CP Capital FY26: ₹42.6 Crore of Profit, and Almost None of It Borrowed From “Other Income”

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1 — At a Glance

CP Capital closed FY26 with ₹76.32 crore in revenue and ₹42.58 crore in profit after tax, the second figure up 11.7% on the prior year. On paper that profit looks almost identical to the ₹43.46 crore the company earned in FY24. The interesting part is where it came from. In FY24, other income contributed ₹17.52 crore. In FY26, other income contributed ₹0.18 crore. The headline profit barely moved; the engine underneath it changed entirely.

This is a company that used to teach students how to crack JEE and now mostly lends money. The education business was demerged out, Srajan Capital was merged in, and the renamed entity received its RBI non-banking finance registration effective 1 April 2025. The name on the door reads CP Capital; the name in the older “About” still says educational services. Both are technically correct, depending on which year you stand in.

The market currently pays about 4.4 times earnings here, against an industry multiple of roughly 21.8 times. The book value sits at ₹315 per share while the company carries a price-to-book of 0.33. A profit that grew, an operating base that grew faster, and a multiple that has stayed in single digits — those three facts do not usually share a sentence.

Where this gets uncomfortable: return on equity is 7.6%, and a 0.33x book multiple is the kind of number the market reserves for assets it has questions about.

2 — Introduction

Career Point Limited was incorporated in 2000 as an education company. For most of its listed life that is exactly what it was — coaching for JEE and NEET, formal schools, university campuses at Kota and Hamirpur, study material, the full Kota apparatus.

Then came the restructuring. The Chandigarh bench of the NCLT approved a Composite Scheme of Arrangement in September 2024, with an appointed date of 1 April 2023. Under it, the education business was demerged into Career Point Edutech Limited, and the NBFC subsidiary Srajan Capital Limited was amalgamated into the parent. The board approved the name change to CP Capital Limited in January 2025. By April 2025 the parent itself held the RBI NBFC certificate of registration.

So the FY26 results describe a different company than the ticker’s history suggests. What remains is two divisions: a financing business that lends, and an infrastructure business — Career Point Infra Limited — that earns rental income off real assets. The coaching empire walked out the side door; the lending desk took the corner office.

The most recent corporate events are quieter. The board approved the audited FY26 results on 29 May 2026. Whole-Time Director Nawal Kishore Maheshwari resigned effective 30 March 2026 — though he remains a 7.62% promoter shareholder, so he left the office without leaving the family WhatsApp group.

3 — Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?

For an encyclopedia entry, the honest answer is: CP Capital is now an NBFC wearing an education company’s old jacket.

The segment annexure settles it. Of FY26’s ₹76.32 crore revenue, the Financing Division brought ₹59.06 crore — about 77% — and the Infra Division ₹17.26 crore, roughly 23%. The lending book is the business. The disclosures describe educational infrastructure loans, loan-against-property, and business loans, all run through the NBFC, against a net loan book that reached ₹442 crore in FY26.

The second engine is rental and infrastructure income off the company’s tangible real assets, housed in the Infra subsidiary. It is the boring, recurring kind of revenue — the financial equivalent of owning the building rather than the tenant. The associate, Imperial Infin Private Limited, sits at the edge of the consolidation contributing a rounding error (₹0.12 crore net profit share for the year).

The model, then, is dual-engine: yield on loans plus rent on assets. There is a certain irony in a company that once sold the dream of cracking competitive exams now running a balance sheet whose main skill is collecting interest. The lesson reads itself: a business model can be replaced entirely while the brand stays frozen — the ₹442 crore loan book is the present tense, “educational services” is the past one.

Does a company keep the right to its old name once 77% of its revenue comes from lending? The filings say yes. The revenue mix raises an eyebrow.

4 — Financials Overview

Figures are consolidated, in ₹ crore. The latest reported period is the quarter ended March 2026.

The March quarter grew year-on-year on every line and shrank against the December quarter on every line. Both are true at once because the comparison bases differ — December 2025 was the year’s strongest quarter at ₹12.5 crore PAT, so the sequential dip measures CP Capital against its own best run, not against weakness.

