Easy Trip Planners Ltd Q2 FY26 – ₹509.57 Mn Provision, 85% PAT Crash, Preferential Issue Drama & 55.9 Cr Shares at ₹9.19: Can EaseMyTrip Still Fly High?
1. At a Glance
If the travel bug has bitten you, chances are you’ve used EaseMyTrip (Easy Trip Planners Ltd) — that no-convenience-fee portal that lets you book tickets without the guilt of “service charge ₹499.” But behind that smooth checkout button, Q2 FY26 has been anything but smooth. The company, once a poster child of post-COVID travel rebound, just posted a Profit After Tax of ₹–36 crore (down a jaw-dropping –85.5% YoY) on Revenue of ₹118 crore (–18.2% QoQ).
At a market cap of ₹2,684 crore, and a stock price of ₹7.39, the scrip is now down 54% YoY, 40% over 3 years, and trading perilously close to its 52-week low of ₹7.37. The P/E sits at 49.6, while industry peers like IRCTC and BLS International hover around 41 and 22 respectively. In short, investors are paying a “business class valuation” for a company that just lost its boarding pass.
Still, the fundamentals show fight — ROCE 20.9%, ROE 16.2%, Debt-to-Equity just 0.04, and a repeat transaction rate of 86%. So, is it turbulence or a new runway?
2. Introduction
EaseMyTrip started out as the middle child of India’s online travel wars — not as loud as MakeMyTrip, not as fancy as Yatra, but definitely the smartest with its “no convenience fee” model. Founded by the Pitti brothers (Rikant, Nishant, and Prashant), the platform has grown from a college hostel side hustle to one of India’s largest travel portals, handling flights, hotels, buses, cabs, and now even insurance.
But FY25-26 hasn’t been the Goa vacation they dreamed of. From management reshuffles, acquisition sprees, and a preferential issue of 55.9 crore shares worth ₹514 crore, the company has been busy rewriting its own travel itinerary.
And investors? Well, they’re still trying to locate their luggage.
EaseMyTrip’s business thrives on thin margins and high volumes. When bookings drop, profits evaporate faster than complimentary water bottles in a budget airline. And with Q2 FY26’s EBITDA at ₹12.1 crore and a ₹509.57 Mn provision, the turbulence looks serious.
But remember — EMT is still a cash-rich, asset-light company that’s aggressively building an ecosystem — from Spree Hospitality hotels to Nutana Aviation and even Ayodhya’s upcoming Radisson Blu.
Maybe they’re not just booking flights anymore — they’re booking empires.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
EaseMyTrip is India’s second-largest online travel aggregator (OTA) and probably the only one that still turns a profit. Its magic formula? A unique no-convenience-fee model, low marketing spends, and laser-focus on repeat customers.
Here’s the recipe:
B2C (90% of business): Direct consumer bookings via app/website. The heart of their empire.
B2B2C (Agents): A massive 60,000-agent network who use EMT’s backend for flight and hotel bookings.
B2E: Corporate bookings and travel management for enterprises.
They’ve turned the travel game into a subscription-style loyalty loop: once you book a cheap flight, you keep coming back. With an 86% repeat rate, EaseMyTrip’s model runs on customer trust rather than celebrity ads.
Their Look-to-Book ratio of 4% may sound low, but in OTA terms, it’s excellent — meaning for every 100 visitors, 4 end up transacting (the rest probably went to Google Flights for “research”).
And in FY24-FY25, they began branching out — acquiring everything from YOLOBus (for premium intercity rides) to Spree Hospitality (for 1,200 hotel rooms). They even set up EaseMyTrip Insurance Broker Pvt. Ltd. because apparently, when life gives you flight cancellations, you sell travel insurance.
4. Financials Overview
Metric
Latest Qtr (Q2 FY26)
YoY Qtr (Q2 FY25)
Prev Qtr (Q1 FY26)
YoY %
QoQ %
Revenue
₹118 Cr
₹145 Cr
₹114 Cr
–18.6%
+3.5%
EBITDA
₹12.1 Cr
₹37 Cr
₹0 Cr
–67%
—
PAT
₹–36.0 Cr
₹27 Cr
₹0 Cr
–233%
—
EPS (₹)
–0.09
0.07
0.00
—
—
The quarter looked like a rerun of Mission: Impossible – Profit Protocol.
Despite modest revenue, profit nosedived due to a massive ₹509.57 Mn provision and a series of accounting hits linked to acquisitions and one-offs. The EBITDA margin crashed from 26% to just 10%, proving that