1. At a Glance
Spencer’s Retail Ltd is that one supermarket chain everyone in India recognises but few can confidently say is making money. At a market capitalisation of roughly ₹348 crore and a current price hovering around ₹38.6, the stock has already punished optimism pretty hard — down ~52% over one year and ~31% over six months. The business reported consolidated sales of ₹1,776 crore with a net loss of ₹252 crore, ROCE of –9.72%, and negative operating margins. Debt stands tall at ₹1,702 crore, while book value has gone full sci-fi at ₹ –87 per share.
Latest quarterly numbers didn’t bring festive cheer either: Q3 FY26 sales of ₹503 crore came with a PAT loss of ₹58.4 crore, and interest coverage remains negative. The company has shut down dozens of stores, exited geographies, cut costs, and pivoted aggressively toward e-commerce and quick commerce. Sounds like a turnaround story? Or a slow, calorie-burning exit treadmill? Let’s open the grocery basket and check what’s actually inside.
2. Introduction
Spencer’s Retail Ltd is part of the broader RP-Sanjiv Goenka universe, which otherwise includes profitable, well-run assets. Unfortunately, Spencer’s seems to be that cousin at the family wedding who keeps saying, “Next year pakka sorted ho jayega,” while borrowing money for dessert.
Founded in 2017 as an organised retail play, Spencer’s runs multi-format grocery and departmental stores across India. Over time, it added premium formats like Nature’s Basket, gourmet food sections, liquor, patisserie, and now quick commerce under the JIFFY banner. On paper, this looks modern, aspirational, and urban. On the P&L, it looks like a never-ending discount season where margins never show up.
Over FY20–FY25, revenue has actually shrunk rather than grown, while losses have deepened. Reserves have gone from positive ₹507 crore in FY18 to –₹832 crore by Sep FY25. That’s not erosion — that’s coastal collapse. The company is now explicitly shrinking to survive, closing stores, exiting NCR and southern markets, and doubling down on East India where
it still has some brand recall.
So the big question: is Spencer’s finally doing the right wrong things, or just rearranging shelves on a sinking ship?
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
Spencer’s is a multi-format food and grocery retailer. Translation: it sells everything from onions and atta to imported cheese, wine, skincare, and air fryers — depending on which store you walk into.
The formats include:
- Convenience stores (small format, neighbourhood focused)
- Large format / hypermarket stores
- Nature’s Basket (NBL) — premium, gourmet, health-focused retail
- ORIPL (e-commerce & omni-channel arm)
Across Spencer’s + Nature’s Basket, the company offers 100,000+ SKUs, while NBL alone carries ~10,000 premium SKUs including private labels. As of FY24, total store count stood at 167 stores, of which 34 belong to Nature’s Basket.
In FY24, ORIPL contributed ~14.5% of revenue, indicating that online isn’t trivial anymore. Add to this:
- Artisan Pantry (luxury grocery)
- Wholesale Bazaar (B2B-ish distribution gaps)
- Express delivery
- JIFFY quick commerce (yet to prove scale)
On paper, the model is diversified. In practice, it’s capital-intensive, margin-thin, debt-heavy, and brutally competitive. When you’re fighting kiranas, Avenue Supermarts, quick-commerce apps, and Amazon — execution needs to be military-grade. Spencer’s execution has been… let’s say “experimental”.
4. Financials Overview
Quarterly Comparison (Consolidated – Rs. Crore)
| Metric | Latest Qtr (Dec FY25) | YoY Qtr (Dec FY24) | Prev Qtr (Sep FY25) | YoY % | QoQ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 503 | 517 | 445 | –2.7% | +13.0% |
| EBITDA | 7 | 12 | –4 | –41.7% | NA |
| PAT | –58 | –47 | –64 | –23.3% | +9.4% |
| EPS (₹) | –6.47 | –5.25 | –7.08 | –23.3% | +8.6% |
