01 — At a Glance
The Mumbai Hammer That Keeps Missing the Nail
- 52-Week High / Low₹479 / ₹304
- FY26 (TTM) Revenue₹991 Cr
- FY26 (TTM) PAT₹191 Cr
- Full-Year EPS (TTM)₹13.03
- Q3 EPS (Quarterly)₹3.97
- Book Value₹228
- Price to Book1.38x
- Dividend Yield0.47%
- Debt / Equity0.16x
- 3M Return-22.5%
Auditor’s Head-Scratch: Q3 FY26 delivered ₹344 crore revenue (+113% YoY), ₹57 crore PAT (+37% YoY), and 9M presales of ₹2,093 crore (+26% YoY) — the best 9-month presales run in company history, as management proudly declared. Yet the stock got clobbered 22.5% in the last three months. The irony: a 24x P/E is actually reasonable for a real estate developer burning capital at ₹6.8 crore every quarter to land-bank. Only catch — your returns are still catching cold.
02 — Introduction
The Khetan Empire: Building Homes While Buying Land Like It’s Diwali
Welcome to Sunteck Realty. Kamal Khetan runs this show. He’s been at it since the early 2000s, and if you’ve lived in Mumbai, you’ve seen his billboards. “Sunteck,” they say. You’ve also seen his buildings — premium homes across Bandra, Goregaon, Mira Road, Vasai, Kalyan, Borivali, and now Andheri (because Mumbai has run out of space and developers have started vertical acquisitions).
Sunteck is a pure-play Mumbai developer. ~50 million sq ft of balance launch pipeline in the Western Suburbs. ~12 million sq ft in the Eastern Suburbs. No Bangalore, no Pune, no “expanding horizons” — just Mumbai. One micro-market. One family. One balance sheet that’s been carefully managed to stay debt-light.
Q3 FY26 was, by their own admission, a “best ever” 9-month presales run. ₹21 billion presales in nine months. Collections holding at 50% of presales (the company targets this). A new luxury segment ramping up. Pricing higher by 10–12% on newer towers. And management burning ₹6.8 billion on land acquisitions in a single financial year — a 3.7x increase from FY25. The company is either building for the next decade or betting everything on one Mumbai real estate super-cycle.
Either way, the market gave the stock a haircut. So let’s figure out what’s actually happening under the surface.
Concall Bombshell (Feb 2026): On new business development, management said “we are quite confident we’ll meet our guidance” for FY26 presales, and “we may only surpass it… not… lesser.” Translation: confidence bordering on swagger. Or just management-speak for “we hope the market doesn’t fall apart.”
03 — Business Model: WTF Do They Even Build?
Land, Launch, Collect, Repeat. (Now With Extra Land.)
Sunteck’s playbook is textbook Mumbai real estate. Acquire land (usually through joint development or outright purchase). Design it. Get RERA approval. Launch phases. Collect from customers over 3–5 years. Deliver. Repeat.
The company operates across seven brands: Signature (uber-luxury HNI homes), Signia (ultra-luxury), Sunteck City (large mixed-use developments), Sunteck World (aspirational luxury), and others. Think of them as different price buckets for different Mumbai pockets.
Historically, Sunteck was a mid-to-premium player. But in FY25 and FY26, the mix is shifting hard upmarket. Uber luxury went from 13% of presales in FY24 to 50% in FY25. Premium luxury stayed stable at 32%. The cheap stuff (aspirational) collapsed from 25% to 15%. Management is literally walking up the property ladder and pulling it after itself.
Cash dynamics are sweet. Customer buys apartment → pays 50% upfront, 30% at mid-construction, 20% on handover. But Sunteck builds on land where the owner (through JD agreements) gets a fixed % of collections, not cost-plus. So if a project makes 50% upfront collections, Sunteck immediately gets cash to start the next project — hence the low debt.
Q3 Revenue₹344 Cr+113% YoY
Q3 Presales₹734 Cr1Q in isolation
9M Presales₹2,093 Cr+26% YoY best ever
Collections Rate50%Of presales (targeted)
Land Hunger Alert: Sunteck spent ₹623 crore on land in 9M FY26 (vs ₹180 crore in full FY25). That’s not scaling costs proportionally — that’s land aggregation on steroids. Nepeansea Road (₹200 cr), ODC 5th Avenue (₹125 cr), Andheri Sahar (₹140 cr). They’re buying like Mumbai land will run out. It will. But timing is everything.
💬 Drop a thought: Is buying ₹6.8 crore of land per quarter visionary or reckless? Does the upcoming launch calendar justify this spend?
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: The Presales Hurricane with Collections Dragging Behind
Result type: Quarterly Results | Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹3.97 | Annualised EPS (Q3×4): ₹15.88 | TTM EPS: ₹13.03
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 344 | 162 | 252 | +112.3% | +36.5% |
| Operating Profit | 81 | 48 | 78 | +68.8% | +3.8% |
| OPM % | 24% | 30% | 31% | -600 bps | -700 bps |
| PAT | 57 | 42 | 49 | +36.9% | +14.3% |
| EPS (₹) | 3.97 | 2.90 | 3.34 | +36.9% | +18.9% |
The Margin Squeeze Story: Revenue jumped 112% YoY, but OPM compressed from 30% to 24%. Why? Higher “other expenses” — the CFO explained this as Ind AS timing: projects where you’ve recognized revenue haven’t hit cost yet (or vice versa). Real estate accounting is a bit like weather forecasting — technically sophisticated but ultimately opaque. The presales jump (+113% quarter-over-quarter on collections) is real. The margin compression is a timing artifact, not structural decay.
05 — Valuation Discussion: Fair Value Range
What’s Actually Fair for a Mumbai Developer Buying Land at Disco Rates?
