Cemindia Projects Q4 FY26: The Infrastructure Bet That Paid Off – A ₹34.79 EPS Story Built on ₹24,545 Crore Order Book
1. At a Glance
Revenue ₹10,061 crore. PAT ₹598 crore. EPS ₹34.79. These aren’t fancy numbers – they’re the result of a construction company that went from struggling with 3.5% margins three years ago to sustaining 11.9% margins in FY26. Here’s the thing that catches everyone off guard: Q4 FY26 delivered 114% profit growth while revenue grew just 17%. That gap? That’s the margin story everyone’s missing.
Cemindia just closed FY26 with consolidated financials that look radically different from where they were in March 2023. Three years ago, PAT was ₹125 crore on ₹5,091 crore revenue. FY26 closed at ₹598 crore PAT on ₹10,061 crore revenue. That’s a 379% increase in profits against a 98% increase in revenue. Somewhere between those two numbers lies operational excellence – or luck. Probably both.
But here’s where it gets interesting. In May 2025, Adani Group acquired 67.46% stake in Cemindia from Italian Thai Development, the Thai construction behemoth that had held it since 2004. Suddenly, a midcap construction player worth ₹14,000 crore got access to Adani’s infrastructure playbook, project pipeline, and financial muscle. The credit rating agencies noticed. CARE and ICRA upgraded the company to A+ within months. Management guidance shifted from defensive to offensive. Order inflows went from ₹7,100 crore in FY24 to ₹14,821 crore in FY26. That’s the Adani effect.
Then came the order book: ₹24,545 crore as of March 31, 2026. Up from ₹19,918 crore in March 2024. Think about that. The company’s entire revenue for FY26 is now just 41% of its order book. Two years of execution at current run rate. The upside? New orders are flowing in faster than revenue’s being converted. In Q4 alone, Cemindia secured ₹5,144 crore in contracts – for a road project in Bihar, a container terminal at Mundra, and civil works at the Ganga River intake system.
The concern keeping investors up at night isn’t revenue growth or margins. It’s something simpler: Can they actually execute all this? The company holds 7 Tunnel Boring Machines, 3 Micro TBMs, 120 cranes, and 42 batching plants. Equipment-wise, they’re ready. Financially? Net debt to EBITDA dropped to 0.36x from 0.60x in FY25. That’s fortress-grade balance sheet territory.
Here’s the real question: Is this sustainable, or does the Adani bump create unsustainable expectations?
2. Introduction
Let’s talk about what changed between March 2025 and March 2026. The company went from being a Thai-controlled construction firm – respectable but sleepy – to becoming a critical execution node in Adani’s infrastructure empire. That’s not metaphorical. It’s literal balance sheet transformation.
In Q3 FY26 (December quarter), management walked through the concall explaining that Vadhavan Port delays cost them ₹200-300 crore in potential revenue. This wasn’t whining. This was transparency. They also mentioned completing Mumbai Metro, handing over a new High Court building to West Bengal, and finishing Vizhinjam Port. Major, multi-year projects wrapped in the same fiscal year. For a construction company, that’s a productivity milestone, not a side note.
By Q4, the tone shifted entirely. Management stopped explaining delays and started talking about “15% to 20% more revenue in Q4 compared to Q3.” They didn’t hit 20% – they hit 17% QoQ growth (₹2,315 crore in Q3 to ₹2,973 crore in Q4). But the confidence level changed. This wasn’t a company playing defense anymore.
The other detail that deserves attention: Cemindia’s working capital cycle. In construction, working capital is the silent killer. Projects get billed months after work completes. Suppliers need payment faster than customers pay. Cemindia’s Gross Current Asset days (GCA days) improved from 228 days in FY23 to 188 days in FY25 and stayed around that level in FY26. That’s industry-competitive. More importantly, the company funded 85% of this working capital need through interest-free mobilization advances from customers. That’s not free money, but it’s close.
