1. At a Glance
Vishnu Prakash R Punglia Ltd (VPRPL), once the hot new kid of the infra-block, has suddenly found itself stuck in a traffic jam of debt, execution delays, and investor heartbreak. With a market cap of ₹1,013 crore, the stock trades around ₹81.3, down nearly 70% from its 52-week high of ₹346, proving that even engineers can overestimate load capacity—especially in their own balance sheets.
For Q2 FY26, the company clocked sales of ₹296 crore (down 11.7% QoQ) and PAT of ₹3.65 crore (down 84.6% QoQ). That’s not a typo; that’s a near wipeout. With an EPS of ₹0.29, an EV/EBITDA of 12.2, and P/E of 32.9, one wonders—what are investors valuing here? Optimism or delusion?
The company boasts a ROCE of 11.4%, ROE of 7.81%, and a Debt to Equity ratio of 0.91, which means the company has borrowed nearly as much as it owns. The working capital days shot up to 157, and debtors now take 217 days to pay—basically, projects finish before clients do.
Its order book of ₹5,086 crore looks shiny, but execution speed matters. If “Make in India” had a meme category, VPRPL’s FY26 Q2 would be a solid contender for “Expectation vs Reality.”
2. Introduction
Once upon a time (okay, in FY24), VPRPL was the infrastructure darling of Rajasthan—an EPC powerhouse laying pipelines, railways, and roads faster than politicians could cut ribbons. Today, it’s a sobering reminder that growth without cash flow is like a bridge without pillars—bound to collapse eventually.
The company, incorporated in 1986, has decades of experience, 500+ construction machines, and contracts across 10 states and 1 Union Territory. But now, the biggest construction it’s managing is its own credibility.
In the last six months, revenues fell 18.3% and profits tanked 75%. Investors who entered during the IPO hype are now experiencing “Value Erosion Projects” instead of “Water Supply Projects.” Promoter holding fell from 67.8% to 58.6%, a classic sign of “we need liquidity, bro.”
To be fair, this is a tough industry. Infra EPC companies depend on timely government payments, project mobilizations, and working capital cycles. When these slip, even a ₹5,000 crore order book becomes a ₹5,000 crore headache.
So, grab your helmet and reflective vest—this is one bumpy ride through India’s newest infra rollercoaster.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
VPRPL’s business model is built on designing, constructing, and maintaining infrastructure for Central and State governments, autonomous bodies, and private clients. Translation: they make the pipelines, not the water.
Their four key verticals are:
- Water Supply Projects (WSP) – Contributing 76% of revenue in H1 FY25. Includes pipelines, tanks, and water treatment systems. Rajasthan is their home turf, but they’re now active in UP, Gujarat, and Assam too.
- Railway
- Projects (13%) – Construction of railway tracks, bridges, and platforms. Let’s just say IRCON isn’t losing sleep yet.
- Road Projects (6%) – New entrant here, but growing. Expect potholes—financial and literal.
- Irrigation Projects (5%) – Canals, pumping stations, and pressurized pipelines. Ironically, their liquidity isn’t as fluid.
The company prides itself on being an “integrated EPC player” with its own fleet of 500+ construction equipment. It’s like saying, “We brought our own JCBs, but forgot to bring in the cash.”
Their “AA class” contractor status with Rajasthan PHED gives them credibility, but recent legal and tender bans (temporarily stayed by courts) add a dramatic courtroom subplot to their corporate screenplay.
4. Financials Overview
| Metric (₹ Cr) | Q2 FY26 | Q2 FY25 | Q1 FY26 | YoY % | QoQ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 295.7 | 296.4 | 276.4 | 0% | 7% |
| EBITDA | 24.3 | 38.3 | 31.9 | -36.5% | -23.8% |
| PAT | 3.65 | 21.2 | 7.01 | -82.8% | -47.9% |
| EPS (₹) | 0.29 | 1.70 | 0.56 | -82.9% | -48.2% |
The company’s Q2 FY26 is a classic case of “profit missing in action.” Despite stable revenues, margins and profits have collapsed. The operating margin has fallen to 8.23% from 12.93% a year ago.
If EPS were a cricket score, last year’s innings was 170 runs; this quarter’s is 29. P/E looks expensive only because “E” is shrinking faster than a puddle in Rajasthan.
5. Valuation Discussion – Fair Value Range
Let’s crunch this the EduInvesting way (and cry responsibly):
A. P/E Method:
Current EPS (TTM): ₹2.47
Industry P/E: 20
→ Fair Value Range = ₹49 to ₹60 (20–24x conservative band)
B. EV/EBITDA Method:
EV = ₹1,684 Cr
EBITDA (FY25 TTM) = ₹129 Cr
EV/EBITDA = 13x → slightly above peers (KEC ~10x, NBCC ~12x)
→ Fair Range = ₹1000–₹1300 Cr EV → per share = ₹60–₹75
C. DCF (Simple 10–15% Growth, 11% Cost of Capital)
Future FCF erratic, but average -₹207 Cr operating cash FY25 → DCF can’t justify premium.
Fair Value Range (Educational Purpose Only): ₹55–₹75
Disclaimer: This fair value range is for educational purposes only and not investment advice.
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