Concall / Investor Update (29 May 2026): Management framed FY26 as the strongest consolidated year on record, attributing the higher interest cost to “calibrated incremental borrowings deployed into the loan book.” That is the company’s stated reason; the borrowings line, examined later, confirms the arithmetic.

5 — Market Expectations & Historical Multiples

This section describes how the market is currently pricing the company and how that compares with its own history and peer group. It is descriptive, not predictive.

The market currently pays about 4.4 times earnings here versus a peer median of 21.9 times — roughly a fifth of what the lending sector commands. On book value the gap is starker: a price-to-book of 0.33 means the market values the company at about a third of its stated net worth.

What the market appears to be pricing in is the operating record, not the headline profit. Return on equity has run at 6.2% over five years and 7.6% in the latest year; return on capital employed sits at 9.8%, almost exactly the peer median of 9.7%. A lender earning single-digit returns on a recently-reorganised structure, with an “About” that still describes a coaching company, is the kind of profile the market discounts heavily until the new identity proves itself.

The one factual observation about market expectations: the multiple sits well below the peer set on every metric except ROCE, where CP Capital matches the median — and ROCE is the one operating number, not a valuation one.

6 — What’s Cooking

Drawn from the filings, the real events of the period:

The demerger-and-merger completed and the RBI NBFC registration took effect from 1 April 2025 — the structural headline of the year. The board approved audited FY26 results on 29 May 2026 and reappointed BDG & Co. LLP as internal auditor for FY27. Nawal Kishore Maheshwari resigned as Whole-Time Director effective 30 March 2026. In March 2025 an arbitral tribunal awarded the company a claim against RSLDC for ₹1 crore — a modest sum that the company nonetheless thought worth announcing. The trading window closed from 1 July 2026 ahead of Q1 FY27 results.

No mega-orders, no acquisition, no drama manufactured for the occasion. For an NBFC, the spiciest event of the year was getting the licence that lets it legally do what its accounts already showed it doing.

7 — Balance Sheet

Assets equal liabilities in every column, as the laws of accounting insist.

• Borrowings nearly doubled in a year, from ₹41.89 crore to ₹77.21 crore — the loan book was fed, and the funding came from debt rather than dilution.
• Net worth climbed ₹27 crore to ₹572.91 crore entirely through retained earnings; the equity capital of ₹18.19 crore has not budged, meaning no new shares were printed.
• Cash and bank stood at ₹3.07 crore — against ₹77.21 crore of borrowings, the word “net cash” does not apply here. This is a leveraged-up year, not a cushioned one.

Even after doubling its debt, the company carries a debt-to-equity of 0.13 — which tells you the equity base is so large that a near-doubling of borrowings barely registers as leverage.

8 — Cash Flow: Sab Number Game Hai

Two years of negative operating cash flow gave way to ₹32.96 crore positive in FY26 — for a lender, operating cash swings with how much fresh lending it does, and the prior two years saw cash flowing out into the loan book. FY26’s positive figure was then redeployed: ₹29.38 crore went out through investing as the company put money to work. The financing line stayed small and negative.

A lender’s cash flow statement is a confession about appetite: when it lends aggressively, operating cash turns negative; when it slows, the cash reappears. FY26 reads as a year of digestion.

9 — Ratios: Sexy or Stressy?

ROE at 7.6% means the equity is working part-time — a large net worth that generates modest returns. ROCE at 9.8% is healthier and matches the peer median, suggesting the capital that is deployed earns its keep; the drag is how much capital sits underused. PAT margin of 55.8% is the signature of a lending-plus-rental model, where revenue carries little cost of goods. The P/E of 4.4x and D/E of 0.13 describe a company the market prices like a troubled lender but which carries a balance sheet of an under-leveraged one. The tension between those two numbers is the entire entry.

