Haryana Financial Corporation Ltd Q3 FY26 – ₹8.56 Cr Profit in a Company That Stopped Lending 15 Years Ago, 205 P/E & Winding-Up Approved!

1. At a Glance – Zombie Company, Hero Valuation

Imagine a financial corporation that stopped giving loans in 2010, has zero borrowings, is officially moving toward winding-up and delisting, and still trades at a ₹1,661 crore market cap with a P/E of 205.

Welcome to Haryana Financial Corporation Ltd.

Current Price: ₹80
3-Month Return: -10.1%
1-Year Return: 189%
Book Value: ₹10.8
Price-to-Book: 7.41
ROCE: 0.03%
ROE: 0.00%
Debt: ₹0

Latest quarterly result (Dec 2025):
Revenue: ₹9.99 Cr
Net Profit: ₹8.56 Cr

Yes, you read that right. A company that has ceased loan sanctioning since May 2010 just reported a quarterly profit of ₹8.56 Cr. And the board has simultaneously recommended winding-up and BSE delisting.

So what exactly are we valuing here? A going concern? A liquidation lottery ticket? Or a government-controlled financial relic that accidentally printed profit?

Let’s investigate.

2. Introduction – The Financial Corporation That Forgot to Do Finance

Haryana Financial Corporation was incorporated in 1951. Back then, Nehru was PM, and state financial corporations were the cool kids helping MSMEs grow.

Fast forward to 2010.

The company ceased loan sanctioning. That means its core business — lending — stopped.

No new loans.
No expansion.
No new growth plan.
Just legacy assets, recoveries, rental income, and interest on old exposures.

By FY23, it had ₹52 lakh in dues to recover from creditors. It has no borrowings. It survives on limited internal resources.

And now, the board has:

• Approved Q3 FY26 results
• Recommended winding-up
• Confirmed BSE delisting underway

This is like a restaurant that stopped cooking in 2010, occasionally rents out its chairs, and somehow gets valued like a 5-star hotel.

So the real question is:

Are investors pricing in liquidation value? Or just momentum madness?

3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?

Originally? They sanctioned loans.

Currently?

Let’s look at FY23 revenue breakup:

• Rental income ~53%
• Interest income ~36%
• Bad debts recovery ~9%
• Interest on loans & advances ~2%

Translation:

They don’t lend anymore. They collect rent. They earn interest on whatever old exposures remain. And occasionally recover old bad loans.

It’s like an old banker who retired 15 years ago but still collects rent from a building and interest from fixed deposits.

And that’s the “business.”

There is no expansion plan.
No new vertical.
No credit growth.
No strategic pivot into fintech.

Just asset harvesting.

Let me ask you something:

Would you pay 7.4 times book value for a company that is literally preparing to wind itself up?

Interesting.

4. Financials Overview – Quarterly Results (Q3 FY26)

Q3 EPS = ₹0.41
Annualised EPS = ₹1.64

Now let’s compare.

Figures in ₹ Crores

*Financing Profit used as operating proxy.

Let’s be honest.

Revenue was literally ₹0.00 Cr in previous quarters, and suddenly ₹9.99 Cr appears.

This explains the 1550% profit variation.

But does this represent sustainable earnings?

Or one-time recoveries and accounting adjustments?

Because remember — earnings include ₹2.28 Cr of other income in TTM.

When your core business stopped in 2010, volatility becomes the norm.

5. Valuation Discussion – Fair Value Range

Current Price: ₹80
Annualised EPS: ₹1.64
Recalculated P/E = 80 / 1.64 = ~48.8

But stock P/E (TTM) shows 205.

So earnings are highly inconsistent.

Method 1: P/E Based

Industry median P/E (from peers): ~19.7

If we apply:

Conservative 10x on annualised EPS:
1.64 × 10 = ₹16

Industry 20x:
1.64 × 20 = ₹32

Method 2: EV/EBITDA

Enterprise Value = ₹1,635 Cr
Quarter EBITDA ≈ ₹8.75 Cr
Annualised EBITDA ≈ ₹35 Cr

EV/EBITDA = 1635 / 35 ≈ 46x

Peers trade far lower (Power Finance, REC, HUDCO all under 10x P/E).

