01 — At a Glance
The Boring Housing Loan Company That’s Actually Doing Interesting Things
- 52-Week High / Low₹972 / ₹600
- Q3 FY26 Revenue₹1,073 Cr
- Q3 FY26 PAT₹265 Cr
- Q3 EPS (₹)₹19.89
- Annualised EPS (Q3×4)₹79.56
- Book Value₹410
- Price to Book2.10x
- Dividend Yield1.40%
- Debt / Equity6.61x
- Return (1 Year)45.0%
Auditor’s Sarcasm Note: Can Fin Homes closed Q3 FY26 with record ₹2,727 crore in disbursements, the highest in company history. Meanwhile, prepayments are running at ₹1,691 crore per quarter. Think of it like running a bath with the tap open and the drain slightly clogged. The AUM still grew, but not as much as you’d hope. 18.2% ROE, though. That’s the silver bullet that keeps the stock bouncing 45% in a year.
02 — Introduction
The Most Boring Business Model in Indian Finance That Also Happens to Be Boring in a Good Way
Can Fin Homes Limited. Say the name out loud. It sounds like a bank’s unloved cousin who doesn’t get invited to the annual shareholder meeting. But that cousin, dear investor, just printed ₹265 crore in Q3 profit. On ₹1,073 crore in revenue. At 18.2% ROE. While Canara Bank sits at 29.99% and watches.
Here’s the business in one sentence: They lend money to Indians who want to buy, construct, or renovate homes. Preferably salaried ones, because salaried people have predictable income and don’t suddenly vanish to Goa.
The story gets spicier. Q3 was record disbursements (₹2,727 Cr, highest ever). But prepayments hit ₹1,691 crore—which is what happens when interest rate cuts make existing borrowers refinance faster than your mother-in-law shows up unannounced. The company’s trying to lock people into quarterly-reset loans instead of annual resets, because annual resets = higher prepayment risk. Also, asset quality improved for the fourth consecutive quarter. GNPA inched up marginally to 0.92%, but GNPA is becoming someone else’s problem now.
The MD got re-appointed for two more years. Canara Bank’s Chairman just retired. The company just declared a ₹7 interim dividend (350% payout ratio—yes, you read that right). And the concall transcript reads like a chess match between management and prepayment rates.
This is the story of a company that’s doing everything right, yet the market keeps it at 11.6x P/E because housing finance is apparently less exciting than watching someone’s mutual fund portfolio go sideways.
Management’s Own Words (Jan 2026): “For the fourth quarter in a row, we have had an improvement in our delinquency numbers.” Asset quality improving. Prepayments increasing. Margin pressure coming. But here’s the kicker—they’re not panicking. They’re solving it. Operationally. That’s the kind of signal you pay ₹2 lakh to an advisor to find.
03 — Business Model: Why Houses Matter (To Them)
They Borrow From Everywhere. Lend It To People Buying Homes. Collect Interest. Repeat.
Can Fin Homes borrows money—from banks (62%), NCDs (21%), the National Housing Bank (16%), commercial paper (7%), and deposits (1%). It’s like a financial Frankenstein that survives because the parts fit together.
Then it lends that money to salaried professionals, government employees, and self-employed (documented income only—no “surrogate income” fancy stuff here). Average housing loan ticket: ₹25 lakh. Average non-housing ticket: ₹14 lakh. LTV ratio: a conservative 47%. This is not a company trying to make Netflix returns on capital. It’s trying to make steady, predictable, boring returns on capital.
The loan book stood at ₹39,657 crore as of September 2025. Housing loans are 85% of the portfolio. Non-housing (personal loans, mortgage loans, etc.) is the remaining 15% and growing at 25–28% annually. Why? Better spreads, lower ticket size, faster origination, and salaried borrowers still mean low default rates.
Geography-wise, they’re heavily concentrated in the South (68% of advances). 234 branches across India. 21 affordability housing loan centers. The goal is clear: deep penetration in southern markets, expanding distribution, and quietly pivoting the product mix toward higher-yielding non-housing loans—all without blowing up the risk profile.
AUM Growth Target15%FY27 Guidance
Disbursement Target₹13,500 CrFY27 Guidance
NIM / Spread3.75%/2.75%FY27 Guided
Housing Mix85%Of Portfolio
The Ambala Fraud Elephant in the Room: Q2 FY24 saw ₹39.67 crore fraud at the Ambala branch—internal staff colluding for 22 months (Sept 2021 to Jul 2023). Fully provided. Post-tax impact: ₹29.69 crore. That was messy. Management has since tightened Aadhaar, PAN, and ITR verification and is rolling out app-based valuations. Translation: they got caught, they learned, they fixed it. Moving on.
💬 Would you take a 15% AUM growth at a salaried-income lender, or would you prefer they pivot to riskier self-employed borrowers for higher yields? Tell us in the comments.
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: The Numbers That Make Auditors Smile
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