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Asgard Alcobev FY26: From Papermills to Breweries, One Loss at a Time

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General information and entertainment, not investment advice. The author is not a SEBI-registered adviser or research analyst. No recommendation, no promised returns. Markets carry risk including loss of capital. Figures may not be current. Consult a registered adviser before acting.


1. At a Glance

The consolidated numbers look bulky — ₹10,151 Cr revenue for FY26 versus ₹5,810 Cr a year ago. The company wrote an exceptional loss of ₹178 Cr when it divested its paper mills subsidiary in February 2026.

Audited net profit to the parent hit ₹96.58 Cr, down from ₹188 Cr last year. The share count exploded: allotments of 15.10 crore shares (swap) plus 4.07 crore (cash) diluted the per-share arithmetic significantly.

The balance sheet carries ₹7,254.50 Cr of borrowing against total assets of ₹20,183 Cr. Current ratio sits at 0.69 — tighter than preferred. The newly acquired CMJ Breweries subsidiary contributed ₹2,900 Cr of the full-year revenue and ₹248 Cr of profit after tax, meaning the old standalone paper business folded into a beverage play mid-year.

At ₹33.12 per share (prices referenced are lagged, not live), the market pays 300x on trailing earnings. The pivot is real. The financial strain is real.


2. Introduction

Asgard Alcobev is a study in velocity. Incorporated in 1984 as Banganga Paper Industries, it was a modest Kraft paper manufacturer in Nashik. In 2024, it changed hands and names twice—first to Inertia Steel, then to Asgard Alcobev—in the span of months.

By mid-February 2026, it had jettisoned its paper mills entirely (sold to the new promoters for ₹11.22 Cr, booking a loss) and acquired 78.90% of CMJ Breweries Private Limited, a beverage player operating in the northeast and planning expansion into Bhutan.

The company’s registered office, originally in Mumbai, migrated to Nashik. Its shareholding structure pivoted overnight: the old public shareholders got diluted via massive preferential allotments to CMJ shareholders, and the new promoters (Ronak Jain, the Dhatrak family) consolidated control at around 60%.

All of this unfolded between December 2025 and February 2026 — boardroom reshuffles, M&A, equity issuance, and a shift in statutory auditors. The filing pace was frantic.


3. Business Model: From Kraft Paper to Golden Eagle

The original business — Banganga Paper Mills — was a vanilla industrial setup: recycled paper input, Kraft paper output, 26,000 MT annual production, 72.5% utilisation, sold to packaging vendors.

As of February 2026, that ceased to be Asgard’s core asset. CMJ Breweries now is.

CMJ manufactures beer under the Golden Eagle brand in the northeast and has a license to produce into Bhutan from April 2026 onward. The subsidiary’s business model is regional distribution of alcoholic beverages — a step up in margin potential but also in regulatory, supply chain, and competition complexity.

The consolidated FY26 revenue of ₹10,151 Cr is therefore a blend: the paper mills contributed ₹58 Cr (FY25 run rate) until February, and CMJ dropped ₹2,900 Cr into the pot in only 44 days (Feb 17 to March 31).

On a consolidated basis, the company now sits in “Beverages” — the auditors and management reclassified it as a single segment in January 2026. There is no reportable segment under Ind AS 108 because it has only one now.

The old water-reuse claims (90-95% recycling, solar PPA with Livint Green Technologies) are historical colour. The beverage story is the story.


4. Financials Overview

Figures are consolidated, in ₹ crore.

MetricFY26YoY ChangeFY25
Revenue10,150.68+74.8%5,809.63
EBITDA540.88*
PAT (to owners)96.58-48.6%188.00
EPS0.10-37.5%0.16

*Calculated from PBT + Interest + Depreciation per consolidated P&L.

The revenue jump is a mirage if read as operational turnaround. CMJ was acquired mid-year, so the consolidation picks up ~1.5 months of beverage revenue. Strip that, and organic paper sales collapsed from ₹58 Cr (FY25) to ₹31 Cr (standalone P&L, FY26, pre-acquisition). That’s a 46% contraction.

Profit tanked because of the exceptional ₹178 Cr loss booked on the paper mill sale — management sold the asset for ₹11.22 Cr but had booked it at a much higher value, creating the gap.

Excluding that loss, profit before tax would have been ~₹393.5 Cr (PBT pre-exceptional was ₹394 Cr before the loss). But the loss was real and was incurred, so the reported ₹96.58 Cr to owners is what was earned.

EPS compression reflects both lower profit and the share dilution: 14.24 Cr shares weighted average FY26 vs 11.98 Cr FY25, and further dilution pending from the preferential allotments and warrant conversions in progress.

No dividend declared for FY26.


5. Market Expectations & Historical Multiples

This section describes how the market is currently pricing the company and how that compares with its own history and peer group. It is descriptive, not predictive.

MetricCurrentHistorical Average (3Y)Peer Median (62 Co)
P/E300.14xN/A (insufficient history)16.92x
EV/EBITDA83.8xN/A
Price to Book11.82x2.52x
ROE5.85%9.43% (3Y avg)12.86%
ROCE7.36%27% (FY25 calc)13.67%

The market currently prices this stock at 300x its trailing EPS — roughly 18 times higher than the median peer multiple of 16.92x.

The ROE at 5.85% sits below the company’s own 3-year average of 9.43% and trails the peer median of 12.86%, suggesting the

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