1. At a Glance – Blink and You’ll Miss the Drama
India Cements today feels like that old-school South Indian cinema hall which was half-empty for years, suddenly bought by PVR-Inox, renovated, and now everyone’s debating whether popcorn margins will finally improve. Market cap stands at ₹13,412 Cr, stock chilling around ₹432, up ~10% in 3 months and ~38% over 1 year—not bad for a company whose ROE is still -8.83% and ROCE -5.49%. Q3 FY26 revenue came in at ₹1,114 Cr, up 18.6% YoY, with quarterly PAT finally flipping positive at ₹5.74 Cr after a horror show of losses earlier. Debt is down to ₹1,340 Cr, promoter holding now a chunky 75%, courtesy UltraTech Cement entering like Thanos and snapping half the shareholding universe. Valuation looks expensive on EV/EBITDA (~45x), but this is no longer a standalone cement story—it’s a control, synergy, and turnaround optionality story. Curious? You should be.
2. Introduction – From Family Business to Corporate Chessboard
Founded in 1946, India Cements was once the undisputed South India cement king—owning brands, IPL teams, and bragging rights at Chepauk. Then came aging plants, cost overruns, leverage, liquidity stress, and suddenly peers like UltraTech, ACC, and Ambuja were running marathons while India Cements was still tying its shoelaces.
FY23–FY25 was basically survival mode: falling realizations, utilization hovering around 60%, negative operating margins in multiple quarters, and auditors probably developing migraines. But FY26 is shaping up differently. Debt refinancing, asset monetization (hello Parli grinding unit at ₹315 Cr), capex focused on efficiency, and finally—the UltraTech takeover.
This is no longer just about cement prices or coal costs. This is about whether a laggard can be rehabilitated under India’s largest cement player. And honestly, when UltraTech writes a ₹3,142 Cr open offer cheque, you sit up and listen.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
At its core, India Cements makes cement. Shocking, I know.
Product mix is 35% OPC and 65% PPC, which means slightly lower margins but better mass-market penetration. Brands like Sankar Super Power, Coromandel King, and Raasi Gold dominate South Indian dealer counters, while specialty cement (oil well, sleeper, SRPC) caters to niche infra and PSU demand.
Manufacturing footprint spans 10 cement units (including split grinding units) across South, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan, with 15.55 MTPA installed capacity and 9 RMC plants. The problem? Vintage. Old plants = higher power consumption, lower thermal efficiency, and production costs that make ACC laugh quietly.
Ancillary businesses—shipping, captive power, coal mining—exist mostly to support cement. IPL sponsorship via Chennai Super Kings? Great brand recall, zero EBITDA help.
The business model works only if utilization improves and costs fall. Enter capex and UltraTech.
4. Financials Overview – The Numbers That Finally Stopped Crying
| Metric | Latest Qtr (Q3 FY26) | YoY Qtr (Q3 FY25) | Prev Qtr (Q2 FY26) | YoY % | QoQ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 1,114 | 939.8 | 1,117 | 18.6% | -0.3% |
| EBITDA / OP (₹ Cr) | 79.1 | -190.1 | 81.1 | NA | -2.5% |
| PAT (₹ Cr) | 5.74 | -118.6 | 8.81 | 105% | -35% |
| EPS (₹) | 0.18 | -3.95 | 0.28 | NA | -36% |
Annualised EPS (Q3 rule):
Average of Q1, Q2, Q3 EPS × 4 ≈ still meaningless because FY26 EPS base is unstable. Translation: don’t anchor to EPS yet.
Commentary: Revenue is stable, margins
