01 — At a Glance
When a Wind Company Stops Spinning Losses
- 52-Week High / Low₹198 / ₹79
- FY26 Revenue (Guidance)> ₹5,000 Cr
- Q3 FY26 PAT₹127 Cr
- Annualised EPS (Q3×4)₹2.72
- Full-Year EPS (TTM)₹3.17
- Book Value₹38.6
- Price to Book2.22x
- Dividend Yield0.00 %
- Order Book3.2 GW
- O&M Portfolio13.3 GW
The Auditor’s Note: Inox Wind reported Q3 FY26 PAT of ₹127 Cr with revenue up 24% YoY and EBITDA margin expanding 39% YoY. The order book stands at 3.2 GW providing 18–24 months execution visibility. Management upgraded FY26 EBITDA margin guidance to 20–22% (from 18–19%) and guided FY27 revenue growth at ~75% with similar margins. The stock crashed 49% in one year despite consistent profitability and guidance raises. Welcome to how markets reward operational excellence in capital-intensive sectors.
02 — Introduction
The Windmill Paradigm: Chaos, Capex, and Eventually Cash
India’s wind energy sector is basically a dystopian novel crossed with an Excel spreadsheet. Thousands of MW installed capacity, millions of lakh rupees of capex, and a business model that rewards you only after you’ve lost money for seven years straight. Inox Wind is the indie film adaptation of this saga—scrappy, underfunded, perpetually misunderstood, and somehow still printing ₹127 crore in quarterly PAT.
The company manufactures wind turbine generators (nacelles, hubs, blades, towers), executes wind farm projects (EPC), and operates O&M contracts across 13.3 GW of assets. It’s one of the few Indian OEMs offering “plug and play” turnkey solutions. Translation: they build the wind farm, commission it, and hand you the keys. Your job is to not ask them to fix it every time the wind changes direction.
For the last five years, Inox Wind was the kid in class perpetually late on assignments but somehow submitting them eventually. Losses from FY22–FY24, broke-even in FY24, and now posting 127% profit growth YoY in FY26 Q3. They are raising capital (rights issue of ₹1,250 cr closed), acquiring 6.5 GW of operational wind assets through their subsidiary Inox Green Energy Services, and demerging a depreciation-heavy substation business. Every headline should read “Inox Wind Finally Gets Its Shit Together.” But the stock dropped 49% anyway.
Let’s understand what’s actually happening here, why the math is in the company’s favour, and why the market is treating it like a penny stock despite a Crisil A/Positive rating.
Concall Feb 2026 Summary: Management explicitly stated they’re shifting guidance from MW delivery (which they don’t control) to revenue and EBITDA margins (which they do). They described FY27 as a “step-change” year driven by acquisition consolidations and depreciation relief post-demerger. If this actually happens, the 1-year 49% loss may look like the bargain of the decade.
03 — Business Model: Turning Wind into Non-Refundable Capital Destruction
How To Make Money From the Air (Eventually)
Inox Wind operates across three lines of business, each with its own special kind of financial torture:
1. Manufacturing (IWL) — They make WTG components: nacelles, hubs, blades, and towers. Manufacturing capacity: 1,900 MW nacelles/hubs, 1,600 MW blades, 600 MW towers. Current order book: ~3.2 GW. Margins: 20–23% EBITDA (when not executing on “limited scope” contracts). Product range: 2 MW, 3 MW, and incoming 4.X MW platforms. Yes, they are planning a 4.X MW turbine in calendar year 2026. Management’s confidence level: “progressing well.” Our confidence level: let’s wait for the type certificate.
2. EPC (Engineering, Procurement, Construction) — They site the project, build the foundations, install towers, commission turbines, and hand over a working wind farm. Sounds simple. It’s not. Scope heterogeneity is killing them. Some contracts are “turnkey” (IWL does everything). Some are “limited scope” (customer supplies equipment, delays are customer’s problem, but payment delays are IWL’s problem). Some are “equipment supply only.” This mix has made MW guidance a nightmare, which is why they stopped providing it in Feb 2026 concall.
3. O&M (Operations & Maintenance) — Through subsidiary Inox Green Energy Services (IGES), they operate 13.3 GW of wind and solar assets. This is a high-margin, sticky-revenue business. Inox Green reported Q3 FY26 EBITDA of ₹53 cr with 80% YoY growth on a 12.5 GW portfolio. Post-acquisition consolidation (6.5 GW pending), management guided FY27 IGES EBITDA “upwards of ₹600 crores.” This is where the real money hides.
Manufacturing20–22%EBITDA Margin
EPC Delivery200+ DaysWorking Capital
O&M Portfolio13.3 GWOperational Assets
Working Capital Horror: The company disclosed 200–210 days of working capital days in Q3 FY26, with a long-term target of 120–150 days. Translation: for every ₹100 of project revenue, they’re waiting 200 days to get paid. Management says “it’s just ramp-up stress.” Maybe. But when was the wind business not ramping up?
💬 Here’s a question for you: Would you take a 49% stock crash for the chance to own a demerger story + acquisition consolidation + margin expansion + 75% guidance? Drop your thoughts.
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: The Numbers That Matter
Result type: Quarterly Results (Dec 2025) | Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹0.68 | Annualised EPS (Q3×4): ₹2.72 | TTM EPS: ₹3.17
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 1,238 | 911 | 1,119 | +35.9% | +10.6% |
| EBITDA | 313 | 225 | 228 | +39.1% | +37.3% |
| EBITDA Margin % | 25.3% | 24.7% | 20.4% | +60 bps | +490 bps |
| PAT | 127 | 111 | 121 | +14.4% | +5.0% |
| EPS (₹) | 0.68 | 0.84 | 0.53 | -19.0% | +28.3% |
The Nuance Nobody Mentions: EPS is down 19% YoY, but that’s because of share dilution. The rights issue of ₹1,250 cr (allotted 10.4 crore shares at ₹120 in Aug 2025) increased the share base from ~98 cr to ~174 cr shares. Revenue grew 36%, EBITDA grew 39%, but PAT growth (14%) is gated by dilution. Going forward, the company is net-cash (per management in concall), so the dilution pain is a one-time phenomenon. The real story: operational leverage is firing on all cylinders. Guidance of 20–22% EBITDA margin for FY26 (vs 18–19% previously) confirms margin expansion is real.
05 — Valuation: Fair Value Range
Is ₹85 a Price, or Is It a Cry for Help?
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