Anjani Portland Cement Ltd: -65 Crore Loss & A Cement Story That Crumbled Like a Biscuit
1. At a Glance
Anjani Portland Cement Ltd (APCL) isn’t your friendly neighborhood cementwala who promises “Mazbooti ki Guarantee.” Instead, this Chettinad group subsidiary looks more like that cousin who always borrows money but never returns. FY23 saw production falling, sales volumes sinking, and profits evaporating faster than water on a hot Andhra road. At CMP ₹140, the company carries a ₹416 Cr market cap, but also drags along ₹463 Cr debt like a cement bag on a donkey’s back. ROE? -31.8%. ROCE? -9.06%. Basically, a masterclass in how not to mix your financial mortar.
2. Introduction
Picture this: India is building highways, bridges, metro lines, smart cities, and what not. Cement companies are usually the hidden backbone of this juggernaut, quietly minting money every time a politician says “infrastructure push.” Now enter Anjani Portland Cement, incorporated in 1983, part of the Chettinad Group, and theoretically in the sweet spot of demand.
But while the cement sector giants like UltraTech and Shree Cement are busy flexing volumes and margins, APCL is struggling with shrinking sales, bleeding profits, and sky-high debt. This is like being invited to an IPL match but showing up without pads, gloves, or even a bat.
The company did try some stunts — raising ₹249 Cr through a rights issue, increasing authorized capital to ₹233 Cr, merging Bhavya Cement, and running captive power plants. But investors are still staring at negative earnings, and banks are staring at overdue interest. So, the big question: Can this cement maker rebuild its foundation, or will it remain a cracked wall in the industry?
3. Business Model (WTF Do They Even Do?)
APCL makes cement. Simple, right? Except they complicate it with too many variants:
OPC 53 Grade: Used in RCC, piers, etc. Basically, if you’re building something tall and don’t want it collapsing on Day 1.
OPC 43 Grade: For everyday beams, slabs, and “chhoti moti” construction.
PPC: Mass works like dams, spillways, retaining walls — basically, anything requiring more volume than profit.
RHPC: For cement bricks, poles, and RMC, aka “filler material.”
The company operates plants in Telangana & Andhra Pradesh (capacity ~2.44 MTPA). But here’s the catch — in FY23, they sold just 1.51 MT, down 19% YoY, because of “subdued demand” and high cost of production at Bhavya Cement. Translation: Too much supply, not enough buyers, and poor cost control.
They also run captive limestone mines (3 for APCL, 2 for BCPL) and a 16 MW power plant, but clearly, none of this stopped the financial bleeding.
4. Financials Overview
Source table
Metric
Latest Qtr (Jun’25)
YoY Qtr (Jun’24)
Prev Qtr (Mar’25)
YoY %
QoQ %
Revenue (₹ Cr)
140
115.8
138.9
+20.5%
+0.9%
EBITDA (₹ Cr)
12.5
-2.0
-4.9
NA
Turned +ve
PAT (₹ Cr)
-3.4
-19.1
-13.1
+82.1%
+74.0%
EPS (₹)
-1.16
-6.47
-4.42
+82.1%
+73.7%
Commentary: Sales growth looks decent at +20% YoY, but that’s only because last year’s base was so bad it makes any number look good. PAT still negative at -₹3.4 Cr, though much better than last year’s disaster. EPS still in the red zone. Basically, this is like celebrating that your patient moved from ICU to general ward — still not healthy.
5. Valuation (Fair Value RANGE Only)
P/E Method: EPS = -₹22.2. Negative. So, P/E = Not meaningful. (Like trying to divide by zero in Excel).
DCF: With negative cash flow, DCF is like predicting rainfall in a desert.
👉 FV Range (educational only): ₹80–₹150 per share. This FV range is for educational purposes only and is not investment advice.
6. What’s Cooking – News, Triggers, Drama
Merger with Bhavya Cements Pvt Ltd approved Jan 2024. Idea: integrate operations, cut costs, reduce duplication. Reality: still bleeding red ink.
Rights Issue in FY23: Raised ₹249 Cr. Mostly used to repay debt, but debt still stands at ₹463 Cr. This is like clearing one credit card bill using another credit card.
