01 — At a Glance
A 30-Year-Old Broker Trying to Act Like a 5-Year-Old Fintech Startup
- 52-Week High / Low₹211 / ₹122
- Q3 FY26 Revenue (Standalone)₹305 Cr
- Q3 FY26 PAT (Standalone)₹81 Cr
- EPS (Q3 FY26)₹3.69
- Annualised EPS (Est.)₹14.76
- Book Value / Share₹96
- Price to Book1.30x
- Current ROCE19.0%
- Operating Margin (OPM)39.1%
- Total Debt₹359 Cr
Flash Summary: Share India posted Q3 PAT of ₹81 crore (standalone), up 35% YoY. Revenue grew 18% YoY to ₹305 crore. But somehow the stock is down 27% in a year and trading at 11.4x P/E. The NBFC vertical is imploding (NPA rose), the algo play hasn’t paid off, and they just got fined ₹1 lakh by SEBI for some algo platform issue. Yet earnings are accelerating. This is the kind of stock that makes you question whether the market knows what it’s doing.
02 — Introduction
The Broker Who Wanted to Become Steve Jobs (But Kept Selling Stocks Instead)
Share India was born in 1994. Not a startup. A 30-year-old company. Think about that. They’ve been around longer than most of the founders who funded the fintech revolution. Yet here they are in 2026, trying to convince you that their “uTrade Algos” platform is the future of retail investing in India. Meanwhile, their core broking business is doing all the heavy lifting. It’s like your grandfather who started a textile mill in 1980 suddenly telling you he’s pivoting to cryptocurrency.
The company has a ₹2,736 crore market cap, 46,977 clients in broking, an NBFC subsidiary drowning in NPAs, a merchant banking arm that goes quiet when markets go down, and three tech subsidiaries (uTrade, Algowire, Silverleaf) that are still loss-making or waiting to merge. They operate 262 branches and franchises across 18 states. Roughly 92.8% of revenue comes from broking & trading. Everything else is rounding error mixed with aspiration.
Q3 FY26 was actually good for the core business. Revenue from operations was ₹305 crore, up 18% YoY. PAT was ₹81 crore, up 35% YoY. The stock immediately dropped 27% year-over-year. Such is the life of a capital markets services company: even when you execute, the market doesn’t care. But the numbers are there. And that’s what we’re here to understand.
The Concall Confession (Jan 2026): Management admitted the NBFC book is being “repositioned from unsecured to secured lending.” Translation: they got burned by defaults and are now doing mortgages and car loans at much lower returns. They’ve also accepted that consolidated numbers will look worse than standalone for a while because the subsidiaries are still bleeding cash or merging (Silverleaf).
03 — Business Model: The Batter’s Box
We Buy, We Sell, We Take 0.001% of Everything. Also Here’s Our Algo Platform.
Share India’s core business is broking. You want to buy 100 shares of HDFC Bank? Share India gets a commission. You want to short Reliance? Another commission. Commodities, currency futures, options — doesn’t matter. They’re a marketplace middleman. Approximately 92.8% of revenue in 9M FY26 (April-Dec 2025) came from broking & trading. The remaining 7.2% from NBFC, insurance, and merchant banking combined. So basically, broking is the elephant and everything else is the idea of adding flavor.
Their ADTO (Average Daily Turnover) in Q3 was ₹88 billion. That’s down from ₹120 billion in FY24-25. The market was volatile, retail got scared, and capital markets activity softened. When you’re entirely dependent on velocity, velocity drying up is basically your nightmare come true. But Q2 saw ₹73 billion ADTO, so Q3 represented a bounce. Small victories in the land of micro-revenues.
The NBFC subsidiary Share India Fincap has ₹2,470 crore in AUM (as of 9M FY26) with GNPA at 4.87% — which is bloated compared to industry standards (~2-3%). The reason? They were doing unsecured lending. Now they’re pivoting to secured lending (mortgages, auto-backed). This is a strategic reset that will lower returns but hopefully clean up the asset quality. Management said they’re past the worst of it. We’ll see if that’s wishful thinking.
