1. At a Glance
If balance sheets had Tinder bios, Finkurve Financial Services Ltd would say: “Fast-growing NBFC, loves gold loans, flirts with fintechs, slightly addicted to leverage.”
Market cap is hovering around ₹1,308 crore, the stock is chilling at ₹93.4, down ~11–13% over the last 3–6 months, and yet the company just dropped Q3 FY26 PAT of ₹6.98 crore (+23.8% YoY) with quarterly revenue at ₹52 crore (+30.3%). Sounds hot? Hold that thought.
The loan book has ballooned like a wedding buffet — AUM at ₹833.15 crore (+118.6% YoY) as per Q3 FY26 disclosure. Secured loans are now ~70%, retail loans dominate, and corporate exposure is being slowly put on a diet. On paper, this is the classic “NBFC transformation arc”.
But markets aren’t buying the fairy tale blindly. At ~59.7× P/E, 3.98× P/B, ROE ~8.8%, and interest coverage of 1.85, the valuation is asking investors to believe the future will arrive early — and stay polite.
So is Finkurve a fintech-powered growth story hiding in plain sight, or just another small NBFC sprinting faster than its balance sheet lungs? Let’s audit this drama properly.
2. Introduction
Finkurve Financial Services Ltd has been around since 1984 — which means it has survived Harshad Mehta, subprime, IL&FS, DHFL, COVID, and RBI circulars written in Sanskrit-level complexity. That alone deserves a slow clap.
Earlier known as Sanjay Leasing Limited, the company has reinvented itself into a non-deposit-taking, base-layer NBFC, focusing on gold loans, payday loans, digital retail lending, and co-lending partnerships. Basically, it moved from boring uncle finance to “fintech-friendly millennial lender.”
The transformation has been aggressive. In just a few years, revenues jumped from ₹50 crore (FY23) to ₹141 crore (FY25) and ₹180 crore TTM. Profit followed suit, but at a more disciplined pace. The real headline, though, is balance
sheet expansion — borrowings jumped to ₹382 crore (Sep 2025) from ₹75 crore (Mar 2024).
Now, rapid growth in NBFC land is like spicy street food — delicious, but only if digestion holds. RBI doesn’t care about vibes; it cares about asset quality, capital adequacy, and liquidity buffers.
So while the company is shouting “growth!”, the investor must whisper: “At what cost?”
Ready to dissect? Let’s open the hood.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
At its core, Finkurve is a lender. Shocking, we know. But the how matters.
Key lending buckets:
- Gold Loans – secured, relatively low-risk, quick churn.
- Retail Digital Loans – personal loans, payday loans, education loans via fintech partners.
- Corporate Loans – legacy book, now being trimmed to ~30%.
- Co-lending Model – partnership with RBL Bank + Augmont Goldtech, giving access to cheaper funds and shared risk.
The fintech tie-ups mean Finkurve doesn’t burn cash building apps or chasing CAC like a VC-funded startup. Instead, it piggybacks on platforms, provides capital, earns interest + fees, and keeps operating costs under control.
Revenue split in FY23 was clean:
- Interest income: ~75%
- Fees & commissions: ~25%
That’s healthy. No random “profit on sale of shares” gymnastics here (for now).
The strategic shift
