PSP Projects Q4FY26: ₹1,115 Cr Revenue, Adani Order Book Triples to ₹13,447 Cr

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1. At a Glance

Q4FY26 delivered PSP Projects’ highest-ever quarterly revenue at ₹1,115 crore, a 66% jump from ₹673 crore in the same quarter last year. Full-year revenue hit ₹3,149 crore, up 25% from ₹2,512 crore in FY25, but the real story is the order book: it nearly doubled from ₹7,266 crore to ₹13,447 crore in twelve months—a staggering 85% growth driven almost entirely by Adani Group inflow.

Profit after tax landed at ₹55.52 crore for FY26, virtually flat to FY25’s ₹56.42 crore, despite the revenue surge.

The tension: scale arrived, but margins collapsed. An ₹29-crore provision on a single delayed project and the ramp-up of high-volume, lower-margin work dragged the full-year PAT margin down to 1.74% from 2.22%. Cash generated from operations hit ₹323 crore in FY26—the strongest since inception—yet the number that matters is how quickly the company swallows interest expense and works receivables down.

Management claims 8% EBITDA is already here if you strip out one-offs. The question: is it?

2. Introduction

PSP Projects, incorporated in 2008, is a construction outfit based in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, with 39 years of hands-on experience under founder Prahalad Patel. The company builds everything—hospitals, colleges, office towers, industrial facilities, residential complexes, and government projects—across six states. By March 2025, it had completed 235 projects and had 94 more underway.

The decisive move: in August 2025, Adani Infra (India) Limited acquired 34.41% of PSP, becoming a co-promoter. In that same period, PSP’s order book composition swung hard: government jobs, which represented 43% of the backlog in FY25, shrunk to just 25% by FY26. Adani projects now dominate: 67% of the ₹13,447-crore order book is Adani work. Before the Adani deal, that number was near zero.

The company commissioned a precast concrete facility in December 2021, which it now uses both captively and to take subcontract orders (L&T engaged PSP for ₹70 crore of precast material for the National High Speed Rail project). In April 2024, PSP raised ₹244 crore via qualified institutional placement and used the cash primarily to repay debt.

Shareholding as of March 2026: promoters (including Adani Infra) 68.82%, public 27.08%, FIIs 1.91%, DIIs 2.18%.

3. Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?

PSP is a full-stack construction play. It handles planning, design, procurement, construction, MEP (mechanical, electrical, plumbing), interiors, and post-construction operations. It also owns and operates the precast facility. The company wins contracts (often as lowest bidder in competitive tenders), mobilizes equipment and labor, executes to contract value and timeline, collects progress payments, and hands over on schedule.

The addressable market spans institutional (hospitals, universities, corporate offices), government (CM’s offices, Riverfront projects, state buildings), residential (group housing, townships), industrial (pharma plants, dairies, tire factories), and government residential (affordable housing). Each segment carries different margin profiles and execution rhythms.

The precast facility is a backward-integration play meant to speed up execution, cut labor dependency, and improve quality on big residential and commercial towers. On Project Ninety—a 3-basement + ground + 18-floor tower—precast shaved four months off the timeline: 148 days from start to substantial completion. That’s a flex.

The constraint: construction is fragmented, hypercompetitive, and cyclical. PSP’s identity hinges on two things: (a) a reputation for on-time, quality delivery that brings repeat orders, and (b) now, privileged access to Adani Group’s ₹50,000-crore ambition over five years. Without (b), growth stalls. With it, scale compounds.

4. Financials Overview

Figures are consolidated, in ₹ crore.

Quarterly (Q4FY26 vs Q4FY25 vs Q3FY26):

Q4 was the standout. Revenue jumped hard, and PAT landed at ₹21 crore, a chunky number that masks what management disclosed in the concall: an ₹29-crore Expected Credit Loss (ECL) provision on unbilled revenue from the Kashi Vishwanath Dham project. Exclude that, and Q4 EBITDA margin bounces to ~8%.

Full Year (FY26 vs FY25):

The gap between 25% revenue growth and flat profit growth: (1) the Kashi ECL; (2) a 110-basis-point margin squeeze from shifting into bigger, lower-margin Adani projects, combined with “execution ramp-up” (a fancy way of saying elevated overheads and mobilization costs as new projects kick off); (3) rising interest burden as working capital swelled.

Concall Notes:

Management attributed the full-year margin compression to “change in project mix and execution ramp-up in large scale.” The CFO confirmed that Q4 receivables spiked because most revenue billing fell in Feb-Mar (standard for construction), and collections are expected in April. On the Kashi project, management maintains the ₹29 crore is a provision “on what is carried on the balance sheet for a longer time”—the work was done, payment is “part and parcel of the original contract value,” and collection is ongoing.

5. Market Expectations & Historical Multiples

This section describes how the market is currently pricing the company and how that compares with its