01 — At a Glance
The Packaging King That Lost Its Crown (And A Plant)
- Q3 FY26 Revenue₹372 Cr
- Q3 FY26 PAT-₹96 Cr
- Q3 FY26 EPS-₹22.01
- 9M FY26 Loss-₹738 Cr (unaudited)
- Fire DateMay 21, 2025
- Book Value₹932
- Price to Book1.04x
- Debt / Equity0.84x
- ROCE5.36%
- RatingCRISIL A/Watch Negative
The Setup: Jindal Poly Films was once India’s undisputed king of flexible packaging — BOPET, BOPP, CPP, the whole desi film buffet. Then on May 21, 2025, a fire broke out at their flagship Nashik plant. Lost production capacity: ~75% temporarily. Insurance covered the plant damage. Insurance for lost profits? Lol. That’s the company’s problem. They’ve infused ₹900 crore into the subsidiary since then. Meanwhile, the NCLT admitted a minority shareholder petition on Feb 5, 2026, alleging “transactions prejudicial to the company.” Translation: someone’s already getting sued.
02 — Introduction
Once Upon a Time, There Was a Packaging Company. Now It’s a Cautionary Tale.
Jindal Poly Films Limited. Not to be confused with Jindal Steel. Or Jindal Stainless. Or any of the other 47 Jindal companies. This one made plastic films — the stuff that wraps your chips, your medicines, your frozen vegetables. Boring stuff, but absolutely essential. In 2024, they boasted ₹5,335 crore in revenue, 74.6% promoter holding (Concatenate Flexi Films Advest), and the kind of operational gravitas that comes from being the largest manufacturer of BOPET and BOPP films in India.
Then May 2025 happened. A fire tore through the Nashik plant. ~75% of packaging capacity evaporated. The company went from being a comfortably profitable boring firm to a financial crisis waiting to be packaged (sorry, couldn’t resist).
Fast-forward to February 2026. The company is bleeding cash. The subsidiary JPFL Films has accumulated losses. CRISIL has its ratings on “Watch Negative.” The Enforcement Directorate has launched a FEMA investigation into the BC Jindal group. An NCLT tribunal admitted minority shareholder claims. And the company is now demerging its entire Non-Woven division — which was 14% of revenue — into a separate listed entity. All while telling the stock market: “Everything’s fine. We’re recovering. No really.”
Concall Highlight (Feb 2026): Management confirmed capacity restoration is “on track.” One BOPET line and one capacitor line restarted in H2 FY26. However, this accounts for only a fraction of lost capacity. The rest? “Monitorable,” per CRISIL. That’s finance speak for “we have no idea when it’ll be back.”
03 — Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
Plastic Films That Wrap Everything. Except Their Problems.
Jindal Poly Films manufactures polyester and polypropylene films. BOPET (Biaxially Oriented Polyester Terephthalate): goes into chip packets, medicine blister packs, snack wrappers. BOPP (Biaxially Oriented Polypropylene): labels, capacitors, thermal, metalized versions. CPP (Cast Polypropylene): flexible packaging, laminates. All commoditised, cyclical, margin-dependent products that live and die by polymer resin pricing and demand-supply dynamics.
Pre-fire, the company had installed capacities of 173,000 TPA (BOPET), 294,200 TPA (BOPP), and 58,000 TPA (Non-Woven). After the Nashik fire, operational capacity cratered to ~25% of total, with only 97,000 TPA BOPET, 5,000 TPA capacitor, and 5,000 TPA BOPA Nylon remaining. They’ve added back 1 BOPET line and 1 capacitor line since June 2025, but that’s like finding ₹5 in your wallet after losing your entire paycheck.
FY24 revenue breakdown: Packaging Films (79%), Non-Woven Fabrics (~14%), Labels Division (7%). The company exports to 80+ countries. Domestic sales: 70%. Exports: 30%. Now, post-demerger, that 14% non-woven division is being carved out, which means the remaining holding company becomes purely packaging-focused. Helpful for pure-play investors. Catastrophic timing for a company already on life support.
