1. At a Glance – Blink and You’ll Miss the Volatility
Regency Fincorp Ltd (RFL) is that small NBFC you probably ignored until it quietly delivered a 230% YoY jump in quarterly profit and suddenly started popping up on screeners like an over-enthusiastic intern. Current market cap sits at ~₹220 crore, stock price around ₹29.9, trading at a P/E of ~17.6, which is below the industry median of ~28.8. ROE is a modest ~6.17%, ROCE around 8.15%, and debt-to-equity at 0.76—not reckless, not conservative, just… polite.
Latest Q3 FY26 (Dec 2025) numbers show ₹8.63 crore in income and ₹3.40 crore PAT, with EPS at ₹0.46 for the quarter. Annualised, that EPS suddenly looks far more confident than the stock price chart over the last three months (-23%, ouch). Add to this a CRAR of ~50%, repeated promoter capital infusions, improving asset quality, and a strategic pivot away from risky JLG loans to secured SME lending—and you have a company that’s clearly trying to outgrow its micro-finance diapers.
But does execution match ambition? Or is this just another NBFC growth spurt before a fever? Let’s investigate. 🕵️♂️
2. Introduction – Small NBFC, Big Intentions
Regency Fincorp Ltd was incorporated back in 1993, which means it has survived liberalisation, multiple NBFC cycles, IL&FS, DHFL, Covid, and the great “everything NBFCs are shady” phase. Survival itself deserves one polite clap. 👏
RFL is a non-deposit taking, non-systemically important NBFC, registered with the RBI. Translation: it doesn’t take public deposits, it won’t crash the financial system if it sneezes, and RBI doesn’t hover over it like a helicopter parent—but still keeps an eye.
Historically, the company focused on micro-credit, primarily serving underserved women borrowers and MSMEs, largely via unsecured loans and JLG (Joint Liability Group) lending. Predictably, FY24 reminded everyone why unsecured micro-credit is not for the faint-hearted. Asset quality slipped, GNPA rose, and management got a gentle slap from reality.
Instead of pretending nothing happened (classic NBFC move), RFL did something rare: it changed strategy. By September 2024, management openly acknowledged stress in the JLG book and began capping JLG exposure at ~20% while pivoting towards secured SME lending, especially to existing borrowers.
So the current
Regency story is not “fast growth at any cost.” It’s more like: “Boss, thoda sambhal ke chalte hain.” But does the data support this newfound maturity? Let’s dig deeper.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
At its core, Regency Fincorp does one simple thing: lend money. But who they lend to, how they lend, and how safely they lend is where all the drama lives.
Old Regency (Pre-FY24):
- Heavy focus on micro-credit & JLG loans
- Entire loan book unsecured
- High yields, high risk, high stress when collections wobble
New Regency (FY24 onwards):
- Strategic shift towards secured SME lending
- Targeting existing borrowers (already known credit behaviour)
- JLG loans capped at ~20% of portfolio
- Focus on improving collection efficiency & PCR
As of 30 September 2024, nearly 70% of the loan book comprised SME borrowers, though still unsecured at that point. The intent is clear: migrate these borrowers to secured structures, reduce volatility, and improve long-term ROA.
Revenue is boring—in a good way. ~98% interest income, ~2% interest on FDRs. No random treasury punts, no crypto-adjacent nonsense, no “other income miracle.” Pure NBFC textbook stuff.
Geographically, RFL is highly concentrated:
- New Delhi ~44%
- Chandigarh ~32%
- Punjab ~20%
~96% of the portfolio lives here. Concentration risk? Yes. But also tighter operational control and better collections. Would you rather chase borrowers across 15 states or dominate 3 nearby ones?
So the business model is simple, focused, and now slightly more cautious. Question is: can this small NBFC scale
