01 — At a Glance
The Great Undressing: From Suits to Satellites
- 52-Week High / Low₹784 / ₹343
- Q3 FY26 Revenue₹557 Cr
- Q3 FY26 PAT₹7.22 Cr
- TTM EPS₹821.76
- Annualised EPS (Q3)₹2.16
- Book Value / Share₹488
- Price to Book0.76x
- Debt to Equity0.32x
- ROCE1.64%
- Return Over 3 Years11.2%
The Plot Twist: This company is trading below book value at 0.76x P/BV, has negative 1-year returns of -27.5%, a laughably low ROCE of 1.64%, and a P/E that makes no sense because the Annualised Q3 EPS is ₹2.16 while the stock trades at 13.1x. That’s because Q3 PAT is ₹7.22 crore on ₹557 crore revenue — which should horrify you. Or maybe excite you. Depends on if you read the fine print: TTM EPS of ₹821.76 is legacy glory from demerger gains. The core operations? A slow-motion car crash turning into an aerospace moon shot.
02 — Introduction: A Company Getting Divorced (Badly)
When Your Family Goes to Court, Your Stock Goes to the ER
Raymond Limited was incorporated in 1925. They made suits. Really good suits. Your grandfather wore Raymond. Your father wore Raymond. You might have worn Raymond, if you ever got invited to a wedding where jeans weren’t acceptable.
But somewhere around 2020, the Raymond board looked at the balance sheet and had an existential crisis. “We’re good at three things — textiles, real estate, and engineering components. These are completely different.” So they decided to demerge like an arranged marriage ending badly. In FY24, Raymond Lifestyle got divorced. In FY25, Raymond Realty got divorced. By May 2025, they were officially separate legal entities. Each was supposed to unlock value. Instead, the parent company — now a orphaned engineering business — has PAT collapsing faster than a cheap suit in monsoon rains.
Q3 FY26 is the first full quarter post-demergers. The numbers? Stunning. Q3 PAT is ₹7.22 crore — down 93% from ₹10.83 crore in Q3 FY25. Revenue is ₹557 crore (up 19.5% YoY), but profit barely exists. The ROCE is 1.64%. The stock has fallen 40% in 6 months and 27.5% in 1 year. But here’s the twist: deep inside this carcass, there’s a defense contractor doing 49% growth in aerospace that’s being called the “preferred supplier to top 3 Global Aircraft Engine Manufacturers.” The market is pricing the ghost stories. The business is trying to write new ones.
Management’s Message (Feb 2026 Concall): Management explicitly said, “we’re not yet” unlisting/splitting the aerospace and auto businesses. They want “critical scale of EBITDA” and for “external macroeconomic factors, specifically global trade pressures… to settle” first. Translation: give us 2-3 more years. The tariff uncertainty from the U.S., they warned, is causing “logistical complexities and temporary scheduling delays.” When aerospace guys talk about U.S. tariffs, normal investors should listen. The order book, they said, covers a “safe” 2.5-year visibility period.
03 — Business Model: Flying Blind (Literally)
From Zoot Suits to Missile Parts. The Career Pivot Nobody Asked For.
What’s left of Raymond after the demergers? Two businesses, each in its own purgatory.
Aerospace & Defense (JKMGAL): This segment supplies complex engine parts, structural components, and system parts to the top 3 global aircraft engine manufacturers (Pratt & Whitney, CFM, Rolls-Royce). Q3 revenue: ₹105 crore, up 49% YoY. EBITDA margin: 18.6%. They’re on 15+ engine programs. LEAP engines alone have them supplying 300-350 part numbers across variants. They hit “more than one new part every day” on the LEAP platform. Their market share on parts has moved from 35% allocation to 65% on over 50% of their parts. The operating leverage is crushing. But why didn’t Q3 margin expand? Because they’re investing in “productization and new product development” — writing off development spend like it’s nothing. Management targets 23-25% EBITDA margins “in the long run.” Long run. Not this year. Not next year. Whenever the Andhra Pradesh capex pays off.
Precision Technology & Auto Components (JKMPTL): This includes steel files (60%+ market share in India, 25% globally), ring gears (55% market share in passenger vehicles), flex plates, and auto components. Q3 revenue: ₹417 crore, up 15% YoY. EBITDA margin: 13.7% (versus 10.4% in Q3 FY25). But here’s the catch — this margin includes a ₹13 crore one-time land sale gain from Q2. Strip that out, and you’re at maybe 13% normalized. They’re growing at 12% 9M revenue but claiming “structural efficiencies” from SAP HANA implementation and synergies. Management targets “break the 15% barrier and aim towards a higher rate on a yearly basis.” They export to 55+ countries. The working capital is tight — receivables at 76 days (down from 212 days in FY20), inventory at 220 days (reasonable for engineering). They’re buying a ₹500 crore capacity expansion in Andhra Pradesh for Aerospace and ₹430 crore for Auto.
The Andhra strategy: Management described it as “working backwards” — if we deploy ₹930 crore capex across the next 5 years in a lower-cost geography, we can ensure growth doesn’t slow as existing capacities fill. This is the grand narrative. It’s also not happening in Q3 or Q4. It’s happening in 2026-28. Your patience is required.
04 — Financials Overview: The Earnings Massacre
Q3 FY26: How To Lose 93% of Your Profit and Still Talk About “Synergies”
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q3 FY26 PAT: ₹7.22 Cr | Post-Demerger Baseline | Annualised EPS (Q3 × 4): ₹2.16
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 557 | 466 | 527 | +19.5% | +5.7% |
| Operating Profit | 60 | 31 | 43 | +93.5% | +39.5% |
| OPM % | 10.7% | 6.7% | 8.2% | +400 bps | +250 bps |
| PAT | 7.22 | 10.83 | 1.71 | -33.3% | +322% |
| EPS (₹) | 0.54 | 1.08 | 0.26 | -50% | +108% |
The Demerger Wreckage: This table is utterly confusing because Raymond is now a truncated company. Q3 FY25 figures are from “old Raymond” (with Realty + Lifestyle), so comparisons are useless. Q2 FY26 PAT was ₹1.71 crore — suggesting Q3’s ₹7.22 crore is actually improving. OPM jumped to 10.7%. But EPS is ₹0.54 — extrapolate that to ₹2.16 annualized and divide by a stock price of ₹373, and you get a P/E of 172x. This makes no sense because the stock isn’t trading on Q3 earnings — it’s trading on the ghost of FY25 gains from demerger exceptional items and the promise of aerospace 2-3 years from now.
💬 TTM EPS is ₹821.76, but Q3 annualized is ₹2.16. That’s a 380x difference. How much of the TTM is legacy demerger gains, and how much is real? Should you even care, or is this a value trap dressed up as a turnaround story?
05 — Valuation: The Demerger Discount
What Is A Orphaned Defense Contractor Actually Worth?
