Search for stocks /

Shree Krishna Infrastructure Ltd H1 FY26 – ₹0.31 Cr Sales, ₹1.09 Cr Loss, 99% Collapse, New Promoter, New Auditors, Same Old Headache


1. At a Glance – Blink and You’ll Miss the Business

If microcap stocks were Netflix series, Shree Krishna Infrastructure Ltd would be that slow-burn documentary where nothing happens for 10 episodes and suddenly everyone resigns in episode 11. Incorporated in 1990 and currently sitting at a market cap of ₹13.8 crore, this real estate company trades at around ₹12.5 per share, down a brutal 81% over one year and 41% in just three months.

Sales for the latest half year? A majestic ₹0.31 crore. Profit? A clean ₹1.09 crore loss. ROE and ROCE are hovering around 0.26% and 0.43%, numbers so low they should come with a microscope. The company is debt-free, yes—but that’s mostly because lenders also seem to have ghosted it.

The real masala is not the numbers but the drama: promoter exits, a new acquirer, multiple auditor resignations, management reshuffles, and an open offer that promised hope but delivered paperwork. This is not a stock—you don’t read it, you investigate it.


2. Introduction – Welcome to the Crime Scene

This is a real estate company that sells less than a mid-sized kirana store annually but still manages to generate board meetings, resignations, and regulatory disclosures like a corporate soap opera.

On paper, Shree Krishna Infrastructure Ltd is into residential and commercial development. In reality, the last few years look more like corporate musical chairs than construction. Revenues barely move, profits vanish periodically, and just when you think things can’t get more chaotic—three auditors resign together like they saw something they shouldn’t have.

In September 2024, the company even amended its Memorandum of Association to include beverages, pharma, healthcare products, and agriculture. Because obviously, when real estate isn’t working, the next logical step is… juice and tablets.

This article is written in funny auditor mode—because when auditors keep quitting, you stop being an investor and start being a forensic accountant with jokes.


3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?

Officially, SKIFL does three things:

  1. Develop land and infrastructure
  2. Act as a financier / hire-purchase agent
  3. Buy agricultural land and grow crops

Unofficially? It mostly sits on assets, books tiny sales, and occasionally experiments with new “objects” in the MOA like it’s browsing Amazon categories at 2 a.m.

There is no visible execution scale. No disclosed project pipeline. No revenue breakout by segment. No indication that beverages or pharma have actually started. The business model today feels less like a construction firm and more like a corporate shell searching for a purpose.

If this were explained to a lazy investor:

“They own some assets, sell very little, lose money periodically, and change management often.”

Simple. Painful. Accurate.


4. Financials Overview – Half-Yearly Reality Check

Result Type Locked: Half-Yearly Results
Annualised EPS = Latest EPS × 2

Financial Comparison Table (₹ Crore)

Source table
MetricLatest H1 FY26H1 FY25H2 FY25YoY %QoQ %
Revenue0.310.430.36-27.9%-13.9%
EBITDA-1.190.050.00-2480%NA
PAT-1.090.020.01-5550%NA
EPS (₹)-0.990.020.01-5050%NA

Annualised EPS: -₹1.98
At a price of ₹12.5, the P/E is mathematically meaningless, emotionally traumatic, and financially educational.


5. Valuation Discussion – Fair Value Range Only

Method 1: P/E

Negative earnings → P/E not applicable

Method

error: Content is protected !!