01 — At a Glance
The Jindal Family ATM That Forgot How to ATM
- 52-Week High / Low₹8,778 / ₹5,310
- Q3 FY26 Revenue₹11.9 Cr
- Q3 FY26 PAT₹7.51 Cr
- TTM Revenue₹86 Cr
- 5-Year Revenue CAGR+16% (Declining)
- Book Value / Share₹31,668
- Price to Book0.17x
- Total Investments₹18,030 Cr (97% of assets!)
- ROE (5-Year)0.69%
- Dividend Paid (Last 10 Years)₹0.00
Flash Summary: Nalwa Sons just posted Q3 PAT of ₹7.51 crore. The TTM PAT is ₹25.4 crore. Revenue fell 11.9% QoQ. The stock is down 24% in 6 months, down 18.8% in 3 months. Trades at 118x P/E on TTM earnings (which is meaningless because the earnings are in ₹7–8 crore range — literally smaller than many startup funding rounds). Holds ₹18,000 crore of investments in unlisted Jindal Group companies. Book value per share is ₹31,668. The stock price is ₹5,366. Let that sink in: you’re paying 17 paise for every rupee of book value. This is not a discount. This is a fire sale that nobody wants to attend.
02 — Introduction
The Company That Changed Its Entire Identity And Still Couldn’t Figure It Out
Nalwa Sons Investments Limited was originally incorporated as “Jindal Strips Limited” in the mists of time — back when O.P. Jindal was laying down the foundations of steel empire, manufacturing HR steel strips in Hisar. Then the company demerged its stainless steel business to Jindal Stainless Steel, rebranded itself as an NBFC, and was basically saying: “We are now a finance company.”
But here’s where it gets hilarious. In FY20, after some introspection possibly involving a bottle of Old Monk and a whiteboard, management decided: “Actually, no. We don’t want to be an NBFC anymore either. Let’s just become a non-NBFC investment holding company that invests in our group companies and occasionally loans them money.” And that’s where the company has stayed — in regulatory limbo, earning almost nothing, holding ₹18,000 crore of unlisted investments that trade nowhere and are valued based on vibes and Jindal Group news.
The Q3 FY26 story is simple: nothing interesting happened. Revenue was ₹11.9 crore (down 11.9% QoQ). PAT was ₹7.51 crore. EPS was ₹14.58 annualised to ₹14.58. Wait, that’s just one quarter. So annualised EPS = ₹14.58 × 4 = ₹58.32. Stock price: ₹5,366. P/E = 5,366 / 58.32 = 92x. Still stupid. The board hasn’t declared any dividend since 1947 (approximately). The company is hoarding cash like it’s planning for Armageddon.
What Is The Company Doing? Nobody knows. The annual report is 80% talk about Jindal Group businesses it doesn’t control, 15% disclosures about accumulated losses in group company books, and 5% hope that this mess somehow makes sense. Investors have essentially paid ₹2,758 crore for the privilege of saying they own shares in a company that owns unlisted shares in other companies. It’s like owning a photograph of an investment rather than the investment itself.
03 — Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
The Company That’s Not Sure If It’s Doing Anything
Nalwa Sons is officially a “non-NBFC Company engaged in the business of investing in shares and granting loans to the group companies.” Let’s break that down in a way that makes sense: they take money from the stock market (by existing on NSE:NSIL), lock it into unlisted equity shares and loans to various Jindal Group entities, earn dividend and interest income when the group companies remember they exist, and distribute almost nothing to shareholders.
Revenue mix in the last full year (TTM): approximately 27% from interest income (loans to group companies that don’t really pay on time), 40% from dividend income (from investments), and the rest from “other income.” The company doesn’t make anything. Doesn’t sell anything. Doesn’t lend to external parties. It’s purely a pass-through vehicle for O.P. Jindal Group restructuring.
The balance sheet is 97% investments. ₹18,030 crore out of ₹18,457 crore total assets is parked in equity shares and loans to group companies. The cash conversion cycle is 738 days. The company is barely rotating its capital. It’s like a patient in ICU that’s technically alive but not really living.
Interest Income~27%of revenue
Dividend Income~40%of revenue
Investments as % Assets97%locked up!
