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Can Fin Homes Q4 FY26: 31% PAT Jump, 23% ROE, 11x P/E — Is This the Quiet Compounder Nobody Is Talking About?

1. At a Glance – The Boring Lender That Is Quietly Printing Money

Some companies scream growth.

Some whisper.

And some simply keep collecting EMIs while the market sleeps.

Can Fin Homes belongs to the third category.

Q4 FY26 was not just a “good quarter.” It was a quarter where a supposedly sleepy housing finance lender casually posted 31% PAT growth, pushed ROE to 23.1%, improved GNPA to 0.85%, took loan book beyond ₹42,209 crore, and traded at barely 11.2 times earnings.

That is where things get interesting.

Because usually, high-quality retail lenders with 20% ROE and sub-1% GNPA don’t sit around at near-commodity valuations.

Something is off.

Either the market thinks growth is too slow…

Or the market is sleeping.

And Can Fin has this peculiar habit of looking boring right before it surprises people.

While others chase fintech fantasies, this 38-year-old institution is quietly running a lender’s version of a cash machine:

  • spreads expanding,
  • provisions falling,
  • disbursements rising,
  • delinquencies shrinking,
  • and management talking about growth without sounding intoxicated.

Which itself is rare in finance.

Even the old concern — “South India concentration risk” — is slowly being diluted under Vision 2028, with southern incremental disbursement mix moving from 78% toward 60%. Management actually appears to be walking the talk here, based on old concall promises.

And then there’s the funny part.

A housing financier with:

  • AAA ratings
  • 563% liquidity coverage ratio
  • 86% provision cover including overlays
  • 18.16% full-year ROE
  • 27% PAT growth

…is trading cheaper than several mediocre lenders with weaker books.

That smells less like efficiency… more like neglect.

But wait.

Before we crown it the monk of mortgage compounding…

there are questions.

Why is AUM growth only 10% when disbursement grew 23%?

Why are prepayments so high?

Why is leverage still 6.4x?

Why does a lender this clean still trade below sector median P/E?

And why does every cheap financial stock always have a hidden chapter?

Let’s investigate.

Because this may be a quality compounder.

Or a value trap wearing a suit.

And those are very different species.


2. Introduction – The Banker Who Refuses to Party

Can Fin feels like that old-school chartered accountant who shows up in sandals, says very little, but somehow owns half the neighborhood.

No drama.

No founder worship.

No “AI lending platform” nonsense.

Just mortgages.

EMIs.

Risk control.

Repeat.

Yet FY26 was anything but dull.

PAT crossed ₹1,086 crore.

Loan book crossed ₹42,000 crore.

PAT has compounded 19% for 5 years.

Profit CAGR over decade? 21%.

Not startup fantasy.

Actual compounding.

Meanwhile, management in January concall basically admitted:

“Yes, we messed up transmission on annual reset loans and it hurt prepayments.”

Imagine.

A financial company admitting fault.

Somebody check if this is still India.

Then they fixed it.

Quarterly reset conversion.
Lower delinquency.
Karnataka recovery.
Telangana stress easing.

Management said they’d fix run-off and protect spreads.

Q4 suggests… they actually did.

That deserves noting.

Because in markets, “management walked the talk” is rarer than unicorns.

Question:

How often do you see a lender improve NIM, asset quality, and ROE simultaneously?

Exactly.


3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?

Simplest explanation?

They lend for homes.

And do it conservatively enough to stay alive.

Mostly salaried borrowers.
Average housing ticket ~₹27 lakh.
LTV around 47%.
68% salaried borrowers.
84% housing-led book including CRE.

Translation:

They aren’t financing moon colonies.

They’re financing middle-class India.

And that may be the biggest secular growth story of all.

Business model recipe:

Take money at ~7%.

Lend at ~10%.

Pocket spread ~2.9%.

Avoid idiots.

Repeat.

It sounds simple.

It is not.

Because the entire trick is avoiding idiots.

That’s where underwriting matters.

And Can Fin’s underwriting smells old-school paranoid.

Which I like.

Even the shift toward self-employed borrowers (toward 35% by FY28 target) is deliberate, not reckless.

Higher yields.

Controlled risk.

Not YOLO lending.

This is not a fintech.

This is a mortgage machine pretending to be boring.


4. Financials Overview

MetricQ4 FY26Q4 FY25Q3 FY26
Revenue1,0749991,073
PBT353279341
PAT346234265
EPS25.9615.7019.89

Commentary

  • PAT up 31% YoY
  • EPS up 65% YoY
  • NIM at 4.19%
  • ROE 23.12%

This is not a sleepy quarter.

This is a lender flexing.

And management said prepayments were hurting growth.

Imagine if run-offs normalize.

Annual EPS and P/E

FY26 EPS = 81.54

Current Price = ₹910

P/E = 910 / 81.54 = 11.16x

Market giving 11x for 20% ROE.

That is comedy.


5. Valuation Discussion – Fair Value Range

Method 1 P/E

Peer median P/E ~14.7
Assume 13–15 reasonable.

81.54 × 13 = 1060
81.54 ×15 = 1223

Range:
₹1,060–1,223


Method 2 EV/Financing Profit proxy

FY26 Financing Profit = 1318

Apply 11–13x:

₹14,498–17,134 crore EV

Implied upside moderate.


Method 3 Simplified DCF / Excess Return Lens

18–20% ROE
Cost equity 13–14%

P/B justified ~2.3–2.8

BV ₹449

Fair value:

₹1033–1257


Fair Value Range

₹1,030–1,250

Current

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