1. At a Glance – Crayons, Calculators & Corporate Confusion
Kokuyo Camlin is that childhood friend you trusted with your geometry box, but adulthood hit it with forensic audits and single-digit ROE. As of 30 January 2026, the company sits at a market cap of ₹836 crore, trading around ₹83, down ~31% over one year and ~27% in six months. Sales for FY25 stand at ₹780 crore, with Q3 FY26 quarterly sales of ₹178 crore and PAT of ₹3.98 crore, showing a spicy 196% YoY jump—but only because the base was tragic.
Valuations? P/E of 31.8, P/B of 2.6, EV/EBITDA 13.6—numbers that scream “mid-cap FMCG premium” while fundamentals whisper “beta test still running.” ROCE is 3.65%, ROE 1.95%, and debt a modest ₹11.7 crore, so balance sheet isn’t choking—just underperforming. Promoters hold a comfortable ~75%, with zero pledging.
So the big question: is this a cleaned-up art box ready for exams, or still missing half the compass? Let’s open the lid.
2. Introduction – When Nostalgia Meets Internal Control Failures
Founded in 1946, Kokuyo Camlin has survived Independence, liberalisation, and multiple syllabus changes. The Camel and Camlin brands are practically curriculum-approved across India, with 2,000+ SKUs and a distribution reach of ~3 lakh retail outlets. On paper, this is a dream FMCG-lite story: trusted brands, wide reach, Japanese parentage, and a product you literally grow up using.
But markets don’t pay for nostalgia. They pay for returns on capital, and this is where KCL has been consistently underwhelming. Over the last decade, sales CAGR crawled at ~3–4%, ROE averaged ~4%, and profits behaved like a kid avoiding homework—showing up only occasionally.
FY25–FY26 brought fresh masala: an inventory fraud of ₹22.7 crore, forensic audits, qualified audit opinions, and write-offs. Management claims the mess is fully accounted for in Q2 FY25 and no further losses are expected. Investors are now forced to decide: forgiven and forgotten, or once bitten twice shy?
Before judging, let’s understand
what this company actually does beyond selling nostalgia.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
Kokuyo Camlin designs, manufactures, and sells stationery and art products—basically everything between a kindergarten crayon and an engineer’s geometry box.
Two core brand pillars:
- Camel – Fine art, painting kits, canvases, brushes, hobby and kids art supplies
- Camlin – Pencils, geometry boxes, office supplies, adhesives, early learning tools
Revenue is well diversified within stationery, but stationery itself is a low-moat, price-sensitive, seasonal business. Back-to-school quarters mint money, rest of the year feels like summer vacation.
Manufacturing happens across Tarapur, Patalganga (Maharashtra) and Samba (J&K) with hundreds of SKUs per plant. Distribution is asset-heavy, inventory-heavy, and working-capital hungry—which explains why inventory days still hover around 112 days even after “clean-up”.
Ask yourself: can a low-margin, high-SKU business afford sloppy inventory controls? KCL learned the answer the hard way.
4. Financials Overview – The Quarter That Looked Better Than It Was
| Metric | Latest Qtr | YoY Qtr | Prev Qtr | YoY % | QoQ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 177.97 | 160.56 | 174.38 | 10.8% | 2.1% |
| EBITDA (₹ Cr) | 11.48 | 0.44 | 16.13 | NM | -28.8% |
| PAT (₹ Cr) | 3.98 | -4.16 | 7.86 | 196% | -49.4% |
| EPS (₹) | 0.40 | -0.41 | 0.78 | 196% | -48.7% |
Yes, YoY growth looks heroic because last year was a disaster quarter (inventory write-offs hangover). Sequentially, profitability actually fell.
Annualised EPS (Q3 rule):
Average of Q1, Q2, Q3 EPS × 4 ≈ ₹2.6, matching reported TTM EPS.
Funny thing—despite “profit recovery”, OPM slipped to ~6.4% from 9%+ levels seen briefly. So
