01 — At a Glance
The Micro-Cap Rollercoaster: A Doshi Family Production
- 52-Week High / Low₹470 / ₹144
- Q3 FY26 Revenue₹27.7 Cr
- Q3 FY26 PAT₹17.0 Cr
- Q3 FY26 EPS₹1.33
- Annualised EPS (Q3×4)₹5.32
- Book Value₹16.9
- Price to Book15.2x
- Dividend Yield0.04%
- Debt / Equity0.02x
- Debtors Days251 days
The Unfiltered Truth: Indo Thai Securities reported Q3 PAT of ₹17 crore, a stunning +1,671% increase from Q3 FY25’s ₹1 crore. Sounds great, right? Here’s the catch: the company had a ₹3 crore loss in Q3 FY25. When you go from a loss to profit, percentage gains become mathematically theatrical. The stock has crashed 28.8% in three months. P/E sits at 88.4x. The debtors cycle is at 251 days — Indian bankers call that “optimistic auditing.” Meanwhile, the promoters are issuing warrants like they’re going out of style. This is not your dad’s brokerage.
02 — Introduction
Welcome to the Warrant Carnival at 60 Dalal Street
Let’s start with the obvious: Indo Thai Securities is a brokerage. Founded in 1995 by the Doshi family, it sits in the messy, competitive world of stock broking in India — where your business depends entirely on trading volumes, margin money, and how many retail investors you can herd through your app.
For a long time, Indo Thai was a steady, forgettable mid-cap: consistent dividend payer, reliable execution, boring financials. But something changed around mid-2024. The stock started flying. Warrants got issued. More warrants. Then a demerger was announced. Then more warrants. By December 2025, the promoter holding had fallen from 72% to 56.8%, and the share count had exploded from 10 crore shares to over 12 crore. The market cap is now ₹3,305 crore — which means a brokerage with ₹71 crore in full-year revenue (TTM) is valued at nearly 47x sales.
Earnings growth of 189% (TTM), a 251-day debtors cycle, a P/E of 88x, and a 0.04% dividend yield. If you’re asking “what could go wrong,” buckle up — this is the financial equivalent of eating samosas off a moving train.
The Doshi Family Strategy (Allegedly): Issue warrants → dilute shareholding → squeeze public float → announce demerger → watch retail investors FOMO into call options. Rinse, repeat. At last count, 15,932 retail shareholders held the stock. That’s up from 3,984 in March 2023. Retail participation up 300%. Promotion value creation: TBD.
03 — Business Model: WTF Do They Actually Do?
Stock Broking: Where Retail Gets Excited and Money Vanishes
Indo Thai Securities is a full-service investment broker. They execute equity trades, derivatives trades, commodity trades. They manage mutual funds (AUM of ₹182.51 crore as of Sept 2025). They offer wealth management, portfolio services, insurance — basically, anything that lets them collect fees from Indians with ₹5 lakh in their savings account.
Revenue breakdown (FY23): 64% from fees and commissions, 21% from interest income, 3% from dividends, and the rest from odds and ends. The business is simple: more trading volume = more commissions. Flat market = flat revenues. Market crash = potential margin calls, but that’s someone else’s problem.
Indo Thai operates in 60+ locations across India, has a membership in NSE, BSE, NCDEX, MCX, and a depository license from CDSL. They’re also a mutual fund distributor and a portfolio manager. The organizational structure is a Swiss Army knife designed to extract fees from every possible angle.
But here’s where it gets interesting: the company announced a demerger in October 2025. They plan to split the “Broking & Distribution” segment into a separate listed entity called ITFSL with a 1:1 share swap. This is classic capital restructuring mixed with valuation arbitrage. More on this later.
FY23 Fee Income64%Commissions
Interest Income21%Loans & Advances
AUM (Latest)₹182 CrSept 2025
Locations60+Across India
Business Model Reality Check: A brokerage is essentially a fee extraction machine that works well during bull markets and falls apart during bear markets. Indo Thai’s FY25 OPM was 44%, which means for every rupee of revenue, 44 paise stays as operating profit. That’s generous for a broking firm. But when trading volumes compress, that 44% can shrivel to 10% overnight. The stock is valued as if trading will never stop.
💬 Quick thought experiment: If the market crashes 20% tomorrow, how many of those 15,932 retail shareholders will still own this stock? Place your bets in the comments.
04 — Financials Overview: The Growth Mirage
Q3 FY26: Where a Loss Quarter Becomes a +1,671% Gain
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹1.33 | Annualised EPS (Q3×4): ₹5.32 | Full-year FY25 EPS: ₹0.71 (TTM)
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 27.71 | 6.94 | 24.27 | +299% | +14.2% |
| Operating Profit | 23.36 | 2.02 | 20.21 | +1,058% | +15.6% |
| OPM % | 84% | 30% | 84% | +5,400 bps | ±0 bps |
| PAT | 17.00 | 1.09 | 14.43 | +1,561% | +17.8% |
| EPS (₹) | 1.33 | 0.09 | 1.19 | +1,378% | +11.8% |
⚠️ The Statistical Illusion: Q3 FY25 had a PAT of ₹1.09 crore (EPS of ₹0.09). That wasn’t a normal quarter — it was actually a ₹3 crore loss when you look at the full dataset (see the raw data: Mar 2025 had -₹2 crore, so Q3 FY25 had Q1 + Q2 + Q3 earnings, but the base loss distorts the comparison). When comparing a loss or near-breakeven quarter to a profit quarter, percentage growth numbers become meaningless. The OPM jumped from 30% to 84% because revenue composition changed — not because of operational leverage. FY25 TTM revenue is ₹71 crore. FY26 is on pace for ₹100+ crore if this continues. But broking revenues are cyclical, and India has been in a sustained bull market since Oct 2023. The moment it flatlines, these numbers collapse.
What Actually Happened in Q3: Trading volumes remained strong (NSE equity turnover was healthy, derivatives segment was active, commodity trading continued). But the real lift came from higher margins — probably better order flow, lower competition in certain segments, or accounting changes post-demerger preparations. The 84% OPM is not normal for broking. Expect mean reversion.
05 — Valuation: The P/E Circus
What’s This Company Actually Worth? (Spoiler: Nobody Knows)