If valued at 10x EBITDA:
10 × 35 = ₹350 Cr enterprise value

Implied equity value drastically lower than current.

Method 3: Liquidation Logic

Book Value = ₹10.8
Even at 1.5x book → ₹16

Fair Value Range (Educational Estimate):

₹16 – ₹32

This fair value range is for educational purposes only and is not investment advice.

Now ask yourself:

Why is the market valuing a winding-up entity at ₹80?

6. What’s Cooking – News, Triggers, Drama

Latest board updates:

• Q3 FY26 approved
• Net profit ₹8.56 Cr
• Winding-up recommended
• BSE delisting underway

Earlier:

• Q1 FY26 loss
• Q2 recommended winding-up
• State Government pushing delisting

Also — MD musical chairs:

• Sushit Sarwan appointed
• Then relieved
• Yash Garg reappointed
• Then replaced again
• Now Dr. Aditya Dahiya appointed Dec 2025

This is less “stable management” and more “IAS transfer season.”

If a company is preparing for liquidation and delisting, then:

Are we investing in future growth?
Or betting on exit mechanics?

7. Balance Sheet – Latest Consolidated (Sep 2025)

Figures in ₹ Crores

Observations:

• Debt = ZERO. Finally something peaceful.
• Assets slowly declining.
• Net worth stagnant.
• Liabilities reducing as liquidation progresses.

This balance sheet is not growing.
It’s slowly shrinking.

Like a melting ice cube.

8. Cash Flow – Sab Number Game Hai

Figures in ₹ Crores

Operating cash flow is consistently negative.

So profit is accounting-based, not cash-based.

When CFO is negative but market cap is ₹1,661 Cr — you should at least raise one eyebrow.

9. Ratios – Sexy or Stressy?

ROE of zero.
ROCE of zero.
But P/E of 205.

This is valuation comedy.

10. P&L Breakdown – Show Me the Money

Figures in ₹ Crores

Revenue collapsed.
Profit swings wildly.
TTM PAT: ₹8.10 Cr.

This is not growth.
This is volatility.

11. Peer Comparison – David Among Giants

Peers are lending, growing, expanding.
This company is winding up.

Yet it trades at the highest P/E in the table.

Who is crying here?

12. Shareholding – 99.36% Government Control

Promoter holding: 99.36%
State Government of Haryana: 97.28%
SIDBI: 2.08%
Public: 0.53%

This is basically a government file with a stock ticker.

Public float is tiny.

Which means price volatility can be wild.

13. Corporate Governance – Angels or Paper Pushers?

No pledges.
Government-controlled.
Auditors flagged winding-up recommendation.
Board repeatedly approving delisting.

This is less corporate governance drama and more bureaucratic closure.

14. Industry Roast – The State Financial Corporation Graveyard

State financial corporations were built decades ago to fund MSMEs.

Today?

Most are irrelevant.

NBFC giants like PFC, REC, HUDCO dominate.
Private NBFCs are aggressive.
Fintechs are eating small loans.

Old SFCs are legacy shells managing old assets.

Haryana Financial Corporation is not competing in lending anymore.

It’s exiting.

The industry moved on.

It didn’t.

15. EduInvesting Verdict – Liquidation Lottery or Value Trap?

Let’s summarise.

Strengths:

• Debt free
• Government backing
• Occasional profit spikes

Weaknesses:

• Core business stopped in 2010
• Winding-up recommended
• Delisting underway
• ROE near zero
• Wild earnings volatility

Opportunities:

• Possible liquidation payout logic
• Asset monetisation surprises

Threats:

• Delisting uncertainty
• Earnings collapse
• Valuation compression

This is not a growth story.
Not a turnaround story.
Not a compounding story.

This is a corporate sunset story.

If you are here, ask yourself:

Are you investing in operations?
Or speculating on exit mechanics?

Because fundamentals don’t justify ₹1,661 Cr valuation.

Sometimes markets price hope.

Sometimes they price hype.

And sometimes they price confusion.

This fair value range is for educational purposes only and is not investment advice.

Written by EduInvesting Team | Date