01 — At a Glance
Green Energy—The Growth Story That Decided to Pay No Dividend
- 52-Week High / Low₹1,179 / ₹765
- 9M FY26 Revenue₹9,496 Cr
- 9M FY26 EBITDA₹8,552 Cr
- 9M FY26 PAT-₹42 Cr (Loss)
- Annualised EPS (9M×1.33)₹12.15
- Book Value₹119
- Price to Book7.24x
- Debt / Equity4.52x
- Interest Coverage1.29x
- Net Debt₹64,462 Cr
Auditor’s Opening Note: AGEL closed 9M FY26 with ₹9,496 crore in operating cash generation, but reported a loss of ₹42 crore in PAT due to interest and depreciation hitting ₹8,523 crore combined. The stock is trading at 85.8x P/E on full-year FY25 earnings (₹9.13 EPS), which, let’s be clear, is not investment-grade territory. Yet management targets 50 GW by 2030, and the Khavda mega-project is humming along. SEC legal drama in January 2026 added some spice. The narrative is growth at any cost. Or is it? We dug into the numbers.
02 — Introduction
The Unicorn That Prints Cash But Hides It in Depreciation Accounting
Let’s start with a fundamental truth that nobody in the renewable energy space wants to admit: Adani Green Energy is not a traditional business. It’s a fixed-asset machinery wrapped in equity financing. You don’t get profit. You get EBITDA, cash flow, and the eternal promise of future growth.
Since FY22, AGEL has grown revenue from ₹3,783 crore to ₹9,495 crore (151% growth). Operating cash flow hit ₹8,364 crore in FY25. The company has 17.2 GW operational as of December 2025 and is targeting 50 GW by 2030. But here’s the kicker: it reported a loss of ₹42 crore in 9M FY26. Not a mistake. Not a one-off. Just the nature of how RE companies depreciate assets faster than a politician loses credibility.
The January 2026 SEC developments—where DOJ/SEC indictments were served on Gautam Adani and Sagar Adani (not the company, they’ll insist)—added theatre. But the street shrugged. Because what matters is growth, Khavda, and the fact that institutional money keeps flowing in. The promoter holding sits at 62.4%. DIIs just touched 4.31% for the first time. This is a story about who controls India’s energy transition. It’s also a story about whether leverage of 4.5x and 92% EBITDA margins can sustain execution.
Concall Insight (Jan 2026): Management confirmed operational capacity at 17,238 MW as of Jan 23, 2026; confirmed Khavda ramp-up on track; acknowledged SEC legal matters but stated company is not a party. Translation: Pray the deal closes and momentum doesn’t break.
03 — Business Model: WTF Do They Even Do?
Convert Sunlight Into ₹9,500 Crore Revenue. Scale It. Finance It. Repeat 6.3x Faster Than Industry.
AGEL owns and operates renewable power generation assets—solar, wind, hybrid (solar + wind), and hydro-pumped storage (PSP). They build plants. They sell power through long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) or merchant routes. They collect payments. They reinvest like maniacs into new capacity. The moat is asset base, land control, execution speed, and Adani Portfolio synergies.
FY25 operating performance: 14.2 GW capacity → 27,969 million units (MU) generated → ₹9,495 crore revenue. Blended tariff realization: ₹3.43/kWh. The revenue base is highly predictable because 75% of generation is on 25-year fixed-tariff PPAs with sovereign counterparties (SECI, NTPC, State DISCOMs). The remaining 25% is merchant or C&I (commercial & industrial) power at market rates. PPA-backed revenue is the bread. Merchant is the butter.
Growth is aggressive: 9M FY26 added 2.9+ GW (annualized 3.8 GW vs industry ~0.5 GW CAGR). That’s 6.3x faster than industry average. The secret sauce: (a) Khavda —one massive site (538 sq km, 5x Paris) with 7.7 GW operational, targeting 30 GW by 2029; (b) Rajasthan sites with 10+ GW potential; (c) PSP pipeline across 5 states. Land is locked. Evacuation is planned. Capital is committed (USD 5.5 billion project finance facility locked for construction).
Revenue CAGR33%FY22–FY25
EBITDA CAGR41%FY22–FY25
Capacity Growth6.3xvs Industry CAGR
Operating CF₹8,364 CrFY25
Target Watch: 50 GW by 2030 would make AGEL 3x larger than today in 4 years. To get there: ₹5.5bn project finance locked, USD 1.125bn promoter warrants issued, USD 1.2bn non-fund-based credit lines in place. Capital is not the constraint. Execution is.
💬 Question: If AGEL is printing 92% EBITDA margins and ₹8,300 crore in operating cash annually, why is the stock treated like a startup with 85.8x P/E? Is the market pricing in 50 GW? Or is it pricing in a stumble?
04 — Financials Overview
Q3 FY26: EBITDA Monster Meets PAT Monster (The Negative Kind)
Result type: Quarterly Results (Q3) | Q3 FY26 EPS: -₹0.25 (Loss) | 9M FY26 EPS: -₹0.10 (Loss) | FY25 Full Year EPS: ₹9.13
| Metric (₹ Cr) |
Q3 FY26
Dec 2025 |
Q3 FY25
Dec 2024 |
Q2 FY26
Sep 2025 |
YoY % |
QoQ % |
| Revenue (Power) | 2,618 | 2,340 | 3,008 | +11.9% | -13.0% |
| Operating Profit | 2,241 | 1,880 | 2,603 | +19.2% | -13.9% |
| EBITDA Margin % | 85.6% | 80.3% | 86.5% | +530 bps | -90 bps |
| Finance Cost | 1,698 | 1,251 | 1,635 | +35.7% | +3.9% |
| Depreciation | 886 | 618 | 834 | +43.4% | +6.2% |
| PAT (Loss) | 5 | 474 | 644 | -98.9% | -99.2% |
The PAT Trap: Q3 FY26 reported PAT of ₹5 crore (vs ₹474 crore in Q3 FY25). Total financing costs jumped 36% YoY and depreciation 43% YoY. This is the classic RE company trap: EBITDA soars, but PAT gets murdered because (a) interest costs grow with debt, and (b) depreciation follows asset commissioning. 9M FY26 reported a PAT loss of ₹42 crore. Investors who focus on net profit will lose sleep. Those who focus on EBITDA and cash flow will sleep fine. Spoiler: The market is doing both at once.
05 — Valuation Discussion
Fair Value Range: The EBITDA Multiplier Approach (Since PAT is a Circus)
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