1. At a Glance – Big Plant, Bigger Headache
If cement plants were judged by size alone, Sanghi Industries Ltd would be walking the ramp with confidence. One of India’s largest single-location cement plants. Captive port. Captive power. Captive mines. Everything captive… except profits.
- Market Cap: ₹1,662 cr
- CMP: ₹64.4
- Debt: ₹2,494 cr (yes, higher than market cap)
- TTM Sales: ₹1,141 cr
- TTM PAT: ₹ -424 cr
- ROE: -46.1%
- ROCE: -3.9%
- Q3 FY26 PAT: ₹ -115.39 cr
Sales are breathing again, margins have stopped bleeding for now, but leverage is still sitting on Sanghi’s chest like a gym bro who skipped leg day. Curious already?
2. Introduction – From Gujarat Pride to Balance Sheet Strain
Sanghi Industries was once the poster child of “single-location scale efficiency”. Massive capacity. Coastal advantage. Export optionality. The works.
Then came:
- Aggressive capex
- Debt-funded expansion
- Cement cycle downturn
- Interest costs that refused to behave
The result?
A company that can produce cement competitively, but can’t yet convert that into sustainable shareholder returns.
Now, with Ambuja stepping in as promoter and a scheme pending at NCLT, Sanghi is no longer just a cement story — it’s a financial restructuring soap opera.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
Sanghi does exactly one thing: make cement at scale.
- Products (FY23 revenue mix):
- OPC: 66%
- PPC: 33%
- PSC: 1%
- Facilities:
- One mega plant at Sanghipuram, Gujarat
- 130 MW captive thermal power
- Captive limestone mines
- Desalination plant
- Captive port (1
- MTPA handling capacity)
This is a vertically integrated fortress. Operationally impressive. Financially… expensive.
If scale automatically meant profits, Sanghi would be minting cash. Unfortunately, lenders don’t accept “potential” as EMI.
4. Financials Overview – Numbers Don’t Lie, They Just Hurt
Quarterly Comparison (₹ cr)
| Metric | Latest Q3 FY26 | YoY Q3 FY25 | Prev Q2 FY26 | YoY % | QoQ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 275 | 259 | 285 | 6.2% | -3.5% |
| EBITDA | 23 | 30 | 25 | -23% | -8% |
| PAT | -115 | -97 | -117 | -19% | +1.7% |
| EPS (₹) | -4.47 | -3.75 | -4.51 | -19% | +0.9% |
Annualised EPS (Q3 rule): Average of Q1–Q3 EPS × 4 → still deeply negative
Commentary:
Yes, revenue has recovered versus FY24 lows. No, it hasn’t fixed the structural problem — interest + depreciation eat EBITDA for breakfast.
Do you see a margin story here, or just survival mode?
5. Valuation Discussion – Fair Value Range (Educational Only)
Let’s be disciplined.
Method 1: P/E
Not applicable. EPS is negative. Next.
Method 2: EV / EBITDA
- Enterprise Value: ₹4,153 cr
- TTM EBITDA: ~₹110 cr
- EV/EBITDA: ~30.6x
That’s premium valuation… for a loss-making cement company. Interesting choice, market.