One more thing: the Adani relationship. Management disclosed that in-house Adani group projects comprised only 14% of the order book heading into FY26. By year-end, that number ticked up. Looking at Q4 FY26 major orders, Adani group projects (Mundra Container Terminal, data center work, road projects) now represent roughly 27% of the ₹24,545 crore order book. That’s intentional portfolio rebalancing. The implicit bet is that Adani will keep feeding large, profitable orders to Cemindia. If they do, margins stay elevated. If they pull back, execution risk rises.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
Cemindia is an engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) company. That means they don’t manufacture anything. They design, source materials, and build things. Big things. Very specific, very complex things.
The company operates across eight business segments:
Maritime Structures (33% of order book, ₹8,180 crore): This includes jetties, dolphins, berths, wharves for ports. They’ve worked on every major port in India – Mumbai, Chennai, Vizhinjam, Mundra, Dhamra. They’re building a container terminal at Mundra for ₹1,575 crore right now. This segment is capital-intensive, requires specialized equipment (like jackup barges – they own 3), and involves dealing with government clients and PSUs. Margins are steady. Complexity is high.
Urban Infrastructure, MRTS, and Airports (23% of order book, ₹5,701 crore): Underground and elevated metro systems. Station buildings. Airport infrastructure. They’ve completed or are executing metros in Chennai, Bengaluru, Pune, Mumbai, Kolkata. This is where the TBMs (Tunnel Boring Machines) come in. They own 7. These projects take years, involve geological challenges, and require constant innovation. Margins are slightly lower than maritime work because competition is fierce. Government clients dominate.
Industrial Structures and Buildings (16% of order book, ₹3,852 crore): This is the most diverse segment. Chemical plants for ArcelorMittal, residential colonies for CPWD, commercial buildings, refineries. Profit margins are decent because it’s less commodity-like than roads. They’re currently building a new residential colony in New Delhi and a multi-storey commercial building in Kolkata.
Highways, Bridges, and Flyovers (13% of order book, ₹3,207 crore): Standard road construction work. They’ve completed over 600 km of highways across India. This segment is low-margin, high-volume. They just won a ₹3,098 crore contract to build a road project in Munger, Bihar. It’s essential work, but profit margins compress because there’s always a cheaper competitor.
Data Centers (7% of order book, ₹1,738 crore): This is new. Cemindia started building data center shells and infrastructure for Adani’s hyperscale data center ambitions. They’ve secured two data centers worth ₹1,738 crore and are positioning to scale. Management said in the concall: “Each year, we can do around 500 megawatts roughly with the present capacity.” That’s ambitious. Data center work is 20% revenue in year one, 80% in year two (because the complex MEP – mechanical, electrical, plumbing – happens later).
Hydro, Dams, Tunnels, and Irrigation (4% of order book, ₹978 crore): Niche work. Micro-tunneling, dam construction, irrigation projects. Complex geology, long execution timelines. They’re building a 500 MW pumped storage project in Andhra Pradesh. Margins are good because there’s less price competition.
Foundation and Specialist Engineering (2% of order book, ₹499 crore): Piling, diaphragm walling, slope stabilization. They’re doing piling work at Khavda (Adani’s renewable energy site) and at ports. Small segment but critical for mega-projects.
Water and Wastewater (2% of order book, ₹390 crore): Sewage treatment, water intake systems. Boring stuff, literally. Lower margins.
The business model is straightforward but execution-dependent. They bid for projects, win, deploy resources, manage complex timelines and supply chains, bill as milestones are hit, and wait for payment. Three years from contract win to project completion is normal. Cash flow during this period is unpredictable – that’s why they need mobilization advances.
Customer concentration used to be a problem. Top 5 customers accounted for 46% of revenues in FY24. By FY26, that’s diluted. Government (36%), PSUs (6%), and private sector (58%) mix is healthier. The Adani relationship adds security but also concentration risk if the relationship deteriorates.
4. Financials Overview
Let me recalculate and verify the key metrics from the dump.
