01 — At a Glance
The Steel Trading Startup That Moved ₹5,856 Crores In First Year
- 52-Week High / Low₹479 / ₹290
- FY25 Revenue (Full Year)₹5,856 Cr
- FY25 PAT (Full Year)₹103 Cr
- Full-Year EPS (FY25)₹9.20
- Current EPS (TTM)₹8.47
- Book Value₹121
- Price to Book3.63x
- Dividend Yield0.00%
- Debt / Equity0.17x
- Open Offer (APL)₹450 (Sep 2023)
The Twist You Didn’t See Coming: SG Mart was bought by Dhruv and Meenakshi Gupta (connected to APL Apollo) in April 2023 for a song. Then management scaled it from ₹151 crore in Q1 FY24 to ₹1,644 crore in Q3 FY26. 10x in three quarters. But Q3 profits collapsed 61.7% YoY because steel prices dropped like a bad Bollywood sequel, leaving ₹20 crores stuck in inventory. CMP ₹435 values it at 53.4x earnings — a number so high it makes sense only if you believe in perpetual geometry. Let’s talk about it.
02 — Introduction
Welcome to the Weirdest Turnaround Story in Indian Markets
Three years ago, this was Kintech Renewables — a failed solar company that couldn’t even sell a panel to a broken roof. Then Dhruv Gupta walked in with his wife, a checkbook, and an audacious idea: let’s become a B2B one-stop-shop for construction materials. Not sexy. Not tech-enabled beyond a logo. Just steel, cement, tiles, and the distribution network of his daddy’s company, APL Apollo.
And it worked. In FY25 (9 months of operations), SG Mart moved ₹5,856 crore of goods and made ₹103 crore profit. That’s a 1.76% net margin — respectable for trading. The concall in January 2026 was the most honest piece of corporate communication you’ll hear this year: “The actual business EBITDA was ₹40 crores in Q3, but reported was ₹17 crores because inventory prices fell ₹2,500–3,000 per ton in 20–25 days.”
Translation: when you’re holding 163,000 tons of HR coils and someone decides to dump prices, you either sell at a loss or sit and watch your balance sheet burn. They chose honesty. FY27 guidance is ₹350+ crore EBITDA. FY26 open offer was ₹450. Stock trades at ₹435. The math is too tight for comfort, and the leverage to commodity prices is too real.
Let’s dig into the numbers — and the very real risks hiding in the cheerful “growth story” narrative.
Concall Highlight (Jan 23, 2026): “Service centres will be our primary model; we’re not a trader, we’re a structured solutions provider.” But also: “Q3 inventory loss of ₹20 crores.” Pick a lane, buddy.
03 — Business Model: What Are They Even Selling?
Four Pillars. Three Competitors. Two Years to Prove It Works.
SG Mart operates via four revenue streams, and they’re not shy about it. On the January 2026 concall, management literally said: “We stand on 4 pillars.” Let’s break down each pillar before the next commodity crash.
1) Service Centre Business (India + Dubai): They buy HR coils, cut them, emboss them (because apparently cutting alone is boring), stock them, and sell them. 163,000 tons in Q3. 5 operational centres now. Plan is 20 by FY29. Dubai alone does ₹50 crore EBITDA per year at ₹5,000+ per ton spreads. This is the margin engine. This is also the suicide mission if spreads compress.
2) B2B Metal Trading: Buy steel from JSW, Jindal, TATA. Sell to dealers. Zero value add. ₹125,000 tons volume in Q3 at ₹500–600 per ton spread. When steel prices are falling, this business bleeds. When they’re stable, it prints money. Q4 guidance assumes ₹900–1,000 per ton spread (optimistic).
3) Renewable Structures (Solar): This is the “secret sauce” everyone talks about. SG Mart supplies solar mounting structures to IPPs. ₹300 crore order book as of January 2026. Only 9 months old. Capacity: 250,000 tons annually. Margin: ₹4,000–5,000 per ton. Q3 did 17,000 tons. Q4 expects 25,000 tons. FY27 target: 180,000 tons. This is a real business — not commodity bleeding.
4) Trade-Led Profiles (APL Apollo Brand): Residential racking, cable trays, rooftop structures sold under the APL Apollo brand. Margin: ₹6,000–7,000 per ton. Q4 target: 10,000 tons. This just launched in January 2026. If it works, it’s a margin inflector. If it doesn’t, it’s a footnote.
Service Centres5 LiveTarget: 20 by FY29
Monthly Capacity70.5kTons per month
Renewable Order Book₹300 CrFY25-26 visibility
SuppliersTop 225Registered partners
The Inventory Risk Nobody Talks About: Management holds 20–25 days of inventory. In Q3, steel prices dropped ₹2,500–3,000 per ton in just 20–25 days. That’s ₹50–75 lakh per ton-day of exposure. With 163,000 tons in Q3, do the math. This is feature, not bug. Feature because it allows scale. Bug because one bad price shock wipes months of margin.
💬 If you were a CFO managing 163,000 tons of inventory and your raw material dropped 20% overnight, would you report it as “business EBITDA” or “inventory loss”? Where’s the line?
04 — Financials Overview: The Q3 Pretend Game
₹1,644 Crore Revenue Looks Impressive. The 61.7% Profit Drop Looks Like Fraud.
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹0.85 | Annualised EPS (Q3×4): ₹3.40 | Full-year FY25 EPS: ₹9.20
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 1,644 | 1,335 | 1,704 | +23.2% | -3.5% |
| Operating Profit (EBITDA) | 17 | 22 | 28 | -22.7% | -39.3% |
| OPM % | 1.0% | 1.6% | 1.6% | -60 bps | -60 bps |
| “Business EBITDA” (Adj) | 40 | N/A | N/A | +₹20 Cr inventory loss bridge |
| PAT | 10.7 | 28 | 27 | -61.7% | -60.4% |
| EPS (₹) | 0.85 | 2.50 | 2.11 | -66.0% | -59.7% |
Wait. What Just Happened? Revenue grew 23.2% YoY. EBITDA fell 23%. That’s not a slowdown — that’s a razor’s edge margin structure collapsing under commodity pressure. But management adds: “The actual business EBITDA was ₹40 crores due to inventory losses of ₹20 crores, plus minor 2–3 crores of business expenses to build renewable structure.” Adjust back, and you’re at 2.4% EBITDA margin — still thin, but honest. The question: can you rely on their adjustments, or are they normalizing away real losses?
Concall Bridge (Management’s Logic): “Reported ₹17 Cr EBITDA. Less: Inventory loss ₹20 Cr. Plus: Business expenses ₹2–3 Cr. Equals: Business EBITDA ₹40 Cr.” The math is self-serving, but the inventory loss is real.
05 — Valuation: Fair Value or Commodity Fever?
P/E of 53.4x Priced for Perfection, Delivery of Paradox
