01 — At a Glance
The NBFC Multiplier: Growth Meets Gearing
- 52-Week High / Low₹232 / ₹151
- TTM Revenue₹4,303 Cr
- TTM PAT₹844 Cr
- Full-Year EPS (TTM)₹9.08
- Annualised EPS (Q3×4)₹10.60
- Book Value₹69.4
- Price to Book2.40x
- Dividend Yield0.12%
- Debt / Equity2.52x
- Gross NPA1.40%
The Quick Audit: Capri Global just dropped the highest quarterly profit in its history: ₹255 crore PAT in Q3 FY26, up 99% YoY. AUM crossed ₹30,406 crores, +47% annually. Revenue running at 46.4% CAGR TTM. All shiny. Then you squint at debt: ₹16,786 crores, and debt-to-equity of 2.52x. The company is running a high-velocity NBFC that pairs fast growth with even faster leverage. ROE at 11.8% is middling. ROCE at 11.2% isn’t setting the world on fire. This is a “growth at all costs” machine that’s only cool if the costs stay reasonable. Let’s dig.
02 — Introduction
Meet the NBFC That Wants to Be Everywhere (And Borrow Everywhere)
Capri Global is a diversified NBFC that started in construction finance back in FY11, then expanded into MSME lending, housing, car loans, and — because the 2020s are the era of pivoting — gold loans in Aug 2022. It also owns UP Warriorz, a women’s cricket franchise in the WPL. This is what happens when an NBFC gets rich and decides financial services alone aren’t exciting enough.
The company has been growing revenues at 46% CAGR over the past 5 years. Profit growth is even crazier: 24.3% CAGR over 5 years, but 120% TTM. Translation? Capri is expanding rapidly across multiple lending verticals while maintaining profitability — at least on paper. The interest coverage ratio is a squeaky 1.70x, which means the company is paying interest from a very thin operating margin if things go sideways.
Q3 FY26 was a blowout: ₹255 crore PAT, highest ever. But the concall was equally revealing about the operating reality. Gold loans are scaling at +80% YoY with conservative LTV discipline. Co-lending is capped intentionally at ~23% of AUM (capital-efficient, fee-led). MSME is ramping in UP. Housing is going national. The board approved a ₹2,000 crore NCD issuance in March 2026. CEO Monu Ratra, hired recently, resigned in January 2026 after <4 months. Classic NBFC chaos meets ambition.
Let’s break down what’s real growth, what’s financial engineering, and whether this leverage makes sense for a smallcap NBFC still learning to walk.
Concall Reality Check (Feb 2026): “Disbursements +87% YoY vs manpower +19% YoY, largely due to 265 new branches YoY.” Translation: Capri is building a branch machine to absorb cheap co-lending fees and gold loan spreads. If the spreads compress or credit quality deteriorates, this model faces headwinds.
03 — Business Model: Multi-Headed Hydra of Lending
A Bit of Everything, Master of None (So Far)
Capri’s business model is intentionally diversified across lending verticals. The company borrows from banks, mutual funds, and other FIs at ~9% cost of funds (post-MCLR cuts), then lends across multiple buckets, each with its own risk and return profile. Gold loans yield ~17.8% on a 24-month tenor. MSME yields are higher — 23–24% in the Micro LAP segment. Housing loans yield less, ~12–14% with long tenors. Co-lending is an origination-only play: Capri approves borrowers, sources from partners, and pockets ~116 crore in quarterly fees without balance sheet deployment.
Current portfolio mix: Gold loans ~42% (expected to rise to 45–46%), MSME/Housing/Construction Finance ~18–20% each, and co-lending/indirect ~3%. Revenue comes from interest on on-book loans (NII: ₹510 cr in Q3, +48% YoY) and fees from co-lending and car loan distribution (non-interest income: ₹240 cr in Q3, +124% YoY). The margin story is compelling: spread of 7.0% in Q3 (expected to reach 7.2%), with a 51.6% cost-to-income ratio in Q3 vs 58.2% in Q3 FY25. Operating leverage is kicking in.
The risk? The portfolio is young (gold loans average 5.1 months holding period before securitisation), and GNPA stands at 1.40% across the portfolio. If economic headwinds emerge or gold prices collapse (which would trigger forced auctions on ~60% LTV portfolio), the credit cycle could reverse fast. The company is betting that young, diversified lending across geographies and ticket sizes will stabilize as the portfolio seasons.
Gold Loans42%AUM Mix
Co-Lending23.5%AUM Mix
MSME19.4%AUM Mix
Housing21.4%AUM Mix
Concall Insight: Management explicitly capped co-lending at 22–23% of AUM “and we do not intend to grow it further.” This is smart portfolio management — they’re not letting fee-led origination dominate. But it also signals capital constraints. If co-lending was purely capital-efficient, why cap it?
💬 Question: If gold loan spreads compress because demand explodes and competition increases, will Capri’s entire growth thesis crumble? Or is the branch network and customer lock-in defensible?
04 — Financials Overview: The Quarterly Numbers
Q3 FY26: The Blowout (That Might Be Unsustainable)
Result type: Quarterly Results (Consolidated) | Q3 FY26 EPS: ₹2.65 | Annualised EPS (Q3×4): ₹10.60 | Full-year TTM EPS: ₹9.08
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue | 1,220 | 821 | 1,121 | +48.7% | +8.8% |
| Financing Profit | 363 | 195 | 338 | +86.2% | +7.4% |
| Fin. Margin % | 30% | 24% | 30% | +600 bps | Flat |
| PAT | 255 | 128 | 236 | +99.4% | +8.1% |
| EPS (₹) | 2.65 | 1.55 | 2.45 | +71.0% | +8.2% |
The Fine Print: Revenue growth of 48.7% YoY is genuine — interest income jumped from ₹333 cr to ₹431 cr, and non-interest income nearly doubled from ₹109 cr (implied Q3 FY25) to ₹240 cr in Q3 FY26. PAT growth of 99.4% looks obscene on the surface, but financing profit margin improved 600 bps YoY (24% to 30%), driven by a lower cost of funds. The company reduced CoF by 24 bps QoQ and expects another 20–25 bps reduction in 3–6 months. This is partially due to RBI MCLR cuts, partially due to borrowing mix optimization (more CP/NCDs, less pure bank debt). Spread of 7.0% in Q3 (target: 7.2%) is healthier than it looks if you factor in the lower CoF trajectory. But here’s the rub: if spreads widen from here only due to CoF reduction, not yield improvement, then the growth thesis depends on rate cuts continuing. MCLR is data-dependent, and inflation could surprise upward.
05 — Valuation: Fair Value Range
Is ₹169 Cheap, Fair, or Just Right For Risk?
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