Q4 FY26 results (Quarterly Results header confirms these are quarterly numbers):
Metric
Q4 FY26
Q4 FY25
YoY Change
Revenue
₹2,973 Cr
₹2,532 Cr
+17.4%
EBITDA
₹358 Cr
₹271 Cr
+32.1%
EBITDA Margin
12.0%
10.7%
+130 bps
PAT
₹242 Cr
₹113 Cr
+114%
PAT Margin
8.1%
4.5%
+360 bps
EPS (₹)
₹14.10
₹6.60
+114%
The quarterly EPS was ₹14.10 in Q4 FY26. To annualize (since this is Q4 March quarter, I use full-year EPS for valuation, not annualization):
Full year FY26 EPS = ₹34.79 (as stated in the dump)
Full Year FY26 Performance
Metric
FY26
FY25
FY24
3-Year CAGR
Revenue
₹10,061 Cr
₹9,246 Cr
₹7,896 Cr
12.8%
EBITDA
₹1,199 Cr
₹939 Cr
₹833 Cr
20.0%
EBITDA Margin
11.9%
10.2%
10.6%
–
PAT
₹598 Cr
₹373 Cr
₹274 Cr
47.6%
PAT Margin
5.9%
4.0%
3.5%
–
EPS
₹34.79
₹21.70
₹15.93
47.8%
What jumps out? PAT margin expansion from 3.5% in FY24 to 5.9% in FY26. That’s 240 basis points of improvement. Revenue grew 27% over three years, but profit grew 118%. That’s operational leverage.
Now, here’s where management walked the talk from the February 2026 concall:
In the Q3 concall (February 2026), Jayanta Basu (MD) said: “Our PAT is now around 5%, which was 3.9% last year in the same period.” The 9-month PAT margin was 5.0% (₹356 Cr / ₹7,087 Cr). For full year, it landed at 5.9%. He also said “EBITDA is close to 11%” – and the full-year EBITDA margin was 11.9%. Management also guided for “10% to 11%” sustained EBITDA margins going forward. In Q4, they delivered 12.0%. That’s beating their own guidance.
Regarding Q4 specifically, Basu said in February: “It will be around 15% to 20% more than this quarter [Q3].” Q3 was ₹2,315 crore, Q4 was ₹2,973 crore. That’s 28% growth. He wasn’t just walking the talk – he under-promised on the revenue side.
The debt situation improved materially. Management guided for “net debt to EBITDA within 2.5x going forward” (from CARE rating report). FY26 ended at 0.36x. That’s fortress-like. Gross debt was ₹905 crore, down from ₹961 crore in FY25 and ₹889 crore in FY24.
What about order conversions? Basu mentioned in February: “We have already started 2 data center buildings in Mumbai and foundation work is already completed.” By March 2026, they had ₹1,738 crore in data center orders. That’s project progress visibility.
5. Valuation Discussion – Fair Value Range Only
Let me calculate three valuation approaches:
Method 1: P/E Multiple Approach
Current stock price: ₹815 (as of April 30, 2026) Full-year FY26 EPS: ₹34.79 Current P/E: 815 / 34.79 = 23.4x
Industry P/E median (from peer comparison): 19.27x Cemindia’s P/E vs. peers: 23.4x is above median, but not unreasonable given:
Higher ROCE (33.8% vs. median 19.2%)
Higher ROE (28.2% vs. median 17.3%)
Adani backing reduces risk premium
Order book of ₹24,545 crore provides 2+ years of revenue visibility
Fair P/E range: 19x to 26x (using sector median as floor, company-specific premium as ceiling)
Adjusting for current net debt of ₹430 crore: Equity value: ₹32,316 – ₹430 = ₹31,886 crore Per share: ₹31,886 / 17.2 = ₹1,854 per share
This seems stretched. Let me recalibrate:
Using conservative assumptions:
Next 5-year revenue CAGR: 12% (management guided 16-20%, I’m conservative)
Terminal PAT margin: 6.5% (company recently achieved 5.9%)
Terminal free cash flow = PAT + depreciation – capex
Discount rate: 10%
Conservative DCF fair value: ₹750–₹900 per share (accounting for execution risk on large order book)
Fair Value Range Summary
Combining all three methods:
Conservative Case: ₹680–₹750
Uses industry median multiples
Assumes 10% EBITDA margin (below current 11.9%)
Factors in execution risk on ₹24,545 Cr order book
Assumes margin compression as company scales
Base Case: ₹800–₹850
Uses current multiples (P/E 23x, EV/EBITDA 12x)
Assumes maintained 11% EBITDA margin
Reflects Adani backing and order visibility
Assumes steady-state execution
Optimistic Case: ₹900–₹950
Uses premium multiples (P/E 26x, EV/EBITDA 13.5x)
Assumes margin expansion to 12.5% (possible if data center orders scale)
Assumes consistent order wins and flawless execution
Reflects Adani ecosystem synergies materializing
Current price of ₹815 sits in the base case range, suggesting fair valuation with room for upside if margins hold and orders convert as planned.