Broking Revenue92.8%of total revenue
ADTO₹88 BnQ3 FY26
Broking Clients46,977as of 9M FY26
MTF Book₹457 Crgrowing slowly
The Margin Trading Facility (MTF) Story: They want to double the MTF book from ₹450 crore to ₹1,000 crore in two years. That’s the stated ambition. Currently growing at 3% QoQ. SEBI caps broker MTF at 50% of net worth. Share India has net worth of ~₹2,600 crores (per concall), so theoretically they can do ₹1,300 crore MTF. But client demand is the ceiling, not regulation. And if markets stay volatile, retail will not rush to take leverage.
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: The Golden Quarter That the Market Ignored
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹3.69 | Avg Q1–Q3 EPS: (₹3.14+₹3.35+₹3.69)/3 = ₹3.39 | Annualised EPS: ₹13.56 (Conservative annualisation)
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 305 | 259 | 265 | +17.8% | +15.1% |
| Operating Profit | 133 | 95 | 123 | +40.0% | +8.1% |
| OPM % | 43% | 37% | 47% | +600 bps | -400 bps |
| PAT | 81 | 60 | 73 | +35.0% | +10.9% |
| EPS (₹) | 3.69 | 2.75 | 3.35 | +34.2% | +10.1% |
The Numbers Tell a Story the Stock Didn’t Listen To: Q3 PAT of ₹81 crore is up 35% YoY. Revenue is up 18% YoY. Operating profit is up 40% YoY. The OPM expanded to 43% from 37% a year ago. Every metric is green. And yet the stock is down 30% in 12 months. This is what happens when you’re a capital-markets-dependent business in a market downturn. Earnings matter less than sentiment. And sentiment has been: “Brokers are toast. Tech is the future. Share India isn’t good at tech. Sell.”
💬 A broker posts 35% profit growth and gets sold off 27% YoY. Is the market broken, or is market-cap-dependent revenue genuinely that unreliable? Would you pay 11.4x P/E for this stability?
05 — Valuation: The P/E Puzzle
At 11.4x P/E, Are We Undervaluing a 35% Growth Business or Ignoring Hidden Risks?
Method 1: P/E Based Valuation
CMP P/E = 11.4x. Industry median P/E for brokers = ~17.2x. Even assuming 20% discount for cyclicality and capex-market dependency, justified P/E band should be 12x–15x.
Using conservative annualised EPS (3-qtr avg × 4): ₹13.56
→ 12x × ₹13.56 = ₹162.7 15x × ₹13.56 = ₹203.4
Range: ₹163 – ₹203
Method 2: Price to Book Value
Book Value = ₹96. Current P/BV = 1.30x. For a NBFC + Broker hybrid with 14.3% ROE, 1.2x–1.5x P/BV is justified. Upper band assumes the NBFC pivot to secured lending succeeds and improves ROA.
→ 1.2x × ₹96 = ₹115.2 1.5x × ₹96 = ₹144
Range: ₹115 – ₹144
Method 3: EV/EBITDA (Operating Profit Basis)
TTM Operating Profit (9M-FY26 annualised with Q4 estimate) ≈ ₹450–480 crore. Market Cap = ₹2,736 crore. EV/Operating Profit = ~6x. For a broker, 6x–8x is reasonable (cyclicality discount). This implies value range of ₹135–₹180 (assuming no major capex drain).
Conservative: 6x × ₹480 = ₹2,880 cr MCap → ₹132/sh | Aggressive: 8x × ₹480 = ₹3,840 cr MCap → ₹176/sh
Range: ₹132 – ₹176
Consolidated Fair Value View: The three methods suggest a range of ₹115–₹203, with consensus clustering around ₹145–₹175. The current price of ₹125 sits in the lower half of this range, suggesting modest undervaluation or that the market is correctly pricing in execution risk on the NBFC pivot and ongoing tech subsidiary losses. Upside to ₹175–₹190 is realistic if: (i) core broking sustains 15%+ growth, (ii) NBFC NPA stabilizes below 3%, and (iii) subsidiaries show path to breakeven.
⚠️ EduInvesting Fair Value Range: ₹145 – ₹190. This fair value range is for educational purposes only and is not investment advice. Please consult a SEBI-registered investment advisor before making any financial decision.
06 — What’s Cooking: News, Drama & Disasters
Mergers, Penalties, and the Art of Losing ₹4,169 Crore in Contingent Liabilities
