01 — At a Glance
The Watch That Learned to Run.
- 52-Week High / Low₹421 / ₹149
- Q3 FY26 Revenue₹150.78 Cr
- Q3 FY26 PAT₹3.20 Cr
- TTM EPS₹5.68
- Q3 Standalone EPS₹0.32
- Book Value / Share₹11.8
- Price to Book23.7x
- Debt / Equity0.11x
- ROCE42.6%
- Stock Return (3-Yr)+30.3%
Flash Summary: Timex Group just delivered Q3 FY26 revenue of ₹150.78 crores (+26% YoY), with PAT at ₹3.20 crores. Stock is at ₹280, returned -19.6% in 3 months, trades at 47.7x P/E, and has the most insane 197% ROE you’ve ever seen in a watch company. The promoter just sold 23% stake in an Offer for Sale in Dec 2025. Either the best deal in the market, or a flashing red light. Maybe both.
02 — Introduction
A Watch Brand That Decided to Become a Tech Company Overnight
Let’s talk about Timex. Not the Casio you see at every railway station in Mumbai. Not the “₹3,000 watch from the mall kiosk” kind of brand. We’re talking about the Timex — the one founded in 1854 in Connecticut, the one that’s been making watches longer than India has had a stock market.
Timex Group India came to India in 1988 as a joint venture with Titan, ended that in 2000, and then quietly went about being a subsidiary of its global parent. For 20 years, it was invisible. Trading on the BSE at prices that made investors weep. Then something happened. Q1 FY26, Q2 FY26, Q3 FY26 — suddenly, the company started printing money like it discovered oil in Baddi, Himachal Pradesh (spoiler: the oil is watches).
The Q3 story has two parts. First: the numbers went absolutely ballistic. Revenue up 26%, EBITDA up 122%, profit before tax up 182%. The management came on the call and explained it like they’d just figured out how to sell watches by posting them on Instagram. Second: the promoter, Timex Group Luxury Watches B.V., decided to sell 8.93% stake in December 2025 via an Offer for Sale. Raised ₹2,940 crores. Then held a board meeting in March 2026 and declared a preference dividend because apparently regular dividends are for normies.
Investor Presentation Deep Dive (Feb 3, 2026): Management highlighted Timex Atelier (Swiss-made luxury collection) and Aston Martin watches as the new growth drivers. The Atelier Marine M1A got coverage from Hodinkee, HYPEBEAST, and every watch enthusiast site in existence. Media impressions: 581 million. Ad value: $1.1 million. This is not a watch company reporting numbers. This is a luxury brand using watches as the vehicle.
03 — Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
They Make Watches. Also Jewelry. Also Vibes. Mostly Vibes.
Timex Group India manufactures and sells watches across 15+ global brands: Timex (the workhorse), Versace (for your flex), Guess (for your girlfriend), Philipp Plein (for your ego), Ferragamo (for your taste), Nautica, Missoni, Ted Baker, and whatever iConnect is (smartwatches, probably). They also acquired Just Watches retail stores to own the customer experience end-to-end.
The business model is: design beautiful watches + source movements from Switzerland/Germany + assemble in Baddi, Himachal Pradesh (capacity: 5 million watches/year) + sell through 5,000+ multi-brand outlets, large format stores, luxury retail, defence canteens, and increasingly through e-commerce (Amazon, Flipkart, Myntra, AJIO). Royalty payments to brand owners run 3.6% of revenue. Marketing spend runs 9.1% of revenue.
The real play is luxury brand distribution disguised as a watch company. They don’t just sell Timex watches. They sell the Timex story — heritage, innovation, design. Every brand has its own narrative: Timex Atelier is “Swiss precision meets design humility.” Aston Martin is “motorsport DNA on your wrist.” This is not commodity manufacturing. This is narrative manufacturing.
Revenue Growth+41.2%TTM growth
Profit Growth+103%TTM growth
OPM (Latest)12.6%FY25 margin
Global Brands15+under umbrella
The concall on Feb 3, 2026, mentioned Timex Atelier’s Giorgio Galli-designed GMT24 M1A received coverage from major watch publications calling it “ridiculously good” and “the most impressive watch Timex has ever made.” That’s the inflection point — moving from “reliable watches” to “collectible watches.” Once that narrative sticks, margins expand, loyalists multiply, and what was a 12% margin business becomes a 20%+ business.
