1. At a Glance – The Burger That Refuses to Turn Profitable (Yet)
Restaurant Brands Asia Ltd (RBA) is what happens when global QSR ambition meets Indian price sensitivity, Indonesian chaos, and debt that refuses to stay on a diet. As of February 2026, the company sits at a market capitalisation of roughly ₹3,700 crore, a stock price hovering near ₹63, and a balance sheet that screams “growth story in progress, profitability still buffering.”
In Q3 FY26, RBA reported revenue of ₹5,773 million, up 16.5% YoY, EBITDA of ₹953 million (+20.9% YoY), and an operating margin touching ~13%, the best it has seen in a while. Sounds decent, right? Except… net profit is still negative, debt stands close to ₹1,800 crore, ROE is a depressing -28%, and interest coverage remains underwater.
The headline grabber, however, is not the burger—it’s the ₹70 open offer, ₹1,500 crore preferential issue, promoter exit, and a new acquirer walking in like a corporate Shaadi ka rishta. Is this finally the rescue arc? Or just another seasoning on a loss-making patty?
Let’s break it down—bun by bun.
2. Introduction – From Whopper Dreams to Balance Sheet Reality
Restaurant Brands Asia began life as Burger King India, armed with the swagger of a global QSR giant and a simple promise: affordable burgers for India’s value-conscious consumer. Since 2014, the company has gone on a store-opening sprint, building a network of ~681 restaurants across India and Indonesia, while adding Popeyes to the Indonesian portfolio.
Revenue growth? Solid.
Store count? Aggressive.
Brand recall? Strong.
Profitability? Still stuck in traffic.
The Indian business has scaled well, driven by rapid expansion, better average daily sales, and high delivery penetration. Indonesia, on the other hand, has been the party pooper—store closures, losses, and a constant need for rationalisation.
Over the years, Everstone-backed QSR Asia diluted stake aggressively, finally selling down to ~11%. By FY25, the company had high debt, negative net worth scars from the past, and a market that had clearly lost patience—reflected in -16% stock returns over three years.
And then came January 2026.
Enter: new acquirers, ₹70 per share deal, boardroom
reshuffle, and fresh equity ammo.
Coincidence? Nope. This is a full-blown corporate reset.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
At its core, RBA is a master franchise operator.
- In India: Exclusive national master franchisee for Burger King.
- In Indonesia: Master franchisee for Burger King and Popeyes.
Revenue comes from:
- Dine-in sales
- Delivery (aggregators + own app)
- Add-ons like BK Café (coffee, beverages, higher-margin products)
The strategy is simple on paper:
- Open stores fast.
- Drive volumes via value pricing.
- Push delivery.
- Improve store-level EBITDA.
- Pray depreciation and interest stop eating profits.
India has worked reasonably well. Indonesia… not so much.
RBA’s Indian Burger King stores are smaller, high throughput, mall-anchored or high-street formats. BK Café has been rolled out aggressively—from 35 cafes in FY22 to 352 by Q1 FY25, lifting ticket size and margins.
Indonesia saw a strategic pivot:
- 26 underperforming BK stores shut
- Popeyes expansion (15 new stores in FY24)
- Focus on reaching restaurant EBITDA breakeven (achieved in FY24, excluding closure costs)
So yes, the business model is proven globally—but execution and capital structure are the real villains here.
4. Financials Overview – The Numbers Don’t Lie (They Just Laugh Quietly)
Q3 FY26 vs Q3 FY25 vs Q2 FY26
| Metric | Latest Qtr (Q3 FY26) | YoY Qtr | Prev Qtr | YoY % | QoQ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 715 | 639 | 703 | 11.8% | 1.7% |
| EBITDA (₹ Cr) | 90 | 70 | 71 | 28.6% | 26.8% |
| PAT (₹ Cr) | -48 | -55 | -63 | 12.7% | 23.8% |
| EPS (₹) | -0.75 | -1.01 | -1.01 | 25.7% | 25.7% |
Annualised EPS (Q3 Rule)
Average of Q1, Q2, Q3 EPS ×
