Globe Civil Projects FY26: ₹376 Cr Revenue, Multiple Below Peer Set, Working Capital in Detention

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1. At a Glance

FY26 delivered ₹376.5 Cr revenue—a 15% lift from FY25—but PAT flatlined at ₹23.3 Cr, down 3% despite topline growth. The mismatch traces to GRAP disruptions in Delhi-NCR (the company’s 90% order-book hub), execution delays, and overhead absorption from un-mobilised projects.

EPS came in at ₹3.90 (from ₹5.60 in FY25), landing the stock at 11.4x annualised earnings—a full 7 points below the peer median of 18x. That gap has one job: either it reflects structural weakness, or it reflects the market’s hesitation toward a working-capital treadmill that swelled from 160 to 299 days by March 2026.

Order book sits at ₹870–1,000 Cr (depending on source date), translating to a book-to-bill near 2.3x against management’s stated 3x target. Margin profile remains modest: operating margin 14% on full-year basis (down from 16% in FY25), squeezed by input-cost pressure and regional execution friction.

The company holds ₹22 Cr net cash against a ₹267 Cr market cap. The IPO proceeds (₹119 Cr raised July 2025) have been largely absorbed into working capital, with only ₹14 Cr deployed toward capex-as-planned.

2. Introduction

Globe Civil Projects is a 22-year-old EPC outfit headquartered in Delhi, run by the Khurana family. It executes institutional buildings (schools, IITs, AIIMS), government offices, hospitals, housing, and sports infrastructure across 11 states.

Incorporated in 2002, the company cut its teeth on Delhi Metro work, CPWD contracts, and DPS society projects. It was listed in July 2025, just before FY26’s operational headwinds kicked in. The promotion holds 63.4% post-IPO; FII and DII stakes are minimal (0.94% and 6% respectively as of March 2026).

The company’s competitive moat is shallow but real: government repeat-business relationships (CPWD, NBCC, TCIL, IITs), Class-I Super Contractor status (eligible to bid up to ₹650 Cr independently), and in-house design/engineering capability. Execution quality matters in this business—delays, cost overruns, and penalties wreck returns.

Recent milestones include crossing ₹1,000 Cr order book in August 2025 and winning major FY26 orders: ₹173 Cr (NBCC, Central University Punjab), ₹222 Cr (Haryana Cricket Stadium), ₹71 Cr (IIT Kanpur sustainability), ₹13 Cr (NIT Delhi sports complex). The company also secured L1 for ₹98.8 Cr (IIT Delhi residential, 18 months) in February 2026.

3. Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?

Globe Civil operates three lines: EPC on infrastructure projects, TMT steel trading, and smaller works (MEP, HVAC, firefighting, structural). Revenue splits show the EPC tilt: Education 53%, Hospitals 8%, Sports 8%, Roads/Bridges 5%, Railway 10%, Commercial offices 13%, Housing 3%.

The unit economics are brutal. A ₹300 Cr order arrives. The contractor pays workers, buys cement and steel upfront, mobilizes cranes and equipment. Payments dribble in after measurement and approvals—sometimes 30–45 days after billing, per management. The company holds ₹204.5 Cr in receivables as of March 2026 (vs ₹143.3 Cr a year prior), a 43% one-year surge. Inventory sits at ₹162.4 Cr, also up 46%.

Working capital days ballooned to 299 by March 2026 from 160 a year earlier—a 139-day deterioration. Management blamed project delays (especially NCR pollution bans that add 6–8 months to a typical 18–24 month cycle), one-time overhead absorption, and delayed project starts.

The geographical concentration is a feature and a liability. Delhi-NCR accounts for roughly 70–90% of the order book. When GRAP 3 or 4 kicks in (pollution over 300 µg/m³), the government halts construction. During 9MFY26, the company had 8% revenue growth and margin compression despite a healthy order book—the NCR ban was the villain.

Most contracts carry escalation clauses for steel, cement, and electrical items, which offsets input-price risk. The Haryana Cricket Stadium order is fixed-price (₹222 Cr) but with a catch: steel is supplied by the client department, a built-in hedge against material-cost surprises.

4. Financials Overview

Figures are consolidated, in ₹ crore.

Quarterly results (FY26):

Full-year FY26 (standalone): ₹376.5 Cr revenue, ₹31.2 Cr PBT, ₹23.3 Cr PAT. EPS ₹3.90 (from 5.60 in FY25). Operating margin dipped to 14% from 16% in the prior year. Tax rate 25% (unchanged).

The concall (February 2026) quantified 9MFY26 weakness: ₹246 Cr revenue (8% YoY growth), ₹175.7 Cr PAT (23% YoY decline on standalone basis). Management attributed this to NCR pollution bans, delayed approvals, and seasonal execution lag in Q3. Q4 bounced back partly due to seasonal strength, but full-year growth came in at 15% vs. the earlier 20–25% guidance.

FY27 guidance resets to 20–25% growth, contingent on (a) project mobilizations starting on schedule, (b) GRAP restrictions easing, and (c) new order inflows closing. The company reiterated its margin-protective bidding posture: “We don’t under-quote and get the project.”

5. Market Expectations & Historical Multiples

This section describes how the market is currently pricing the company and how that compares with its own history and peer group. It is descriptive, not predictive.

The market pays 11.4x current-year earnings for Globe Civil against a peer band (L&T, NBCC, Rail Vikas, Kalpataru, Cemindia) clustered at 18–58x. The discount is material.

At 6.9x EV/EBITDA, the company sits comfortably below peer medians, partially justified by the working-capital bulge (299 days vs. peer range of ~100–150 days). However, the company’s ROE (13.5%) and ROCE (16.1%) are inside the peer band, suggesting the capital isn’t working worse—just more of it is deployed to fund receivables and inventory.

The market appears to be pricing three concerns: (1) execution risk in high-concentration markets (Delhi-NCR), (2) working-capital deterioration