raise some equity also.” If you blinked, you missed the transformation from retired chit-fund vibes to aspiring credit shark.
But let’s be clear: Gowra is not Bajaj Finance, not even a poor cousin of Shriram Finance. It is a Non-Systematically Important, Non-Deposit Taking NBFC, operating under RBI’s Base Layer norms. Translation: small size, limited regulatory complexity, but also limited margin for stupidity. Every wrong loan hurts more. Every related party transaction raises eyebrows faster.
So now the big question: is this growth sustainable credit expansion or just one aggressive lending cycle fueled by cheap capital and optimism? Ready to play NBFC detective?
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
At its core, Gowra Leasing does one thing: lend money and charge interest. No fancy app, no buy-now-pay-later nonsense, no celebrity endorsements. Old-school lending, but with multiple flavours.
Their lending menu includes:
Inter-corporate deposits (basically lending to other companies)
Mortgage loans
Bill discounting
Loans against shares
The sectors they lend to sound like a CA firm’s client list: pharma APIs, engineering, manufacturing, trading, IT/software, real estate, construction, infrastructure, medical & health. In other words, everyone who needs short-to-medium-term capital and doesn’t want to beg banks for six months.
Revenue-wise, FY25 tells an interesting story:
~68% interest income from loans
~16% interest on bad debt recovery (yes, recovery itself earns interest)
~12% profit on sale of shares
~4% bad debt recovered
This is not a pure vanilla lender. There’s a strong element of opportunistic finance here—recoveries, share sales, and inter-corporate funding doing heavy lifting. That’s fine, but it also means earnings can swing faster than an RBI repo decision.
Ask yourself: do you like predictable EMI machines or slightly jugaadu finance operators?
4. Financials Overview – The Quarter That Changed the Mood
Result Type Locked: Quarterly Results (Q2 FY26) Annualised EPS = Latest EPS × 4
Quarterly Performance Table (₹ crore)
Metric
Latest Qtr (Sep 2025)
Same Qtr LY (Sep 2024)
Prev Qtr (Jun 2025)
YoY %
QoQ %
Revenue
2.87
0.88
2.62
226%
9.5%
EBITDA
2.40
0.62
2.40
287%
0%
PAT
1.19
0.57
1.29
109%
-7.8%
EPS (₹)
2.18
1.90
2.37
14.7%
-8.0%
Annualised EPS: ₹2.18 × 4 = ₹8.72
Commentary time. Revenue more than tripled YoY, EBITDA margins are flirting with 80–90%, and profits doubled. But QoQ profit dipped slightly, mainly due to higher interest costs as borrowings kicked in. This is what happens when you grow using leverage—returns go up, but so does pressure. Still, for a company this size, these numbers are… loud.
Does this feel like disciplined scaling or just growth adrenaline?
5. Valuation Discussion – Numbers, Not Emotions
Let’s keep this academic and clean.
P/E Method
CMP: ₹110
Annualised EPS: ₹8.72
Implied P/E: ~12.6x
Given industry median P/E around 21x, a conservative band of 10–14x looks reasonable.
Fair value range (P/E): ₹87 – ₹122
EV/EBITDA
EV: ₹86 crore
Annualised EBITDA (Q2 FY26): ~₹9.6 crore
EV/EBITDA: ~9x
Peers trade anywhere between 10–15x. Conservative range: 8–11x.
DCF (Simplified)
Using modest assumptions aligned with historical growth and margin stability, intrinsic value clusters near current levels with limited margin of safety.