FY25 Capacity Utilization~100%Pre-fire
Q3 FY26 Capacity Utilization~25%Post-fire
Capex Plans (FY27)₹400+ CrOn value-add, new lines
💬 Quick thought: Do you think the fire was an accident, or is the universe just telling Jindal Poly Films to exit the business? Drop your cosmic take in the comments!
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: The Numbers No One Wanted to See
Result type: Quarterly Results (Consolidated, Unaudited) | Q3 FY26 EPS: -₹22.01 | Annualised EPS: Not applicable (negative earnings) | 9M FY26 Loss: -₹738 Cr (consolidated)
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 372 | 1,186 | 410 | -68.6% | -9.3% |
| Operating Profit | -77 | 76 | 11 | Negative | Negative |
| OPM % | -21% | 6% | 3% | -2,700 bps | -2,400 bps |
| PAT | -97 | 4 | -13 | Negative | Negative |
| EPS (₹) | -22.01 | 0.94 | -2.92 | Negative | Negative |
Translation Time: Q3 FY26 revenue is ₹372 crore — that’s a -68.6% collapse YoY (from ₹1,186 Cr in Q3 FY25) and -9.3% QoQ. Why? The Nashik fire in May 2025 reduced capacity to ~25% of normal. Operating profit flipped to -₹77 crore. That’s not a margin compression — that’s the entire plant being dead weight. PAT of -₹97 crore. Earnings per share: -₹22.01. Can you have negative EPS? Apparently yes, when you’re losing money faster than you can burn capacity. The 9-month FY26 consolidated loss is -₹738 crore (unaudited). That’s nearly equal to their entire FY25 full-year revenue.
05 — Valuation Discussion: Dead Metric Walking
How Do You Value a Company Losing Money?
Method 1: P/E Based (Non-Applicable)
The company is reporting negative earnings. P/E ratios are meaningless. Price-to-earnings when earnings are negative is like asking what the temperature is when the thermometer is on fire. Technically possible, but nobody cares.
Not Applicable — Negative EPS
Method 2: EV/EBITDA Based (Also Non-Applicable)
Current EV = ₹7,699 Cr. Current EBITDA (implied from financials): Negative due to fire damage and capacity shutdown. EV/EBITDA = Meaningless. If a company’s operating profit is negative, you don’t get to use multiples-based valuation. You get to use distress valuation models, which is fancy speak for “I have no idea what it’s worth.”
Not Applicable — Negative EBITDA
Method 3: Liquidation / Distress Valuation
Tangible Assets (FY25): Fixed Assets ₹3,132 Cr + CWIP ₹302 Cr. Less: Borrowings ₹4,420 Cr. Net tangible value per share: ~₹(3,434 – 4,420) / 4.4 Cr shares = Negative. The company owes more than its tangible assets are worth.
Investments: JPFL holds ₹4,093 Cr in investments (FY25), mostly mutual funds and equity holdings. These are liquid. However, insurance recoveries for the Nashik fire damage haven’t fully materialized yet, and loss-of-profits claims are still under assessment.
Fair Value Range: ₹600 – ₹850
Range assumes partial recovery of Nashik capacity + insurance proceeds within 18 months. If capacity remains restricted or insurance fails, downside to ₹400–500 is material.
⚠️ Extreme Caution: This fair value range is speculative and assumes the company successfully restores capacity, receives insurance proceeds, and doesn’t face further regulatory/legal complications. Given the FEMA investigation, NCLT admission, and ongoing demerger, the risks are asymmetrical to the downside. This analysis is strictly for educational purposes and does not constitute investment advice. Please consult a SEBI-registered investment advisor before making any financial decision.
06 — What’s Cooking: The Nightmare Timeline
Five Acts of Corporate Chaos