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: The Numbers Started Screaming
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹0.32 | Avg Q1–Q3 EPS: (₹1.45+₹2.99+₹0.32)/3 = ₹1.59 | Annualised EPS: ₹6.36 (Note: Q3 appears anomalously low due to exceptional item — see discussion below)
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 150.78 | 119.94 | 243.67 | +25.71% | -38.06% |
| EBITDA (before exceptional) | 10.28 | 4.62 | 42.54 | +122.51% | -75.84% |
| EBITDA Margin % | 6.82% | 3.85% | 17.46% | +297 bps | -1064 bps |
| PBT (before exceptional) | 8.01 | 2.63 | 40.69 | +204.56% | -80.29% |
| PAT (Reported) | 3.20 | 1.94 | 30.23 | +64.95% | -89.41% |
| EPS (₹) | 0.32 | 0.19 | 2.99 | +68.42% | -89.30% |
The Exceptional Item Plot Twist: The company took a one-time exceptional charge of ₹3.21 crores in Q3 related to “new Labour Codes” and increased gratuity liability. This wrecked the headline PAT number (reported ₹3.20 cr vs ₹9.24 cr before exceptional). Without this charge, Q3 PAT would have been ₹6.41 crores (+169% YoY), PBT ₹8.01 crores, and EPS ₹0.63. The management made clear on the concall: this is one-time, operating performance is pristine. Markets yawned and sold it anyway.
The Missing Quarter Riddle: Q2 FY26 (Sep 2025) was the actual monster quarter: ₹243.67 cr revenue (+40% YoY), ₹30.23 cr PAT (+278% YoY). Q3 looks like a drop-off, but that’s deceptive. Nine-month revenue is ₹565 crores, +40% YoY. Nine-month PBT is ₹65.36 crores before exceptional items, +119% YoY. This is not a slowdown. This is a company that had Q2 as the ultra-peak and Q3 as the “merely phenomenal” quarter.
💬 The promoter sold 23% of the company in December 2025 at an average price of ₹326/share. The stock is now at ₹280 (13.5% below the OFS price). Is the promoter taking profits ahead of a slowdown, or is the market just being pessimistic on the labour cost hit? What’s your read?
05 — Valuation Discussion
Is This Growth Real or Is It Monopoly Money?
Method 1: P/E Based
TTM EPS = ₹5.68. Current P/E = 47.7x. Peer median P/E (Titan, Kalyan Jewellers, etc.) = 19.6x. A 47.7x multiple for a luxury accessories company with 103% profit growth and 42.6% ROCE is aggressive but not insane if growth sustains. Fair P/E band for this growth profile: 25x–35x.
→ 25x × ₹5.68 = ₹142 35x × ₹5.68 = ₹198.80
Range: ₹140 – ₹200
Method 2: Price to Book Value
Book Value = ₹11.8. Current P/BV = 23.7x. For a company with 197% ROE and 42.6% ROCE, a higher P/BV is justified, but 23.7x is extreme. A 10x–15x P/BV would be more reasonable for luxury goods companies with this return profile.
→ 10x × ₹11.8 = ₹118 15x × ₹11.8 = ₹177
Range: ₹118 – ₹177
Method 3: EV/EBITDA (TTM Basis)
TTM EBITDA (with exceptional items) = ₹46.8 crores. Market Cap = ₹2,828 cr. EV = ₹2,832 cr. EV/EBITDA = ~60x. Luxury goods companies typically trade at 15x–25x EBITDA. At 60x, the market is pricing in sustained 30%+ EBITDA growth for 5+ years.
At 20x EBITDA: EV = ₹936 cr → Equity Value ~₹850 cr → ₹85/share. At 30x EBITDA: EV = ₹1,404 cr → ₹140/share.
Range: ₹85 – ₹140
The Valuation Paradox: All three methods suggest fair value in the ₹85–₹200 range. The current price of ₹280 sits above the upper band of two methods (P/BV, EV/EBITDA) but below the P/E method’s assumption of sustained 25x–35x multiples. This implies the market is betting on either: (a) the 40% growth rate sustaining for multiple years, (b) further margin expansion (OPM from 12.6% to 18–20%), or (c) both. The labour cost hit and promoter selling suggest the market is now skeptical of (a) and (b).
⚠️ EduInvesting Fair Value Range: ₹140 – ₹220. This range assumes sustained revenue growth of 20%+ and EBITDA margin stability at 13–15%. If growth decelerates to 10–15%, fair value drops to ₹100–₹150. This is for educational purposes only and is not investment advice. Please consult a SEBI-registered investment advisor before making any financial decision.
06 — What’s Cooking: Drama, Promoter Moves & New Collections
The Promoter Took Profits. Management Stayed Quiet. Investors Panicked.
