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Nazara Technologies:-24% Revenue. +29% EBITDA. Still Burning Cash. What the Heck is Going On?

Nazara Technologies Q3 FY26 | EduInvesting
Q3 FY26 Results · Apr 2025 – Dec 2025 (9-Month Period)

Nazara Technologies:
-24% Revenue. +29% EBITDA. Still Burning Cash.
What the Heck is Going On?

The gaming platform just deconsolidated its eSports business. Margins are expanding. But the balance sheet looks like a teenager who discovered credit cards. EBITDA margins are fat, yet operating cash flow is turning negative. Welcome to the beautiful mess that is Nazara.

Market Cap₹8,775 Cr
CMP₹237
P/E Ratio219x
Book Value₹91.6
ROCE2.5%

Gaming. Gaming Never Changes. But This Stock Definitely Does.

  • 52-Week High / Low₹363 / ₹221
  • Q3 FY26 Revenue (Quarterly)₹406 Cr
  • Q3 FY26 Net Profit₹8.84 Cr
  • Q3 FY26 EPS₹0.27
  • Annualised EPS (Q3×4)₹1.08
  • Book Value Per Share₹91.6
  • Price to Book2.59x
  • Dividend Yield0.00%
  • Debt / Equity0.06x
  • Promoter Holding35.5%
Auditor’s Red Flag: Nazara closed Q3 FY26 with ₹406 crore revenue (-24% YoY), ₹8.84 crore net profit (-67% YoY), but somehow also reported ₹67.8 crore EBITDA (+29% YoY) on a standalone basis. The magic trick? Deconsolidated NODWIN (eSports) from the books, pulled out a failing poker betting business, and suddenly the remaining “core” looks premium. The stock now trades at 219x P/E — which is either a screaming buy or humanity’s most elaborate joke.

The Gaming Platform That Plays Hide-and-Seek With Its Own Profits

Nazara Technologies. It’s a stock market institution in India’s retail investor ecosystem — the “gaming unicorn” that’s been trying to graduate from a loss-making startup to a business that, well, actually makes money. Spoiler: it’s still working on that.

Founded in the early 2010s, Nazara owns a constellation of gaming IPs: WCC (cricket), CarromClash, Kiddopia (early learning), Halaplay (fantasy games), and used to own Sportskeeda and Nodwin before the great “portfolio optimization” of 2024–2025. The company went public in 2021, raised capital, made bets on eSports, skill-based gaming, and international expansion. Some worked. Most didn’t. Now it’s in restructuring mode — closing the poker business, deconsolidating eSports, and hoping nobody notices the operating cash flow is flipping negative.

Q3 FY26 results hit in February 2026. Revenue fell 24% YoY. Net profit crashed 67% YoY. But EBITDA margins expanded to 16.7%. The meme potential here is immense: the company is smaller but “more profitable.” It’s like losing weight by cutting off a limb and claiming victory.

This deep-dive isn’t here to shame anyone — it’s to unpack what’s actually happening beneath the margin expansion theatre.

Concall Intel (Feb 2026): “We’re refocusing on higher-margin IP-based gaming.” Translation: We’re ditching the low-margin, high-volume stuff. Also: “We’re targeting >20% EBITDA margins in the coming quarters.” Translation: The goal-posts are moving, as they always are.

How Do You Actually Make Money From Gaming? Apparently, Not Like This.

Nazara’s operating model is a bewildering constellation of bets. Let me break it down, because even they seem confused.

Mobile Gaming (₹535 Cr revenue, ~48% YoY growth): This is the crown jewel. Kiddopia (gamified early learning), WCC (cricket), CarromClash, Love Island (licensed), and others. Monetization: in-app purchases, ads, subscriptions. The pitch: user acquisition at scale, improve unit economics, reinvest profits into growth. The reality: they’re spending massive dollars on user acquisition (CAC: $35.8 in Q3), banking on 2–3 year payback periods, and praying the LTV (lifetime value) math works. It mostly does. Kiddopia is back to subscriber growth after quarters of decline. But it’s a grind.

Offline Gaming (Smaaash arcades + Funky Monkey centres): Physical gaming. Smaaash operates 42+ experience centres. Funky Monkey (kids’ gaming + sports) is expanding at “one to two new centres per month.” Sounds good. Margin profiles are reported at 36% EBITDA for the segment. Reality check: those margins are distorted by lease accounting treatment under Ind AS. Management admits steady-state is more like 25–35%. Also, each center needs ₹1–2 crore capex and takes 18–24 months to break even. Slow, capital-intensive, low leverage.

PC & Console Publishing (Curve Digital): Acquired gaming studio. They publish indie and AA titles (Human Fall Flat: 58 million units lifetime; Wobbly Life: 200k+ on Switch). It’s a stable, high-margin business that generates royalties on back-catalogue sales. Problem: organic growth is low. Solution: five to six new titles signed for FY27–FY28. This is important but boring.

eSports & Media (now an associate): NODWIN runs esports tournaments, events, and media. Sportskeeda is a sports media platform decimated by Google algorithm updates. Management is pivoting to owned channels (CricRocket app) and reducing dependency on organic search. Margins are trying to recover. The optics game is strong. Actual growth is weak.

The “consolidated” Nazara is a hodgepodge. The “standalone” Nazara (post-deconsolidations) is becoming a purer play on mobile gaming + offline experiences. That’s the thesis management is selling.

💬 If a gaming platform deconsolidates a loss-making business and suddenly looks profitable, did the profit actually improve or did accounting just get optimised? Drop your take in the comments.

Q3 FY26: The Numbers That Don’t Add Up (Yet)

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