10 — P&L Breakdown: Show Me the Money

This is the table that explains the title. Look across the Other Income column: ₹17.52 crore, then ₹10.49 crore, then ₹0.18 crore. The non-operating cushion that once flattered profit has all but vanished. Now look at Operating Profit: ₹42.3 crore, ₹48.3 crore, ₹63.4 crore — up roughly 50% over two years, with FY26’s operating margin at 83.1% of revenue.

So FY26’s ₹42.58 crore PAT, almost identical to FY24’s ₹43.46 crore, is a far higher-quality number. FY24 leaned on ₹17.52 crore of other income; FY26 stands almost entirely on operations. The headline barely moved, but the company swapped one-off income for recurring earnings — the financial equivalent of replacing a sugar rush with a meal.

EPS moves in lockstep with PAT (₹23.88, ₹20.95, ₹23.40) because the share count never changed — the dip in FY25 is a profit dip, not a dilution event, and the recovery in FY26 is real.

11 — Peer Comparison

The scale gap is almost comic: Bajaj Finance posts more profit in a quarter (₹5,553 crore) than CP Capital’s entire market capitalisation (₹192 crore). On the multiple, CP Capital trades at roughly a third of even Muthoot’s 11.3x, the cheapest of the large lenders. The peer set carries multiples of 24x to 32x; CP Capital sits in single digits. A ₹192 crore lender and a ₹6 lakh crore one are technically in the same NBFC bucket, the way a kayak and an aircraft carrier are both watercraft.

12 — Miscellaneous: Shareholding & Promoters

The promoter block is a family ledger: the Maheshwari household holds the lot, led by Kailash Bai at 14.73% and CMD Pramod Kumar Maheshwari at 11.75%, with four more relatives at 7.36–7.62% each. Promoter holding has crept up a hair to 63.80%, and pledged shares stand at 0.00% — the family owns its stake outright.

The newest development sits in institutions: domestic institutional holding jumped from zero to 2.91% in the March 2026 quarter, as Negen Undiscovered Value Fund and a YR Investment fund appeared on the register. The clue is in the first fund’s name — “undiscovered value” is the polite institutional phrase for a 0.33x book multiple. Foreign holding remains a token 0.05%.

13 — Corporate Governance: Angels or Devils?

The statutory auditors, S.P. Chopra & Co., issued an unmodified opinion on both standalone and consolidated FY26 results — the clean bill. The internal auditor, BDG & Co. LLP, was reappointed for FY27.

The audit chair has been busy elsewhere: Lodha & Co. LLP resigned as statutory auditor in November 2024, and the board moved to appoint replacements through late 2024. A whole-time director, Nawal Kishore Maheshwari, resigned in March 2026. Related-party transactions featured on the September 2025 AGM agenda. None of these is a flagged irregularity — they are the disclosures of a company that reorganised its entire structure and rotated its auditors in the same window. Pledges are nil, the opinion is unmodified, and CMD Pramod Kumar Maheshwari signed the accounts. On the record as stated, the governance file is clean, if eventful.

14 — Industry Roast & Macro Context

The NBFC sector is where balance sheets go to be judged by a single ratio. Lenders live or die on the spread between what they borrow at and what they lend at, and the market grades them on net interest margins, asset quality, and how much equity they can squeeze a return out of. A large equity base is a comfort and a curse — it cushions the downside and dilutes the return, which is precisely the bind a 7.6% ROE describes.

Then there is the real-asset twist: NBFCs that also collect rent occupy an awkward category, half lender and half landlord, and the market rarely knows which multiple to apply. Add the recently-notified Labour Codes, which CP Capital flagged as adding ₹12.51 lakh of past-service gratuity cost in FY26 — a sector-wide nudge, modest here, that every employer is now absorbing. The lending business is unforgiving to the under-returning and unbothered by the under-leveraged; CP Capital manages to be both.

15 — EduInvesting Verdict

FY26 was the year CP Capital’s profit stopped leaning on other income and started standing on operations — ₹42.58 crore of PAT, nearly all of it now operating, against a market that values the whole company at a third of its book. A balance sheet with little to hide, and a multiple with everything to prove.