1. At a Glance
Ashika Credit Capital Ltd is that one NBFC in the room that looks wealthy, sounds sophisticated, but currently earns like it forgot to invoice someone. Market cap sits around ₹1,593 crore, the stock trades near ₹356, down ~57% over the last year, yet up 122% over three years—classic smallcap cardio. Book value is ₹138, so the stock is at ~2.6× P/B, which would be fine if ROE wasn’t -20%.
Latest quarter (Q3 FY26) shows revenue of ₹7.63 crore, PAT of -₹0.31 crore, and EPS of -₹0.02. But zoom out to nine months, and suddenly the company reports ₹65.6 crore PAT. Confused? Good. You’re paying attention.
Debt is almost zero (₹1 crore), investments have ballooned, promoters bumped stake to 58%, and corporate actions are flying faster than Diwali forwards. This is not a sleepy NBFC. This is an NBFC mid-restructuring, mid-merger, mid-identity-crisis.
So the big question: is Ashika quietly rebuilding an investment banking–style financial supermarket, or is this just accounting gymnastics with a nice suit on?
2. Introduction
Ashika Credit Capital is not new. Founded in 1994, it has survived Harshad Mehta jokes, dot-com crashes, global financial crises, IL&FS trauma, and every RBI circular known to mankind. Survival itself deserves a small golf clap.
The company positions itself as a non-deposit-taking NBFC, but calling it “just” an NBFC is underselling it. Ashika operates more like a financial services holding company—with equity broking, commodities, currency trading, IPO distribution, mutual funds, bonds, investment banking, AIFs, and corporate lending all thrown into the thali.
But here’s the catch: most of the glamour sits in subsidiaries and group entities, while the listed entity’s standalone numbers look… anemic.
FY25 ended with ₹4.24 crore revenue and ₹51.5 crore loss. That’s not a typo. That’s the kind of mismatch that makes analysts rub their eyes and recheck the unit column.
Yet, balance sheet reserves jumped, investments surged, promoters infused capital, mergers were approved by NCLT, and SEBI even gave in-principle approval to sponsor a mutual fund. This is not a company shutting shop. This is a company rearranging the furniture—possibly
breaking walls.
So, is the pain temporary or structural? Let’s peel the onion.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
Imagine Ashika as a financial services buffet.
- Want to trade equities? ✔️
- Commodities and currency? ✔️
- IPOs, bonds, mutual funds? ✔️
- Corporate lending and structured finance? ✔️
- Investment banking and AIFs? ✔️
At the core, Ashika Credit Capital earns primarily from interest income (about 86% in FY22) and the rest from fair value gains and other income. That tells you this is more of a balance-sheet-driven entity than a fee machine—at least historically.
But over the last two years, management seems to be pivoting:
- Spinning off or merging group entities
- Consolidating broking, wealth, and advisory under one umbrella
- Exploring GIFT City opportunities
- Setting up mutual fund AMC + trustee structure
In short, Ashika wants to be less “loan book with a visiting card” and more “mini financial conglomerate”.
The problem? Conglomerates only work when capital allocation is disciplined and profitability shows up somewhere. Right now, the ambition is loud, but the P&L is whispering.
Would you trust a financial supermarket that hasn’t figured out billing yet? Or are they just renovating the store?
4. Financials Overview
Quarterly Comparison Table (Consolidated, ₹ crore)
| Metric | Latest Qtr (Q3 FY26) | Same Qtr LY | Prev Qtr | YoY % | QoQ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 7.63 | NA | 20.54 | NA | -62.8% |
| EBITDA | 0.64 | NA | 16.77 | NA | -96.2% |
| PAT | -0.31 | NA | 12.49 | NA | -102.5% |
| EPS (₹) | -0.02 | NA | 3.31 | NA | -100.6% |
EPS Annualisation (Q3 FY26)
Average of Q1, Q2, Q3 EPS × 4
=
