01 — At a Glance
The Solar Glass Company That’s High On Margins (And I Mean Really High)
- Q3 FY26 Revenue₹386.5 Cr
- Q3 FY25 Revenue₹275.28 Cr
- YoY Growth+40.4%
- Q3 EBITDA Margin33.4%
- EPS (Q3 Annualized)₹28.56
- Book Value₹63.7
- Price to Book6.45x
- ROCE (Current)-4.41%
- Debt / Equity0.23x
- Return (52W)-19.5%
The Plot Twist Nobody Expected: Borosil just posted its highest-ever quarterly revenue at ₹386.5 crore, highest EBITDA margins in years at 33.4%, AND an almost all-time P/E of 60.3x. Sounds great. Then Germany happened. The company’s wholly-owned German subsidiary filed for insolvency in July 2025. The stock has crashed 19.5% in 52 weeks. Welcome to renewable energy investing, where every silver lining has a nuclear cloud.
02 — Introduction
The Glass Half-Full, Then Shattered by EMI Loans
Borosil Renewables manufactures tempered solar glass. That’s the transparent pane sitting between the sun and your rooftop solar panel. It’s unglamorous, invisible, essential — basically the accountant of renewable energy. It doesn’t get the hype of battery storage or the swagger of EV makers. But it is literally the medium through which sunlight becomes electricity.
The company holds 20%+ market share in India’s solar glass market. The Indian solar glass industry is growing at 3.5%–4% per year. For context, that’s slower than India’s GDP growth, which is itself slower than a pensioner’s sprint to the vegetable market. But in the green energy space, consistency beats hype. Except when Germany gets involved.
In October 2022, Borosil made an audacious acquisition: 86% of Interfloat Group, Europe’s largest solar glass manufacturer. The deal made sense. Europe. Scale. Exports. Global diversification. What could go wrong? Let me check. *checks notes* — everything. German subsidiary bankruptcy filing. ₹32.59 crore impairment charge. Deconsolidation of financials. And now investors are paying 60x P/E for a fundamentally Indian company operating a single plant in Bharuch, Gujarat.
But here’s the thing: even with Germany on flames, Q3 FY26 shows something extraordinary. Domestic margins at 33%+. Revenue growth at 40%. EBITDA growth at 235% YoY. And enough operational headroom that management says they can add another furnace whenever they feel like it. The stock is down 23.6% in three months and -27.5% in six months. Which begs the question: is this a value trap or a diamond in the rough?
Concall Insight (Feb 2026): When asked about expansion, management casually mentioned they’re “cautious… don’t want to move in a hurry and not be able to manage the situation.” Translation: we can double our business, but we’re too busy dealing with German bankruptcy courts.
03 — Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
They Make Glass That Lets Sunlight In (And That’s The Whole Story)
Solar glass is simple. Low-iron textured glass. Transparent. Durable. Sits on top of photovoltaic cells. Lets photons in. That’s it. No software. No blockchain. No AI. Just good old-fashioned glass-making, which is older than democracy.
Borosil operates one furnace at Bharuch with a capacity of 1,000 TPD (tonnes per day). A second furnace (SG-3) added in Feb 2023 brought capacity to 1,550 TPD. They’re now adding two more furnaces — expected online by Dec 2026 — which will push capacity to 2,600 TPD by end-FY27. Utilization was above 90% in FY24. Domestic market share is 20%+. Global share through Germany was meaningful. Until Germany imploded.
Revenue mix: Domestic 59% in FY24. Exports 41%. But wait — if exports are 41% and Germany went bankrupt, where are the exports? Smaller geographies. Turkey. USA. EU. All struggling with their own renewable subsidies and tariff chaos. The real money is domestic. That’s where the 33%+ EBITDA margins come from.
Domestic Mix~59%FY24 Split
Exports~41%Pre-Germany
Capacity2,600TPD by FY27
Market Share20%+India Solar Glass
Pricing Anchor: The Indian government set a “minimum import price” for Chinese solar glass. This creates a price floor. Chinese dumping is arrested. Borosil can push prices up without losing customers to undercut. It’s a beautiful policy accident, and management credits it for the current margin burst. When that policy expires, margins compress. Mark this date.
💬 If the government’s minimum import price disappears tomorrow, do you think Borosil’s margins hold at 30%+? Or do they crater? Drop your thoughts below.
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: When Everything Works (Except Germany)
Result type: Quarterly Results (Standalone) | Q3 EPS: ₹7.14 | Annualised EPS (Q3×4): ₹28.56 | Full-year implied: ~₹28.56 (provisional)
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue (Standalone) | 386.5 | 275.3 | 378.4 | +40.4% | +2.1% |
| EBITDA | 129.0 | 20.9 | 125.5 | +517% | +2.8% |
| EBITDA Margin % | 33.4% | 7.6% | 33.2% | +2580 bps | +20 bps |
| PAT (Standalone) | 100.2 | 8.7 | 62.0 | +1,052% | +61.6% |
| EPS (₹) Standalone | 7.14 | 0.63 | 4.39 | +1,033% | +62.6% |
Wait. Those Numbers Don’t Make Sense: A 1,052% YoY PAT jump? A 517% EBITDA jump? The reason: Q3 FY25 was a disaster quarter. Germany was bleeding cash like a subsidized wind farm. Q3 FY26 is standalone-only after deconsolidation. So the “growth” is partly real margin improvement AND partly accounting magic from dropping the loss-making German entity. Management explicitly said: “almost the entire increase in sales value came from increased sales prices,” not volume. Volumes grew only 6% YoY. Pricing grew ~43% YoY. Price floor policy at work.
05 — Valuation Discussion: The P/E Trap
Is 60x P/E Justified? Or Just Really Expensive Sunglasses?
