01 — At a Glance
The Pesticide Company That Needed Pesticide Itself
- 52-Week High / Low₹311 / ₹89.8
- FY25 Revenue (Full Year)₹1,235 Cr
- FY25 PAT (Full Year)-₹92.1 Cr
- Q3 FY26 Revenue₹318 Cr
- Q3 FY26 PAT-₹10.2 Cr
- Book Value₹19.0
- Price to Book7.16x
- Debt₹502 Cr
- Equity₹444 Cr
- CRISIL RatingAA/Stable (Upgraded)
The Setup: NACL Industries lost ₹60.3 crore in FY25. Its stock crashed 56% in 18 months. Banks were sweating. Then Coromandel International — a profitable Rs 3.5 trillion market cap company — acquired 53% in August 2025 and the stock went parabolic. Ratings jumped from A3/BBB- to AA/Stable. The company is now bleeding slower. On paper, it’s a turnaround. In reality, it’s a wounded gazelle being nursed back to health by a lioness. Let’s see if NACL survives the operation.
02 — Introduction
When Your Pesticide Company Becomes The Pest
NACL Industries is the agrochemical equivalent of that friend who keeps saying “mere paas plan hain bhai” but never executes. They sell insecticides, fungicides, and herbicides to farmers across India and to MNCs globally. Sounds solid. Sounds stable. Sounds… profitable. Except it’s not. It was, once. Then between 2022 and 2025, the company imploded so spectacularly that even the stock market needed therapy.
For three straight years, NACL played financial roulette with negative working capital, inventory bloat, and operating margins that swung like a cricket bat in a hurricane. The company that was supposed to serve 1.5 million farmers across 55,000 distribution points was busy serving financial heartburn to its lenders instead.
Then, in March 2025, Coromandel International showed up with a cheque for ₹402 crore (via open offer), acquired 53% voting control, and the market said: “finally, an adult in the room.” The stock went from ₹88 to ₹311 in months. A 252% rally on hopes and parent company comfort letters. By December, CRISIL upgraded the ratings from junk-tier (A3/BBB-) to investment grade (AA/Stable). Meanwhile, NACL is still posting ₹10 crore losses in Q3. The audacity. The hope. The comedy.
Now we’re in turnaround season. Management says revenues will hit ₹1,600–₹1,700 crore in FY26. EBITDA margins will hit 8–9%. Debt will shrink. The working capital nightmare will vanish. Coromandel will inject synergies, share distribution networks, and probably lend them ₹160 crore to keep the lights on. It’s not a business turnaround yet. It’s a parent company life support system. And like most parent rescues, it’s expensive, slow, and filled with awkward family dinners.
Coromandel’s Confidence Play: CRISIL explicitly noted in their Nov 2025 upgrade that NACL’s rating is now “notched up to factor in support from CIL” — which is finance-speak for “this company’s credit is only good because its daddy promised to keep it alive.” Brutally honest. Refreshingly transparent.
03 — Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
Selling Poison To Farmers. Very Legally.
NACL is a three-part business: (1) Domestic retail — farmers buy branded pesticides through 55,000 retail counters spread across India. (2) Institutional B2B — state governments, agriculture departments, and corporates buy in bulk. (3) Exports — technicals (active ingredients) and formulations sold to 30+ countries. Revenue split is roughly 78% domestic, 22% exports, as of 9MFY25.
The product portfolio spans six major groups: Insecticides (48% of revenue), Herbicides (21%), Fungicides (19%), and Plant Growth Regulators (12%). They hold 518 domestic and 120 international product registrations. In other words, they have the products. They have the reach. They have the brand. The only thing they forgot to have was profitability.
The core issue: NACL’s business is inherently working-capital intensive. They import >50% of raw materials at dollar-linked costs, manufacture at three plants (Srikakulam, Ethakota, Dahej), offer 130–140 days credit to dealers, and carry 90 days of inventory. The cash conversion cycle used to be positive. Then crude oil prices shot up. Raw material costs spiked. Inventory became dead weight. Dealers couldn’t pay. Banks panicked. By FY25, NACL had ₹502 crore in debt vs. ₹444 crore in equity. The business model was mathematically broken.
Product Base518+Domestic Registrations
Export Countries30+Global Presence
Dealer Network55KRetail Touchpoints
Debt/Equity Ratio1.13xStill Highly Leveraged
Capacity Update: NACL has 63,000 TPA total installed capacity across four plants. Utilization hovers around 70%. This means they can double revenue without building a single new factory. The irony: they can’t afford to operate at 100% because they’re broke.
💬 Genuine Q: If NACL can’t turn profit selling pesticides (an essential product with zero elasticity), how do management consultants sleep at night? Drop your theory.
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: The Eternal Patient
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q3 FY26 EPS: -₹0.43 | Annualised EPS: -₹1.72 | FY25 Full-Year EPS: -₹3.94
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 318 | 268 | 457 | +18.8% | -30.4% |
| Operating Profit | 7 | -26 | 45 | N/A | -84.4% |
| OPM % | 2% | -10% | 10% | +1,200 bps | -800 bps |
| PAT | -10.2 | -36 | 3 | +71.7% | -440% |
| EPS (₹) | -0.43 | -1.56 | 0.11 | +72.4% | -491% |
The Rollercoaster: Q2 FY26 (Sep 2025) showed ₹3 crore PAT. Q3 (Dec 2025) shows -₹10 crore PAT. This is not a turnaround. This is volatility. Management attributes Q3 losses to working capital reconstruction and seasonal demand — both valid. But when you’re bleeding, even a slower bleed is still bleeding. The recovery narrative will hold only if FY26 full-year clocks ₹1,600+ crore revenue at 8–9% EBITDA margins. That’s a 30% revenue jump YoY. Possible? With parent support, yes. Certain? Bhai, yeh India hai.
05 — Valuation: The Coromandel Confidence Premium
What’s This Company Actually Worth Without Its Daddy?