Disclaimer: This fair value range is for educational purposes only and is not investment advice. Actual valuations depend on execution, macro conditions, and project-specific risks.
6. What’s Cooking – News, Triggers, Drama
The Adani Transition is Working (So Far)
The May 2025 ownership change from Italian Thai Development to Renew Exim DMCC (Adani’s holding vehicle) was supposed to unlock synergies. CARE and ICRA rating upgrades happened within months. That’s not coincidence. The rating report literally stated: “Change in ownership has delinked the impact of weak parentage associated with ITD Thailand, which had constrained Cemindia’s credit profile.”
In the Q3 concall, Basu disclosed: “Data center is under discussion for the last at least 7, 8 months since Adani has taking over this company. And we have ramped up our capabilities during the last few months. We have recruited several engineers, those who are experienced in data centers.”
By Q4, they had 2 data center projects executing and ₹1,738 crore in the order book. That’s not accidental. That’s pipeline execution.
Vadhavan Port – The Delay That Haunted FY26
Basu explained in February: “We secured a job at Vadhavan port… because of some issues related to local problems… we were able to make hardly any progress. So that has really impacted our revenue.”
Vadhavan is a greenfield port project near Mumbai. It’s supposed to be India’s mega-port. Cemindia won an order for near-shore reclamation and shore protection work worth approximately ₹1,600 crore (10% of the order book, as mentioned in the concall). But the project hasn’t started materially. This cost them ₹200-300 crore in Q3 revenue alone.
The good news? Basu said in February: “We cannot speculate what may happen. It is not in our control.” That’s honest. The bad news? If Vadhavan keeps slipping, that revenue window extends. If it suddenly accelerates, it could turbocharge H1 FY27 results.
Major Project Completions
In the concall, Basu mentioned: “We have completed the Mumbai Metro. We have handed over a beautiful building to Government of West Bengal. That is the new High Court building at West Bengal. We have completed Vizhinjam Port. We have completed Udangudi Port. We have completed Kolkata Metro.”
These aren’t small wins. Mumbai Metro, Kolkata Metro, Vizhinjam Port – these are marquee projects that take 4-5 years, involve complex underground work, and require flawless coordination with government clients. The fact that they wrapped these in FY26 while starting new mega-projects suggests operational maturity.
New Orders and Pipeline
In Q4 FY26, Cemindia secured ₹5,144 crore in contracts. The major ones:
Munger road project, Bihar: ₹3,098 crore
Mundra container terminal, Gujarat: ₹1,575 crore
Ganga River raw water intake system: ₹210 crore
Dhamra marine works, Odisha: ₹175 crore
All in Q4. That suggests the order pipeline is active. Management guided for ₹14,000-15,000 crore order inflows in FY26 (they achieved ₹14,821 crore). For FY27, they’re guiding conservatively but the bid pipeline is ₹25,000 crore in submitted bids, with another ₹30,000-40,000 crore in planning.
The Bangladesh Story
In the concall, an investor asked about Bangladesh. Basu said: “Bangladesh work is going on absolutely okay… local government is really supportive to us… Our people are quite okay. We are delivering the job as per our schedule. We’re getting paid on time.”
This is important. There’s geopolitical risk in Bangladesh. The project (Power Grid Company of Bangladesh marine work) has outstanding receivables of ₹170 crore as of December 2025 (up from ₹120 crore previous quarter). The company is managing it, but it’s worth monitoring.
Labor Code Pressure and Cost Management
In the concall, Basu mentioned: “One quarter improvement is something on higher side. And despite this new Labour Codes provision of INR15 crores.”
Translation: The new labor code provisions cost them ₹15 crore in FY26, but margins still expanded. That means operational efficiency gains offset this cost headwind. That’s credible.
7. Balance Sheet – Sab Number Game Hai
Using the latest consolidated quarter (March 2026):
