01 — At a Glance
A Travel Company That Lost Its Way… To The Profit Bathroom
- 52-Week High / Low₹14.0 / ₹6.11
- Q3 FY26 Revenue₹151.7 Cr
- Q3 FY26 PAT₹3.41 Cr
- TTM PAT-₹1.8 Cr
- EPS (Latest Qtr)₹0.02
- Book Value / Share₹2.38
- Price to Book2.88x
- Debtor Days (TTM)184 days
- 3-Yr ROE (Avg)26.5%
- Promoter Holding47.7%
Flash Summary: EaseMyTrip delivered Q3 FY26 revenue of ₹151.7 crore but PAT nose-dived to ₹3.41 crore (down 82.6% QoQ). The stock is trading at ₹6.85, down from ₹14 a year ago. P/E of 94.8x is less “growth premium” and more “someone made a calculator error.” Promoters have been diluting their stake from 74.9% (Mar 2023) to 47.7% (Dec 2025) through repeated equity fundraises. The company is buying hotels, buses, and foreign hospitality companies while its home business is melting like ice cream in a Delhi summer.
02 — Introduction
The Three Pitti Brothers’ Grand Tour Of Financial Experimentation
Founded in 2008 by Rikant, Nishant, and Prashant Pitti, EaseMyTrip started as a B2B2C flight booking platform and somehow convinced the market it was worth ₹50,000 crore at IPO in March 2021. That’s the moment every investor who understood hospitality economics started sweating. But hey, it was COVID, SoftBank was still writing cheques, and everyone was a unicorn in their own mind.
Today, EaseMyTrip is a “one-stop travel ecosystem”—which is corporate code for “we’ll buy anything that moves and hope the synergies materialize.” Flight bookings (64% of Q3 revenue). Hotels (30%). Trains, buses, and “others” (6%). They also own YoloBus (premium intercity buses), Spree Hotels (56 hospitality properties), and are now investing in Easy Green Mobility to manufacture electric buses. Because why focus when you can diversify?
The revenue growth story looks incredible on a brochure: ₹141 crore (FY20) to ₹587 crore (FY25). But profitability is playing hide-and-seek. Net profit has swung from ₹33 crore (FY20) to ₹61 crore (FY21) to ₹106 crore (FY22) to ₹109 crore (FY25), but the TTM is negative ₹1.8 crore. Stock price down 49% in one year. Promoter holdings diluted from 75% to 48%. Welcome to the “unicorn exit strategy via waterfall dilution” playbook.
Investor Presentation Insight (Feb 2026): Management highlighted “Consistently profitable, including during COVID” as their opening slide pitch. They did not open with “Loss-making on TTM basis” or “Promoter ownership halved in 3 years.” Perhaps they had another presentation for the audit committee.
03 — Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
It’s Like Maruti Suzuki Decided To Also Sell Bajaj Scooters, Hotel Rooms, and Bus Tickets
EaseMyTrip makes money by taking a commission on flight bookings (most flights), hotels (lower volume, higher margin), and other ancillary services. In Q3 FY26, they booked ₹2,213.2 crore in Gross Booking Revenue (GBR) but only captured ₹151.7 crore in revenue. That’s a 6.8% conversion rate. Sounds small? For OTAs, it’s actually decent. But then the company is expanding into things that make you wonder about strategic discipline.
Dubai operations are growing 133% YoY with ₹397.6 crore GBR in Q3. Good news. But consolidation costs are rising—employee benefits expense was ₹1,028.3 crore in FY25, up from ₹210.4 crore in FY20. That’s a 5x increase while revenue grew only 4x. Other expenses jumped to ₹3,392 crore from ₹421.4 crore. The company is spending like it’s building a pharma empire, not an OTA.
Management says they spend just 0.9% on marketing. That’s because brand loyalty isn’t about spending—it’s about CMP, which they have in abundance now. The “Look-to-Book” ratio is 4%, meaning for every 25 unique visitors, only 1 makes a booking. Compare this to IRCTC (trains), which prints money because monopolies are beautiful.
Q3 Revenue₹151.7 CrYoY +0.72%
Q3 GBR₹2,213 Cr84% YoY growth
Hotel Nights (Q3)4.6 Lakh84% YoY growth
EBITDA Margin (Q3)2.82%Was 40% in FY21
The Irony Cocktail: EaseMyTrip pioneered “zero convenience fee” and “transparent pricing”—which sounds consumer-friendly until you realize it means razor-thin margins on core business. So the company is chasing volume growth, accepting margin compression, and now buying assets (hotels, buses, aviation) that require capex, management attention, and working capital. It’s like someone realized they weren’t profitable so they decided to double down on diversification. Classic startup move.
04 — Financials Overview: The Numbers That Went Sideways
Q3 FY26: Revenue Is Up, Profit Is Down, Hope Is Negotiable
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹0.02 | Annualised EPS (Q1-Q3 avg × 4): (₹0.04 + ₹0.00 + ₹0.02) ÷ 3 × 4 = ₹0.053
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 151.7 | 150.6 | 118.3 | +0.72% | +28.2% |
| Operating Profit | 4.3 | 47.8 | 3.2 | -91.0% | +33.8% |
| OPM % | 2.82% | 31.7% | 2.74% | -2900 bps | +8 bps |
| PAT | 3.41 | 34.0 | -36.0 | -89.7% | N/A (Loss) |
| EPS (₹) | 0.02 | 0.09 | -0.09 | -77.8% | N/A |
Translation: Revenue is basically flat YoY (₹150.6 Cr to ₹151.7 Cr). The company is spending more to keep the lights on, so operating profit crashed 91%. Q2 FY26 was a loss-making quarter (₹-36 crore PAT). Q3 barely broke even. For a company with ₹2,491 crore market cap and ₹2.38 book value per share, trading at 94.8x P/E on ₹0.02 EPS is the kind of math that makes auditors update their resumes.
💬 If a company’s revenue is growing but profit is collapsing, and the stock is down 49% in a year, is that “correction” or “gravity finally working”? What do you think?
05 — Valuation: What Is This Stock Actually Worth?
Spoiler: Less Than It Costs Right Now
