01 — At a Glance
The Hotel Chain That’s Finally Stopped Bleeding
- 52-Week High / Low₹255 / ₹120
- FY25 Full-Year Revenue₹1,130 Cr
- FY25 Full-Year PAT₹85.5 Cr
- Full-Year EPS (FY25)₹3.87
- Annualised EPS (Q2×4)₹7.16
- Book Value₹80.7
- Price to Book1.87x
- Debt / Equity0.97x
- Operating Margin36.1%
- Interest Coverage1.86x
Auditor’s Note: SAMHI Hotels went from losing money faster than a Bollywood remake to actually making profit. FY25 saw ₹85.5 crore PAT on ₹1,130 crore revenue, with GIC Pte. Limited throwing ₹604 crore at it (out of promised ₹752 crore) to slash debt and stabilize the ship. Q2 FY26 annualized EPS sits at ₹7.16 — better than FY25’s ₹3.87 full-year. That’s improvement. That’s also why the stock is down 15% in 3 months. Welcome to India, where good news crashes the market.
02 — Introduction
The Hotel Business: Where Bad Timing and Debt Collide
SAMHI Hotels is a branded hotel ownership and asset management platform. Translation: they buy old, struggling hotels, renovate them, slap a Marriott or Hyatt badge on them, hand operational keys to a professional hotel operator, and then sit back and collect rent. Sounds simple. Turns out it’s one of the most capital-intensive, leverage-heavy, cyclicality-prone businesses in India.
The company was founded by Ashish Jakhanwala and Manav Thadani — two blokes who walked into a hotel recession, decided to double down, and somehow managed to stay operational long enough for things to turn around. As of June 2025, they own and operate 32 hotels across 14 cities with 4,948 rooms under 10 brands: Marriott (Courtyard, Sheraton, Fairfield, Renaissance, Four Points), Hyatt (Regency, Place), and IHG (Holiday Inn Express).
For years, the math didn’t work. Debt exploded. Losses compounded. Interest payments ate profits before they even existed. Then something magical happened: occupancy rates stabilized, Average Room Rates (ARR) climbed, and suddenly the business model — which had been theoretically sound but financially catastrophic — started generating actual cash flow. GIC Pte. Limited stepped in with ₹752 crore in fresh capital. Debt got slashed. Leverage ratios stopped looking like cardiac arrest victims. And now, for the first time in ages, the company is printing profit.
The question, of course: at what price? And is the turnaround actually durable? Let’s find out — with data, sarcasm, and the financial honesty your portfolio manager charges ₹5 lakhs a year to avoid.
Management Insight (Mar 2026 Concall): “RevPAR growth of 8–11% anticipated in near-to-medium term,” said management. They also admitted that even as occupancy hit ~74% and ARR crossed ₹6,654, competitive pressure and economic cycles remain real threats. Refreshingly candid for an India hospitality company.
03 — Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
Buy Broken Hotels. Fix Them. Let Marriott Run Them. Profit.
SAMHI follows an acquisition-led turnaround strategy. In plain English: find a struggling hotel (overlevered, underperforming, cash-strapped owner), negotiate a discount, refinance via long-term debt, hire a global hotel operator like Marriott or Hyatt to manage it, then optimize the asset. The operator handles staff, reservations, guest experience. SAMHI handles ownership, capex, and distributions. It’s asset-heavy, but it works — if ARRs grow and debt servicing doesn’t choke you to death first.
Current portfolio is segmented into three tiers: Upper Upscale/Upscale (₹8,954 ARR, ~74% occupancy, 1,086 keys), Upper Midscale (₹5,580 ARR, 2,189 keys), and Midscale (₹3,523 ARR, ~72% occupancy, 1,673 keys). Revenue mix: 72% from room sales, 25% from F&B, 3% from other. Geographically diversified — Pune, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Gurgaon, Delhi, Chennai. Over 90% of assets in Tier-1 cities.
The strategy was sound. The execution was painful. Losses from FY19–FY24 totaled over ₹2,000 crore cumulatively. Debt ballooned to ₹2,744 crore by FY23. Leverage hit 3.66x. Interest coverage collapsed to 0.77x in FY24 — meaning the company couldn’t even service interest from operating cash flow. Then in August 2023, they acquired ACIC’s portfolio (six hotels, 962 keys, 3.75 crore shares). Then GIC pumped capital. Then things got better. Took a decade, but here we are.
Operating Margin36.1%FY25: 36%
Room Revenue Mix72%F&B: 25%
Avg Occupancy72–74%All segments
Capital Structure Note: SAMHI just announced a ₹470 crore investment to acquire 70% of RARE India — an experience-led leisure platform with 60+ hotels, 990 rooms across India, Bhutan, and Nepal. Post-acquisition, RARE will become Marriott’s exclusive “Outdoor Collection by Marriott Bonvoy” platform. This is either genius diversification into high-margin leisure or the biggest distraction from core business. Time will tell.
💬 Real question: Can SAMHI truly manage two business models simultaneously — capital-heavy branded business hotels AND asset-light leisure partnerships? Or is this the IPO cash burn everyone warned about?
04 — Financials Overview
Q2 FY26: The Numbers That Prove Miracles Do Happen
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q2 FY26 EPS: ₹1.79 | Annualised EPS (Q2×4): ₹7.16 | Full-year FY25 EPS: ₹3.87
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
Q2 FY25
Sep 2024 |
Q1 FY26
Jun 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 293 | 262 | 272 | +11.8% | +7.7% |
| Operating Profit | 107 | 92 | 90 | +16.3% | +18.9% |
| OPM % | 37% | 35% | 33% | +200 bps | +400 bps |
| PAT | 48 | 13 | 19 | +269% | +153% |
| EPS (₹) | 1.79 | 0.57 | 0.78 | +214% | +129% |
The Real Story: Yes, PAT jumped 269% YoY. But Q2 FY25 had a one-time ₹71 crore OTHER INCOME REVERSAL. Strip that, and organic profit growth is ~35–40%, which is solid but not miraculous. Revenue up 11.8%, operating margin expanded 200 bps. The business is getting better. The leverage story is getting better. But it’s not the hockey-stick curve the numbers suggest. Fair is fair.
05 — Valuation: Fair Value Range
What’s This Hotel Chain Actually Worth?