Debt-to-Equity0.00xno debt
Fun fact: The company has ₹203 crore of loans outstanding to various Jindal Group companies that have accumulated losses in their books. These are non-performing in every way except the word “loan” — the companies borrowing money are technically insolvent. The group keeps lending to itself like a Ponzi scheme that’s given up on secrecy.
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: The Slow Death Continues
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹14.58 | Annualised EPS: ₹14.58 × 4 = ₹58.32 | TTM EPS: ₹45.54 | P/E @ ₹5,366: 117.8x
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 11.94 | 13.55 | 13.49 | -11.9% | -11.5% |
| Operating Profit | 11.29 | 11.16 | 21.39 | +1.2% | -47.2% |
| OPM % | 94.6% | 82.4% | 86.5% | +1220 bps | +810 bps |
| PAT | 7.51 | 8.18 | 17.86 | -8.2% | -57.9% |
| EPS (₹) | 14.58 | 15.89 | 30.61 | -8.2% | -52.4% |
The Math That Makes No Sense: TTM EPS = ₹45.54. CMP = ₹5,366. P/E = 117.8x. This is not a valuation. This is a cry for help. But here’s the thing: the earnings are so small (₹25 crore annually) that the P/E ratio is mathematically useless. It’s like calculating the return on investment of a Rs 10 note you found on the road. Why are you even doing this calculation?
What’s Really Happening: The company doesn’t make money in any meaningful way. It collects dividend from Jindal Group investments and interest on loans to the same group. When those investments don’t perform (and Jindal steel has been in the dog house), the income dries up. Q3 revenue fell because the underlying group companies didn’t perform. Simple as that.
💬 Would you pay ₹5,366 per share to own 0.17x of book value in a company that hasn’t paid a dividend in a decade and earns 0.32% ROE? If yes, why? Drop your reasoning in the comments section — we’re genuinely curious.
05 — Valuation Discussion: The Paradox
How Do You Value a Black Box That Hides Unlisted Investments?
Method 1: P/E Based (Meaningless But Obligatory)
TTM EPS = ₹45.54. If we assume the company can earn 0.32% ROE (which it currently does), it would need to be valued at… well, infinity, because the return is so poor. A reasonable P/E for a company earning nothing would be 5–8x just to give it benefit of the doubt.
→ 5x × ₹45.54 = ₹227.70 8x × ₹45.54 = ₹364.32
Range: ₹228 – ₹364 (95% downside from current price)
Method 2: Price to Book Value (The Real Story)
Book Value = ₹31,668 per share. P/BV = 0.17x. This discount exists for a reason: the investments are unlisted, illiquid, and belong to a family-controlled group. A reasonable P/BV for such a vehicle would be 0.3–0.5x (still a heavy discount to liquid assets).
→ 0.3x × ₹31,668 = ₹9,500 0.5x × ₹31,668 = ₹15,834
Range: ₹9,500 – ₹15,834 (yet still way above current valuation!)
Method 3: Liquidation Value (Most Honest)
If Nalwa Sons were to be wound up and its investments sold at market rates: unlisted Jindal Group equity would fetch maybe 0.25–0.35x of book value in a distressed sale. ₹18,030 crore of investments = ₹4,500–₹6,300 crore in a fire sale scenario.
Equity Value per share at 0.25x–0.35x on investments implies ₹1,690–₹2,366 range.
Range: ₹1,690 – ₹2,366 (60–70% downside from here)
Consolidated View: Every method screams the same thing: the stock is trading well above any reasonable valuation that accounts for illiquidity, family control, and terrible returns. The stock is at ₹5,366. Book value is ₹31,668. The disconnect is not a discount — it’s a revelation that the market doesn’t believe the book value is real. Because the book value is sitting in unlisted companies owned by the same family that controls the holding company. You’re paying for a promise that these investments have value. They might. Or they might not. The lack of transparency makes this a lottery ticket, not an investment.
⚠️ EduInvesting Fair Value Range: ₹2,000 – ₹5,000. This fair value range reflects the illiquidity and family control premium/discount. At current prices (₹5,366), the stock is already near the upper end. Any re-rating lower is possible if Jindal Group faces a business downturn. This analysis is strictly for educational purposes and is not investment advice.
06 — What’s Cooking: News, Triggers & Family Drama
The Silence Is Deafening: What We Don’t Know
