Nikki Global Finance Q4 FY26: ₹0.40 Crore Revenue, 720% Profit Jump, But Still A Finance Company Running On Fumes

1. At a Glance

There are companies that lend money, there are companies that invest money, and then there is Nikki Global Finance — a tiny NBFC with a market cap of just ₹7.5 crore trying to survive in a sector where giants like Bajaj Finance and Shriram Finance throw around quarterly profits bigger than Nikki’s entire balance sheet.

This company generated just ₹0.40 crore revenue in FY26. That is not quarterly revenue. That is full-year revenue. Yet somehow, it still managed to report PAT of ₹0.21 crore and a quarterly PAT jump of 720%.

Sounds exciting? Maybe. But there is a catch. The company has been loss-making for years, its reserves are negative, promoter holding is only 10.48%, and almost 90% of the company is with public shareholders who are essentially sitting in a floating boat without a captain.

Even the business itself looks half asleep. The loan book stood at ₹6.76 crore in FY25 with no meaningful growth. Investments stood at only ₹0.75 crore and even that is concentrated in a couple of obscure companies. Revenue mostly came from sale of listed equity shares rather than from any robust lending activity.

This is the kind of company where one good quarter can make the stock look like a turnaround story, while one bad quarter can push it back into irrelevance.

The funny part? Nikki Global Finance trades at a P/E of nearly 36 times despite barely having a business. The market is valuing hope, not operations.

And when a finance company’s biggest quarterly event is changing the CFO and appointing an internal auditor, you know the real action is happening inside the office, not outside.

Still, there is a strange curiosity here. The company has finally reported a profit after years of losses. Borrowings are low, the auditor has given an unmodified opinion, and FY26 results are visibly better than FY25.

But is this the start of a real turnaround? Or just one lucky year of selling some listed shares?

That is where things get interesting.

2. Introduction

Nikki Global Finance Ltd was incorporated in 1986 and is registered as a non-deposit-taking NBFC.

In theory, it is supposed to provide loans and investments to corporates and individuals. In practice, the business is so small that its annual revenue is lower than what some neighbourhood kirana stores generate.

The company’s loan portfolio stood at ₹6.76 crore in FY25, of which around 29% was secured loans and 71% was inter-corporate advances. So rather than aggressively lending to retail borrowers, Nikki appears to be largely parking money into corporate loans and waiting for interest income.

The bigger issue is that there has been almost no growth. The loan book remained flat at ₹6.76 crore. The investment book also remained flat at ₹0.75 crore.

When a finance company’s assets do not grow, it becomes difficult to justify premium valuations because the entire point of an NBFC is to expand lending and compound earnings.

Instead, Nikki’s FY26 revenue came largely from sale of listed equity shares. That means profits may not be recurring.

This is why the FY26 numbers need to be viewed carefully. The jump in profitability looks good on the surface, but investors need to ask whether this profit came from sustainable lending activity or from one-off gains.

Because a finance company that survives by selling shares rather than generating interest income starts looking less like an NBFC and more like a part-time trader with a listed shell.

3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?

Nikki Global Finance is essentially a very small NBFC.

Its business model is built around:

• Giving loans and advances
• Investing in shares and securities
• Earning gains from sale of investments
• Earning interest on loans

The company’s loan book stood at ₹6.76 crore. Its investments stood at ₹0.75 crore.

That is tiny.

For context, even a single branch of a large NBFC like Muthoot Finance probably handles more business in a month than Nikki Global Finance does in a year.

The company does not appear to have any large lending franchise, retail distribution network, digital app, co-lending arrangement, insurance cross-sell, gold loan operation, or vehicle finance business.

Its biggest business strength currently is that it has survived.

And honestly, survival itself deserves some respect because the company has spent several years with negative reserves, tiny operations, and inconsistent profitability.

The other strange thing is employee count. The company reportedly has just 3 employees.

Three.

That means one person can handle loans, another can handle compliance, and the third probably has to do everything else from tea orders to financial reporting.

4. Financials Overview

Since the latest official heading is Quarterly Results, this is treated as quarterly data for EPS annualisation purposes.

Annualised EPS = Latest quarter EPS × 4

Latest quarterly EPS was ₹0.91.

So annualised EPS becomes:

₹0.91 × 4 = ₹3.64

At CMP of ₹22, the annualised P/E works out to around 6 times.

$P/E = \frac{22}{0.91 \times 4} \approx 6.04$P/E=0.91×422​≈6.04

Metric	Latest Quarter Mar FY26	Same Quarter Last Year Mar FY25	Previous Quarter Dec FY25
Revenue	₹0.40 Cr	₹0.00 Cr	₹0.00 Cr
EBITDA / Financing Profit	₹0.35 Cr	-₹0.05 Cr	-₹0.02 Cr
PAT	₹0.31 Cr	-₹0.05 Cr	-₹0.02 Cr
EPS	₹0.91	-₹0.15	-₹0.06

This table looks dramatic because the base was almost zero. A company moving from negative ₹0.05 crore PAT to positive ₹0.31 crore PAT automatically creates 720% growth headlines.

But investors should remember that percentage growth looks very glamorous when the